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Sustainable Development is a widely used phrase. A superficial search for the phrase on the 
internet indicates that it is used by a diverse range of users who imbue it with various 
interpretations depending upon their purpose and intentions as well as depending upon the 
manner of application (or usage) of the phrase. As such there does not appear to be any 
single accepted definition of the phrase. 
 
Sustainable Development has been widely referred to in international conventions, 
international tribunal findings and by academics yet its precise legal status remains 
uncertain. Its status, particularly in a legal context, as a concept, legal principle or policy 
objective will be examined in light of its origins in international conventions and declarations. 
Its usage in international law will also be examined in this dissertation.  
 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa appeared to introduce and cement the 
phrase into South Africa’s legal lexicon through Section 24 and, in particular, 24(b)(iii). 
Section 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa is commonly referred to as the 
‘environmental right’. Reference in Section 24(b)(iii) to ‘ecologically sustainable development’ 
appears to have been assumed to refer to Sustainable Development and to incorporate 
Sustainable Development into South African law. The phrase has been used in South African 
law with increasing frequency as a building block of legislation and as a basis of judicial 
findings. Despite this reliance on the phrase the phrase itself remains poorly defined and 
open to subjective interpretations. 
 
This dissertation will look at the origin and meanings of the phrase Sustainable Development 
and compare these to a textual, contextual and purposive interpretation of Section 24(b) in 
an attempt to determine whether or not there is a relationship between the two and, if so, 
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List of Citations, Abbreviations and Acronyms 
 
A Blueprint for 
Survival 
 




The World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, 
under the chair of Gro Harlem Brundtland 
 
Brundtland Report United Nations Report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development: Our Common Future (1987) 
 
Caring for the Earth IUCN. ‘Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living’ 
(1991) 
 
Constitution The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
 
DFA Development Facilitation Act no. 67 of 1995 
 
Earth Charter The Earth Charter Initiative’s  ‘The Earth Charter’ (2000)  
 
ECA The Environment Conservation Act, 73 of 1989 
 
EIA Environmental Impact Assessment as a general concept 
 
ILA Delhi Declaration Proceedings of the 70th Conference of the International Law 
Association, held in New Delhi, April 2002 
 
Interim Constitution The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1993 (Act 200 of 
1993) 
 
IPCC The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
 
Limits to Growth The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s Project on 
the Predicament of Mankind published in 1972 
 
National 
Development Plan or 
NDP 
 
South Africa’s National Development Plan 2030 published in 2012 
 
 
NEMA National Environmental Management Act, 107 of 1998 
 
NFSD National Framework for Sustainable Development 
 
NSD Sustainable Development as defined in NEMA 
 
NSSD National Strategy for Sustainable Development and Action Plan 
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Rio Conference The United Nations Conference on the Environment and 
Development (also known as the Earth Summit) held Rio de Janeiro 
in 1992 
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Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 




Environmental Sustainability Indicators: Technical Report 2011. SA 
Dept. of Env. Affairs 
 




The IUCN, ‘World Conservation Strategy’ (1980) 
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Part One: Introduction 
 
Section 24 of the South African Constitution1 sets out what is known as the ‘Environmental 
Right’. It is composed of two parts, Section 24(a) and Section 24(b). Prior to promulgation of 
the Constitution South Africa was governed in terms of an Interim Constitution.2 The Interim 
Constitution also contained an environmental right which was, essentially, replicated as 
Section 24(a). Section 24(b) had no antecedent in the Interim Constitution. To this date 
Section 24(b) has not been definitively interpreted.3 The Interim Constitution and the 
Constitution were drafted during the early 1990’s with the Constitution becoming law in 1996. 
 
Coinciding with the drafting of the Constitutions the international community was giving 
substance to the concept of Sustainable Development most notably through the Rio 
Conference.4 Section 24(b) appears to refer to or even to incorporate Sustainable 
Development through its use of ‘ecologically sustainable development’5 as well as reference 
to environmental protection, economic development and social development6 which are the 
fundamentals of Sustainable Development. Despite the lack of definitive interpretation 
Section 24(b) (and Section 24(b)(iii) in particular) have been equated with Sustainable 
Development. De Waal et al. regard Section 24(b) as having remedied the ‘potentially 
dangerous omission’7 of the concept of Sustainable Development8 from section 29 of the 
Interim Constitution. Murombo states that ’the Constitution expressly incorporates 
[sustainable development] in s 24(b)(iii).’9 Similarly:  
‘South Africa’s definition of sustainable development is influenced by the 
globally accepted definition provided by the Brundtland Commission and 
which is entrenched in the Constitution. Section 24 (b)(ii) of the Constitution 
                                                          
1
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (previously also Act 108 of 1996). 
2
 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993. 
3
 Kidd, M ‘Environment’ in Currie, I and De Waal, J (eds) The Bill of Rights Handbook (6
th
 ed) (2013), Juta & Co., 
Cape Town at 525 see fn 11 below. 
4
 The United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (also known as the Earth Summit) held 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992. 
5
 See Section 24(b)(iii). 
6
 See Section 24(b) generally. 
7
 De Waal, J., Currie, I. and Erasmus, G. The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4
th
 ed (2001), Juta & Co, Landsdowne at 
406. 
8
 ‘Sustainable development means that development takes place in a way that allows renewable resources to 
re-accrue. The environment should thus be exploited in such a way that it will be able to sustain human, plant 
and animal life over the longest possible period.’ De Waal et al. fn 7, at 406. 
9
 Murombo, T. ‘From Crude Environmentalism to Sustainable Development: Fuel Retailers’ (2008) 125(3) SALJ 
pages 488 – 504 at 494. 
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guarantees everyone the right to having “the environment protected, for the 
benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and 
other measures that secure ecologically sustainable development and use of 
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development.” South Africa has formalised its definition of sustainable 
development by including it in law.’10 
 
This dissertation will examine these assumptions through attempting a legally defensible and 
practical interpretation of Section 24(b). It will compare Section 24(b) to Sustainable 
Development whilst also assessing the legal merit and status of Sustainable Development. 
No detailed assessment or interpretation of Section 24(a) is undertaken and the dissertation 
focusses, almost exclusively, on Section 24(b). 
 
The second half of this introduction will focus on determining the textual or grammatical 
interpretation of Section 24(b) as well as justifying why this is done. Part Two will set out the 
origins and evolution of Sustainable Development up until the WSSD (World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002) as this process predated and 
overlapped the drafting of the Constitution. Part Two will also investigate the legal status of 
Sustainable Development in international and South African law. Part Three will then use the 
assessment of Sustainable Development to provide a more detailed interpretation of Section 
24(b) before Part Four examines the context, both environmental and historical, of Section 
24(b). The context provides insight as to both the intention of the drafters of Section 24(b) as 
well as identifying some of the possible issues Section 24(b) was intended to or will need to 
address. Section 24(b) is then given a broadly purposive interpretation in Part Five based on 
the understanding developed in the previous parts.  
 
At the heart of the discussion lie two issues. The first is the question of whether or not 
Section 24(b)(iii) is a somewhat clumsy11 recordal of the concept of Sustainable 
                                                          
10
 This is taken from [2.1] at page 14 of Department of Environment & Tourism, Republic of South Africa, A 
National Framework for Sustainable Development in South Africa (2008) and the erroneous reference to 
s24(b)(ii) is as published.  
11
By pure coincidence ‘clumsy’ was also used by Kidd who, in suggesting that using ‘ecologically sustainable 
development’ to require the integration of environmental, social and economic development would make the 
subsequent ‘whilst promoting justifiable economic and social development’ redundant notes: ‘If, however, 
ecologically sustainable development means something different from economic and social development, 
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Development or whether its peculiar wording allows for a ‘more carefully phrased and 
counterpoised’12 meaning. The second is, in answering the first question, how can Section 24 
be interpreted in a practical manner to achieve its apparent purpose? 
 
1.1 Constitutional Interpretation 
 
In this dissertation legislation will not be used to interpret a Constitutional provision. This is 
because law which is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid13 and therefore legislation 
has to be interpreted with reference to the Constitution and not the other way around. 
Decisions of the Constitutional Court will be regarded as definitive statements, either 
peremptory or persuasive, of Constitutional interpretation whilst those of the Supreme Court 
of Appeals and High Courts are indicative and will be used in conjunction with general rules 
of interpretation. 
 
"A Constitution is an organic instrument. Although it is enacted in the form 
of a statute it is sui generis. It must broadly, liberally and purposively be 
interpreted so as to avoid "the austerity of tabulated legalism" and so as to 
enable it to continue to play a creative and dynamic role in the expression 
and the achievement of the ideals and aspirations of the nation, in the 
articulation of the values bonding its people and in disciplining its 
Government."14 
In interpreting a Constitutional provision one should utilise ‘the text of [a] section, read in its 
context and with regard to the objects of the Constitution’.15 Context ‘requires the 
consideration of two types of context. On the one hand, rights must be understood in their 
textual setting. This will require a consideration of chap[ter] 2 [the bill of rights] and the 
Constitution as a whole. On the other hand, rights must also be understood in their social 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
there would be no redundancy , which would usually be the preferable way of interpreting a phrase. This issue 
has not been considered by any commentators to the best of my knowledge, and it is most likely that the 
phrase is simply the result of clumsy drafting.’ Kidd, M ‘Environment’ in Currie, I and De Waal, J The Bill of 
Rights Handbook (6
th
 ed) (2013), Juta & Co., Cape Town at 525. 
12
 See part 4.3 and fn 307 below. 
13
 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
14
  Government of the Republic of Namibia and Another v Cultura 2000 and Another 1994 (1) SA 407 (NASC) at 
418 quoted with approval by Mahomed J in S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at [8] 
15
 S v Mhlungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) at [46]. 
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and historical context.’16 But ‘whilst paying due regard to the language that has been used, 
[interpretation] is "generous" and "purposive" and gives expression to the underlying values 
of the Constitution.’17 ‘[E]mbodying fundamental rights should as far as its language permits 
be given a broad construction’.18 Although interpretation is ultimately based on perceived 
values the language used cannot be disregarded. Undue preference given to its values in 
favour of its language will lead, not to interpretation, but to ‘divination’.19 
 
The interpretation which follows therefore follows these requirements in firstly using a textual 
(or language) based interpretation followed by a contextual and then a broadly purposive and 
generous interpretation.  
 
1.2 Some Constitutional Concepts 
 
The ‘Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct inconsistent with it is 
invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled.’20 The Bill of Rights is contained in 
chapter two of the Constitution and sets out 27 substantive rights. It also contains sections 
important for interpretation and application purposes. These will be referred to in the course 
of this discussion. 
 
The Constitutional Court is the highest21 court in South Africa and is the final22 decision 
maker regarding constitutional matters. ‘A constitutional matter includes any issue involving 
the interpretation, protection or enforcement of the Constitution.’23 As the highest court its 
                                                          
16
 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at [22] 
17
 S v Makwanyane and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at [9]. 
18
 S v Moagi 1982(2) Botswana LR 124,184 at 184 and quoted with approval in S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 
642 (CC) at [18]. 
19
 ‘We must heed Lord Wilberforce's reminder that even a constitution is a legal instrument, the language of 
which must be respected. If the language used by the lawgiver is ignored in favour of a general resort to 
''values'' the result is not interpretation but divination.’ S v Zuma and Others 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at [18] and 
quoted with approval in S v Jafta; S v Ndondo; S v Mcontana 2005 (1) SA 108 (E) at [18]. 
20
 Section 2 of the Constitution. 
21
 Section 167(3)(a) of the Constitution. In this dissertation Constitutional Court judgements are indicated by 
(CC), Supreme Court of Appeal judgements by (SCA) and other High Courts by a variety of letters.  
22
 Section 167(3)(b)(i), read with s 167(3)(c) and s 167(5) of the Constitution. 
23
 Section 167(7) of the Constitution. 
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decisions (the rationes decidendi) are binding on all other courts in South Africa. This 
supremacy extends to the ‘common law’ where there is a constitutional element.24 
 
1.3 The Origin of Section 24 
 
The Interim Constitution was promulgated as an Act of the South African parliament in 1993. 
In 1996 it was replaced by the Constitution. The Interim Constitution contained a Bill of 
Rights which provided, in section 29, an ‘environmental right’. This read:  
‘Every person shall have the right to an environment which is not 
detrimental to his or her health or well-being.’ 
In the course of negotiating the Constitution it was proposed to replace section 29 with the 
following (then proposed as section 23): 
’23. Everyone has the right- 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; 
(b) to have their environment protected through reasonable legislative and 
other measures designed to- 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure sustainable development and use of natural 
resources.’25 
This proposed section 23 was then redrafted to become the more detailed Section 24. 
Section 24 has been described as ‘[o]ne of the more elaborate [environmental rights] 
provisions’26 and reads as follows:  
‘Everyone has the right- 
(a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being; and 
(b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and future 
generations, through reasonable legislative and other measures that- 
(i) prevent pollution and ecological degradation; 
(ii) promote conservation; and 
(iii) secure ecologically sustainable development and use of natural 
resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development.’ 
 
                                                          
24
 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of SA and Another: In re Ex parte President of the Republic of 
South Africa and Others 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC) at [44]. 
25
 As quoted by Glavovic, P. D., ‘Environmental Rights as Fundamental Rights’ (1996) 3 SAJELP 71 - 79 at 79. 
26
 May, J. R. and Daly, E., ‘Vindicating Fundamental Environmental Rights Worldwide’ (2009) 11 Oregon Review 
of International Law. 365 - 439 at 376.  
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It has been recognised that, apart from some minor differences in wording, ‘s24(a) of the final 
Constitution is identical to s29 on the interim Constitution’.27 Section 24(b) however was a 
completely new provision and furthermore it departs from the proposed section 23 in some 
respects. The essence of this dissertation is therefore to determine an appropriate 
interpretation of Section 24(b) given that it was a deliberate insertion not found in the Interim 
Constitution and that there appears to have been considerable debate around its final 
formulation. Because Section 24(b) was a new insertion it will not be assumed to necessarily 
be an expansion of Section 24(a). The interpretation of Section 24(b) will be based, firstly on 
a textual interpretation, followed by a contextual and then, finally, a generous purposive 
interpretation. 
 
1.4 Textual Interpretation of Section 24(b) 
 
Sub-sections 24(b)(i) and (ii) seem to be reasonably clear in their grammatical construct. The 
word ‘and’ in Section 24(b)(i) should probably, correctly, be interpreted as ‘and / or’ but this is 
a trite rule of legal interpretation. Further grammatical assessment of Sections 24(b)(i) and 
(ii) will therefore not be undertaken at this stage. However Section 24(b)(iii) is less clear. 
Section 24(b)(iii) could be read in a number of ways. The first part could be read in one of the 
following ways: 
1. ‘…that secure ecologically sustainable, development and use, of natural 
resources…’; or 
2. ‘…that secure ecologically sustainable development and ecologically sustainable use 
of natural resources…’; 
While the last part could be read either as: 
3. ‘…while promoting justifiable economic development and justifiable social 
development.’ Or 
4. ‘…while promoting justifiable, economic and social, development.’ 
Based on these possibilities there could, potentially, be four linguistic constructs. Not only 
must the individual constructs be legally justified but the two parts must, together, result in a 
legally coherent and justified overall construction. 
 
                                                          
27 Liebenberg, S., ‘Section 29/24: Environment’ in Davis, Cheadle and Haysom (eds.) Fundamental Rights in the 
Constitution: Commentary and Cases Cape Town,  Juta and Co., (1997), 256-263 at page 260. 
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The first possible construct requires the words ‘development and use’ to be grouped 
together. Dictionary definitions indicate that the two concepts conveyed by the words are 
diametrically opposed. ‘Development’ envisages a process of growth, progress, 
advancement or expansion; ‘use’ means the ‘putting into service’ or ‘consumption’ of 
something. Envisaging the simultaneous development and use of a resource is therefore 
nonsensical. It would be more logical for the two to be used in the alternative and not to link 
them. Therefore the first possible construct must be rejected. 
 
The second construct requires the insertion of the phrase ‘ecologically sustainable’ before 
the word ‘use’. This is problematic in that, had that been the intention of the lawmakers, then 
one would presume that they would have made the insertion themselves. It is not 
impermissible though. The second part of Section 24(b)(iii), commencing ‘while…’, seems to 
act as a proviso in that it qualifies or limits the extent of the substance of the first part. The 
correct interpretation of the first part should therefore allow the provisio to flow ‘naturally and 
logically to qualify the substantive provision’.28 It is noteworthy that Ngcobo J, in discussing 
this section in the Fuel Retailers29 case says: ‘This is apparent from s 24(b)(iii) which 
provides that the environment will be protected by securing “ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and social 
development”. Sustainable development and sustainable use and exploitation of natural 
resources are at the core of the protection of the environment.’30 Whilst this comment cannot 
be regarded as being definitive it does seem to support the contention that both development 
and use must be sustainable and that this is the correct interpretation31 of the section. 
  
Determining which of the third or fourth constructs is to be preferred essentially relies on 
whether or not ‘economic’ development is distinct from ‘social’ development. The dictionary32 
defines ‘economic’ to be ‘adj 1 of or relating to an economy, economics or finance’. 
‘Economy’ is similarly defined as ‘n 1 careful management of resources to avoid unnecessary 
expenditure or waste; thrift. 2 a means or instance of this; saving. 3 sparing, restrained, or 
efficient use … 4a the complex of human activities concerned with the production, 
                                                          
28
 S v Mhlungu at [32]. 
29
 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department of 
Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province, and Others 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) 
30
 At [45] emphasis added. 
31
 It has been and will be further argued that the qualification is not ‘sustainable’ but, rather, ‘ecologically 
sustainable’.  
32
 Collins English Dictionary Millennium Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, Glasgow, 1998. 
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distribution, and consumption of goods and services.’ While ‘social’ is defined as ‘adj 1 living 
or preferring to live in a community rather than alone. 2 denoting or relating to human society 
or any of its subdivisions. 3 of, relating to, or characteristic of the experience, behaviour, and 
interaction of persons forming groups.’  The meanings given to ‘economic’ and to ‘social’ 
strongly suggest that they should not be joined together in a single phrase as contemplated 
in the fourth construct. Rather, they are distinct concepts and should therefore be treated 
separately. Both are also commonly associated with the word ‘development’ and, for these 
reasons, the third construct is preferred. If the concepts are to be separated then it would 
follow that both have to be ‘justifiable’. This preference is not absolute though and, as will be 
seen later on, general parlance uses ‘socio-economic’ as a widely accepted conjunction.33 It 
is interesting to note that the fourth construct implies that the word ‘development’ was 
deliberately omitted after the word ‘economic’ and if this is accepted as the style used by the 
drafters in the provision then the acceptance of the second construct is supported.  
 
Thus Section 24(b)(iii) may be properly read, with the insertions in bold, as follows: 
Everyone has the right to have the environment protected, for the benefit 
of present and future generations, through reasonable legislative and 
other measures that secure ecologically sustainable development and 
[ecologically sustainable] use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic [development] and [justifiable] social development. 
 
At first glance there appear to be a number of elements usually associated with the concept 
of Sustainable Development included in Section 24(b). Most notable is the phrase 
‘ecologically sustainable development’ although ‘benefit of present and future generations’ 
and ‘justifiable economic [development] and [justifiable] social development’ similarly 
resonate. 
 
                                                          
33 Tladi argues against this conflation in the context of Sustainable Development, in which it is stressed that 
there are ‘subtle but important distinctions between economic concerns and social concerns,’ and that 
Sustainable Development ‘was born out of a realisation that the existing paradigm (in which economic 
concerns trumped all other concerns (social and environment) — could not continue. By blurring the 
distinction between social and economic concerns, our jurisprudence flirts with the undesirable outcome of 
preserving the status quo’. Tladi, D. ‘Fuel Retailers, Sustainable Development & Integration: a Response to 
Feris’  (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 254 – 258 at 258. 
P a g e  | 16 
 
Because of this apparent commonality and the assumptions referred to34 this interpretation 
will be contrasted and compared to Sustainable Development as generally used in 
international policy in order to determine the nature of the relationship between the two. This 
will be discussed in detail further on but, in essence, Sustainable Development is popularly 
held to encompass three elements, namely environmental protection, economic development 
and social development. The phrase has been popularly defined35 as a derivative of the word 
sustainable to mean ‘(of economic development, energy sources, etc.) capable of being 
maintained at a steady level without exhausting natural resources or causing severe 
ecological damage’. 
 
It is also important to note that the textual interpretation favoured above, i.e. ‘ecologically 
sustainable development and [ecologically sustainable] use of natural resources’ suggests 
that both development and the use of natural resources must be ecologically sustainable. 
This suggests that, rather than development and use of resources being sustainable, in 
pursuing these outcomes it is ecological processes that must be sustained. This is possibly a 
key distinction between Section 24(b)(iii) and Sustainable Development.36 This interpretive 
element is critical to the following discussion. 
Part Two: Sustainable Development 
2.1 Sustainability 
 
Sustainability is a concept which evolved in parallel to that of Sustainable Development and 
the two are closely related. Both concepts arose out of a growing realisation that the human 
population was consuming natural resources at a rate which jeopardised, not only the 
survival of the living resources, but of humankind itself. 
 
                                                          
34
 See fn 7 -12 of the Introduction. 
35
 Collins English Dictionary Millennium Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, Glasgow, 1998. 
36 Feris makes the same observation: ‘Section 24(b)(iii) of the Constitution refers to the need to ‘secure 
ecologically sustainable development’.  It can be argued that ‘ecologically’ qualifies the type of sustainable 
development that is envisioned by the Constitution. It therefore clearly places an emphasis on environmental 
considerations and as such it places the environmental value centre-stage.’ Feris, L., ‘Sustainable Development 
In Practice: Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General Environmental Management, 
Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province’  (2008) 1 Constitutional 
Court Review – 253 at 252 the emphasis is the author’s. 
P a g e  | 17 
 
The authors of the seminal Limits to Growth37 developed a model ‘built specifically to 
investigate five major trends of global concern – accelerating industrialization, rapid  
population growth, widespread malnutrition, depletion of nonrenewable resources, and a 
deteriorating environment’ and concluded that two pathways existed for human society as a 
whole: 
‘1. If the present growth trends in world population, industrialization, pollution, 
food production, and resource depletion continue unchanged, the limits to 
growth on this planet will be reached sometime within the next one hundred 
years. The most probable result will be a rather sudden and uncontrollable 




2. It is possible to alter these growth trends and to establish a condition of 
ecological and economic stability that is sustainable far into the future. The 
state of global equilibrium could be designed so that the basic material needs 
of each person on earth are satisfied and each person has an equal 
opportunity to realize his individual human potential.’38 
 
Similarly in A Blueprint for Survival39 which was prepared in anticipation of and for 
presentation at the 1972 Stockholm Conference it was stated: 
‘The principal defect of the industrial way of life with its ethos of expansion is 
that it is not sustainable. Its termination within the lifetime of someone born 
today is inevitable - unless it continues to be sustained for a while longer by an 
entrenched minority at the cost of imposing great suffering on the rest of 
mankind. We can be certain, however, that sooner or later it will end (only the 
precise time and circumstances are in doubt), and that it will do so in one of 
two ways: either against our will, in a succession of famines, epidemics, social 
crises and wars; or because we want it to - because we wish to create a 
society which will not impose hardship and cruelty upon our children - in a 
succession of thoughtful, humane and measured changes. We believe that a 
growing number of people are aware of this choice, and are more interested in 
our proposals for creating a sustainable society than in yet another recitation 
of the reasons why this should be done.’40 
 
Both of these works call for a more stable society, one where the expansion of 
industrialisation is curtailed and human population growth is limited. 
                                                          
37
 Meadows, D. H., Meadows, D. L., Randers, J. and Behrens III, W. W., The Limits to Growth: A Report for the 
Club of Rome’s Project on the Predicament of Mankind (1972) Universal Books, New York.  
38
 Limits to Growth, at  23 -24. 
39
 Goldsmith, E., Allen, R., Allaby, M., Davoll and Lawrence, S., A Blueprint for Survival (1972) 2:1 The Ecologist.  
40
 A Blueprint for Survival at [110]. 
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 ‘It should go without saying that the world cannot accommodate this 
continued increase in ecological demand [i.e. a measurement of: ‘The 
combination of human numbers and per capita consumption [which] has a 
considerable impact on the environment, in terms of both the resources we 
take from it and the pollutants we impose on it.’41]. Indefinite growth of 
whatever type cannot be sustained by finite resources. This is the nub of the 
environmental predicament. It is still less possible to maintain indefinite 
exponential growth - and unfortunately the growth of ecological demand is 
proceeding exponentially (i.e. it is increasing geometrically, by compound 
interest).’42 
 
These works can therefore be regarded as promoting environmental conservation at the cost 
of human population growth and /or its resource consumption (which were the key measures 
of development); i.e. they promote ‘stability’ rather than ‘development’. Rather than 
advocating Sustainable Development (which as will be seen promotes development with 
environmental consideration) a policy of curtailing development in favour of environmental 
conservation was called for. It was seemingly for this reason that Sustainability failed to gain 
traction; developing nations were opposed to environmental protection which was regarded 
as being incompatible with economic development. This sentiment has been noted in 
discussing Sustainable Development: 
‘In fact, they [leaders of developing countries] questioned the rationale for 
developed countries and indeed, the emergence of an international regime on 
environmental protection, demanding that their development projects should 
be environment friendly. Leaders of developing countries suspected that this 
was another ploy by the developed countries to keep them perpetually under-
developed. They found no moral justification for the developed countries that 
could not adhere to the principles of protecting and preserving the 
environment during their early stage of development and are at the moment 
the worst polluters of the environment suddenly becoming champions of 
environmental protection.’43  
And it is this sentiment which led to the wider acceptance of Sustainable Development with 
its anthropocentric focus on development rather than Sustainability with its ecocentric focus 
on the environment. 
 
                                                          
41
 A Blueprint for Survival at [113]. 
42
 A Blueprint for Survival at [114]. 
43 Okon E. E., ‘The Environmental Perspective in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution’ (2003) 5 Environmental Law 
Review  256 at 260. 
P a g e  | 19 
 
Sustainability formed a basis for Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living44 in 
1991 coinciding with the Rio Conference. One of the nine principles proposed in Caring for 
the Earth was that ‘conservation-based development needs to include deliberate action to 
protect the structure, functions and diversity of the world’s natural systems, on which our 
species utterly depends.’45 It also tried to introduce a new definition of Sustainable 
Development in contrast to the, by then, accepted UNCED Brundtland Commission 
definition.46 In the Caring for the Earth definition: Sustainable Development means 
‘improving the quality of human life while living within the carrying capacity of supporting 
ecosytems.’47 
 
Notably Caring for the Earth defined the concept of sustainable use to apply only to the use 
of renewable resources and to mean ‘using them at rates within their capacity for renewal.’48 
Non-renewable resources therefore cannot be used sustainably but may be used more 
efficiently and therefore for longer through a variety of mechanisms.49 The concept of 
sustainable use was carried forward into the, predominantly ecocentric, Convention on 
Biological Diversity50 which is premised51 on the ‘intrinsic value of biological diversity’ and 
‘the importance of biological diversity for evolution and for maintaining life sustaining 
systems of the biosphere’ and pursues52 ‘…the conservation of biological diversity, the 
sustainable use of its components…’ 53   
  
Prior to the WSSD the Earth Charter54 was produced. In turn this had built on the preceding 
Caring for the Earth as an alternative to Sustainable Development. Like its antecedents it too 
is ecocentric ‘recognis[ing] that all beings are interdependent and every form of life has value 
regardless of its worth to human beings.’55 And regards ecological systems as being critically 
                                                          
44
 IUCN/UNEP/WWF, ‘Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for Sustainable Living’ (1991) Gland, Switzerland.  
45
 Caring for the Earth at 9. 
46
 ‘Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ Brundtland Report at [1] 
47
 Caring for the Earth, Box 1 page 10. 
48
 Caring for the Earth, Box 1 page 10. 
49
 Caring for the Earth at 10. 
50
 United Nations, Convention on Biological Diversity (1992) . 
51
 As set out in the preamble to the Convention on Biological Diversity.  
52
 Article 1 of the Convention on Biological Diversity.  
53
 Article 1 of the Convention on Biological Diversity.  
54
 The Earth Charter Initiative, The Earth Charter (2000).  
55
 The Earth Charter at I.1.a. 
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important requiring steps to: ‘Protect and restore the integrity of Earth's ecological systems, 
with special concern for biological diversity and the natural processes that sustain life.’ 
 
The Sustainability movement can therefore be regarded as having similar origins to those of 
Sustainable Development both in timing and concepts and to have continued alongside the 
evolution of Sustainable Development as its ecocentric ‘poor cousin’. Despite its 
commonality with Sustainable Development, and presumably because of its contra-
development basis, it appears to have never achieved the universal acclaim of Sustainable 
Development.  
 
2.2 Sustainable Development 
  
2.2.1 Sustainable Development in the Broad, World Context 
 
Sustainable Development can trace its roots back to the 1972 Declaration of the United 
Nations Conference on the Human Environment (referred to as the Stockholm Declaration) 
which produced 26 ‘common’ principles necessary to ‘preserve and enhance’ the human 
environment. A common recurring theme of the principles is the need to consider both 
present and future scenarios. The eighth principle is a clear forerunner of what is now known 
as Sustainable Development and states: ‘Economic and social development is essential for 
ensuring a favorable living and working environment for man and for creating conditions on 
earth that are necessary for the improvement of the quality of life.’ Although concerned 
primarily with the human environment56 (both natural and built) the Stockholm Declaration is 
important for highlighting the need for a long term approach and for introducing economic 
and social development alongside the environment as being the factors defining human well-
being. This anthropocentric viewpoint is summarised in the first principle: ‘Man has the 
fundamental right to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a 
quality that permits a life of dignity and well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to 
protect and improve the environment for present and future generations…’.  
 
                                                          
56
 See point 2 of the preamble to the declaration: “The protection and improvement of the human 
environment is a major issue which affects the well-being of peoples and economic development throughout 
the world; it is the urgent desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of all Governments.” 
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In 1980 the IUCN produced the World Conservation Strategy which had the ‘..aim…to 
achieve the three main objectives of living resource conservation’.57 These objectives were 
firstly to maintain essential ecological processes and life support systems, secondly to 
preserve genetic diversity and, thirdly to ensure the sustainable utilisation of species and 
ecosystems.58 Conservation of the natural world was again unashamedly justified from an 
anthropocentric viewpoint with reasons being based on human support, development and 
resource economics – ‘Conservation, like development, is for people; while development 
aims to achieve human goals largely through use of the biosphere59 conservation aims to 
achieve them by ensuring such use can continue’.60 Most notable though was the 
introduction,61 as a global concept, of a precursor of Sustainable Development: 
‘Development is defined here as: the modification of the biosphere and the 
application of human, financial, living and non-living resources to satisfy 
human needs and improve the quality of human life. For development to be 
sustainable it must take account of social and ecological factors, as well as 
economic ones; of the living and non-living resource base; and of the long 
term as well as the short term advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
actions.’62 
In other words economic development must take into account social and ecological factors. It 
is not bound by these factors and exactly what ‘take account of’ means is not certain. The 
intertwined relationship between conservation, poverty alleviation and development was 
summarised thus: 
‘People whose very survival is precarious and whose prospects of even 
temporary prosperity are bleak cannot be expected to respond sympathetically 
to calls to subordinate their acute short term needs to the possibility of long term 
returns. Conservation must therefore be combined with measures to meet short 
term economic needs. The vicious circle by which poverty causes ecological 
degradation which in turn leads to more poverty can be broken only be 
development. But if it not to be self-defeating it must be development that is 
sustainable — and conservation helps make it so.’63  
A position statement which would be appealing to developing nations. 
 
                                                          
57
 IUCN, 1980, World Conservation Strategy, point 1 of page vi.  
58
 IUCN, 1980, World Conservation Strategy, point 1 of page vi. 
59
 Biosphere is defined as ‘the thin covering of the planet that contains and sustains life’ in paragraph 2, 
Chapter 1 of the Word Conservation Strategy. 
60
 In paragraph 5 of Chapter 1 of the ‘Word Conservation Strategy’. 
61
 In paragraph 3 of Chapter 1 of the ‘Word Conservation Strategy’. 
62
 In paragraph 3 of Chapter 1 of the ‘World Conservation Strategy’. 
63
 Paragraph 11, chapter 1 of the ‘World Conservation Strategy’. 
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The globally accepted concept of Sustainable Development was finally cast by the 
Brundtland Report in 1987.64 The general assembly of the United Nations had tasked the 
World Commission on Environment and Development to formulate ‘a global agenda for 
change’ in the early 1980’s. Building on the growing realisation of and general acceptance 
that economic development is inextricably linked to environmental consideration and social 
development, the chairperson of the commission states, in her foreword: 
‘When the terms of reference of our Commission were originally being 
discussed in 1982, there were those who wanted its considerations to be 
limited to "environmental issues" only. This would have been a grave mistake. 
The environment does not exist as a sphere separate from human actions, 
ambitions, and needs, and attempts to defend it in isolation from human 
concerns have given the very word "environment" a connotation of naivety in 
some political circles. The word "development" has also been narrowed by 
some into a very limited focus, along the lines of "what poor nations should do 
to become richer", and thus again is automatically dismissed by many in the 
international arena as being a concern of specialists, of those involved in 
questions of "development assistance". 
But the "environment" is where we all live; and "development" is what we all 
do in attempting to improve our lot within that abode. The two are inseparable. 
Further, development issues must be seen as crucial by the political leaders 
who feel that their countries have reached a plateau towards which other 
nations must strive. Many of the development paths of the industrialized 
nations are clearly unsustainable. And the development decisions of these 
countries, because of their great economic and political power, will have a 
profound effect upon the ability of all peoples to sustain human progress for 
generations to come. 
Many critical survival issues are related to uneven development, poverty, and 
population growth. They all place unprecedented pressures on the planet's 
lands, waters, forests, and other natural resources, not least in the developing 
countries. The downward spiral of poverty and environmental degradation is a 
waste of opportunities and of resources. In particular, it is a waste of human 
resources. These links between poverty, inequality, and environmental 
degradation formed a major theme in our analysis and recommendations. 
What is needed now is a new era of economic growth - growth that is forceful 
and at the same time socially and environmentally sustainable.’ 
The Brundtland Report provides a concise and generally accepted definition: ‘Sustainable 
development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs’.65  
                                                          
64 United Nations ‘Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future’ 
(1987) WCED. 
65
 Paragraph 1 of Chapter 2 of the Brundtland Report. 
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In 1992 and as a direct result66 of the Brundtland Report the Rio Conference was convened 
and this produced the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992). The Rio 
Declaration was a reaffirmation of and modification of the Stockholm Declaration. The Rio 
Declaration similarly produced a number of principles (27 in total). Principle 1 states that 
‘human beings are at the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled 
to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.’ While principle 3 provides that ‘the 
right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and 
environmental needs of present and future generations.’ Principle 4 emphasises the 
relationship between environment and development where it states that ‘in order to achieve 
sustainable development, environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the 
development process and cannot be considered in isolation from it.’ 
 
2.2.2 Sustainable Development in a South African Context 
 
The concise Brundtland Report definition67 of Sustainable Development requires the context, 
provided by the Brundtland Report and its antecedents, to clarify its meaning. As has been 
observed ‘[s]ince the Brundtland Commission first defined sustainable development, dozens, 
if not hundreds, of scholars and practitioners have articulated and promoted their own 
alternative definition; yet a clear, fixed, and immutable meaning remains elusive.’68 Arguably 
this lack of precision is what makes the concept universally attractive. 
‘In fact, this commonly accepted meaning of sustainable development [i.e. the 
Brundtland Commission definition] is championed as a reason for its 
popularity, for it is acceptable to all interested parties, developed and 
developing countries, environmentalists and developmentalists, State and 
non-State actors. Where the ambiguity and confusion lie is in taking this 
meaning of sustainable development and applying it within a particular 
international, regional, national or local context.’69 
 
                                                          
66 ‘The [Brundtland] report placed the concept of sustainable development as an urgent imperative on the 
global agenda, and led directly to the decision by the United Nations to convene the 1992 Earth Summit.’ 
Introduction to ‘The Earth Summit and Agenda 21’, UNCED (1992). 
67
 Paragraph 1 of Chapter 2 of the Brundtland Report. 
68
 Kates et al. at 20. 
69
 Rieu-Clarke, A., International Law and Sustainable Development (2005) IWA Publishing, London at 56 
footnote omitted. 
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The WSSD was convened by the United Nations as a continuation of the work of the 
Stockholm and Rio Conferences and reaffirmed the Rio Declaration. It produced the 
Johannesburg Declaration on Sustainable Development.70,71 The WSSD was then followed, 
in June 2012, by the Rio +20 Conference which ‘resulted in a forty-four page, nonbinding 
"Declaration" that many consider a failed document.’72 Subsequent developments will not be 
considered here. 
 
The Johannesburg Declaration provided a clarification of Sustainable Development in 
paragraph [5]: ‘Accordingly, we assume a collective responsibility to advance and strengthen 
the interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars of sustainable development - economic 
development, social development and environmental protection - at the local, national, 
regional and global levels.’ And similarly at paragraph [2] of the Implementation Plan, ‘[The 
Implementation Plan]…will also promote the integration of the three components of 
sustainable development - economic development, social development and environmental 
protection - as interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars’. This is probably a 
crystallisation of the earlier Brundtland Report Definition and reflects an interpretation of the 
spirit of the Brundtland Report which required ‘economic growth…that is forceful and at the 
same time socially and environmentally sustainable.’73 The conceptual amalgam that is the 
Brundtland Definition has been simplified by reducing it to three distinct pillars, each capable 
of measurement in isolation. Kidd uses what he refers to as the ‘commonly held view’74 that 
these three pillars of sustainable development can be likened to the three legs of a 
traditional African cast iron cooking pot. The metaphor is developed thus:  
‘Without the three legs (environmental, economic and social), the pot will be 
useless. Moreover, no one of the legs is more important than the others, or the 
pot will be unbalanced and topple over. Sustainable development, on the 
basis of this view, thus regards the economic, environmental and social legs 
as all equally important – none of them ought to be regarded as a primary 
consideration.’75 
Whilst the three-pillar view of sustainable development evolved before the WSSD it was 
formally adopted then and ‘is the view that is reflected in South African legislation.’76    
                                                          
70 
United Nations September 2002, World Summit on Sustainable Development, A/Conf.199/20. 
71
 For a synopsis of the process from Stockholm to WSSD see Tladi, D., ‘Intragenerational Equity: A New Name 
for International Environmental Justice’ (2003) 9 Fundamina  197 – 204 at 199 – 202. 
72
 Craig, R. K. and Benson, M. H., ‘Replacing Sustainability’ (2013) 46 Akron Law Review 841 – 880 at 841. 
73
 Chairman’s Foreword to the Brundtland Report. 
74
 Kidd, M., ‘Removing the Green-Tinted Spectacles’ (2008) 15 SAJELP 85 at 86. 
75
 Kidd, M., ‘Removing the Green-Tinted Spectacles’ (2008) 15 SAJELP 85 at 86. 
76
 Kidd, M., ‘Removing the Green-Tinted Spectacles’ (2008) 15 SAJELP 85 at 87. 
P a g e  | 25 
 
Figure One – Diagrammatic Representations of Sustainable Development  
 
 Figure 1.1: An adaptation of the ‘three circle’ diagrammatic representation of Sustainable 
Development. The area of Sustainable Development lying in the intersection of the three elements. 
 
Figure 1.2: diagrammatic representation of the ‘Three Pillar’ model of Sustainable Development. 
Taken from http://www.sustainability-ed.org.uk/pages/what3-1.htm# accessed 12 April 2014 
 
Figure 1.3: The ‘Nested Model’ of Sustainable Development. Department of Environment and 
Tourism, Republic of South Africa ‘A National Framework for Sustainable Development in South 
Africa’ (2008) at 15  
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Sustainable Development has environmental, economic and social connotations. It is a 
malleable phrase: subjective interpretations, usages and agenda mean that the phrase has 
found acceptance by a diverse group of people and organisation who use it to justify myriad 
and sometimes antagonistic, activities and arguments. Sustainable Development is also a 
continuously evolving phrase where its evolution appears to be giving rise, not only to wider 
interpretations, but to separate branches as differing scenarios and differing agenda 
continually mould and re-mould Sustainable Development to fit. 
 
2.2.3 Some Limitations of the ‘Three-Pillar’ Concept 
 
In the African three legged cooking pot metaphor77 the legs represent, ‘environmental 
protection’, ‘economic development’ and ‘social development’. If we are to accept this 
metaphor then humankind is represented by the contents of the pot itself and is supported by 
the three legs. If the legs are not in equilibrium then the pot topples over and the contents are 
lost.  This understanding (which seems to correctly represent generally accepted Sustainable 
Development) reflects the anthropocentric origins and focus of Sustainable Development. 
The purpose of the three legs is to support humankind, the legs lack individual purpose and 
lack any independent merit other than as a necessary support component of humankind. 
Despite possibly being a somewhat quaint and, given the context of the WSSD, parochial 
metaphor it is a useful one in that it allows a number of inherent problems with the three pillar 
approach to be recognised. 
 
The first of these problems lies in the inherent assumption that equilibrium should be 
sought78 and that it can be reached. If placed on a level surface the three legs must be of 
equal length or roughly equal length to allow the pot to stand level and prevent the contents 
spilling out.  (An extrapolation of the metaphor would be that the greater the human 
population the greater the respective volume of the contents of the pot in relation to the pot 
and therefore the greater the susceptibility to spill over if the legs are unequal or if equilibrium 
is lost). Equilibrium assumes that there is a direct correlation between the three legs, thus an 
                                                          
77
 Kidd, M., ‘Removing the Green-Tinted Spectacles’ (2008) 15 SAJELP 85 at 86 as discussed previously. 
78 The focus on the three pillars ‘seems deficient because, while it may convey an understanding that 
sustainable development is about upholding the three ‘mutually reinforcing pillars’ of economic development, 
social development and environmental protection, it does not tell us why or to what end.’ Field, T-L., 
‘Sustainable development versus environmentalism: Competing paradigms for the South African EIA regime’ 
(2006) 123 SALJ 409 at 412. 
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increase in environmental protection can only be sustained if both social development and 
economic development increase by the same proportion.  An increase in social development 
(or economic development) which does not result in a proportionate increase in 
environmental protection similarly unbalances the pot. The state of equilibrium however is a 
mythical concept, it cannot be measured and therefore it cannot be aimed for or maintained. 
 
The problem with equilibrium reflects an earlier problem associated with the ‘three circle’ 
depiction. In practice the three circles do not carry equal importance in the decision making 
process, instead one or two are given value based priority, therefore ‘sustainable 
development decisions are inevitably value driven. It means that decision-makers decide in 
advance which of the values they prefer to advance, and whilst still taking into account the 
other two values, base the decision on the preferred value.’79 Strictly speaking this requires 
the favouring of economic development and merely considering environmental and social 
issues. Tladi notes that there are three variations of Sustainable Development depending on 
which of the three circles is emphasised.80 In other words the Sustainable Development 
focus can be shifted to suit the proponent’s agenda and ‘allows decision-makers to decide 
which variation best serves the aims of sustainable development.’81 Such subjectivity in 
application is concerning if the concept is to be used as a basis for law.   
 
A further problem which is well illustrated by the cooking pot metaphor is the presumption 
that equilibrium can be reached and that the pot is located on a level substrate. In a South 
African context the substrate is not level. History has determined that the substrate or 
starting point is anything but level. South Africa has a GINI Index82 value of 63.183 which is 
the highest in the world. As a measure of inequality this is indicative of the highly skewed 
                                                          
79 Feris, L., ‘Sustainable Development In Practice: Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-
General Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga 
Province’  (2008) 1 Constitutional Court Review 249 – 253 at 251. 
80
 Tladi, D., Sustainable Development in International Law: an Analysis of Key Enviroeconomic Instruments 
(2007) Pretoria University Press, Pretoria at 80-83. 
81
 Tladi, D., Sustainable Development in International Law: an Analysis of Key Enviroeconomic Instruments 
(2007) Pretoria University Press, Pretoria at 82. 
82
 ‘Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption expenditure among 
individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution. A Lorenz curve plots 
the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative number of recipients, starting 
with the poorest individual or household. The Gini index measures the area between the Lorenz curve and a 
hypothetical line of absolute equality, expressed as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. Thus a 
Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality.’ World Bank see fn 
83 below. 
83
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI accessed 12 April 2014. 
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substrate. Seeking equilibrium from a skewed base will be self-defeating. From a South 
African perspective the cooking pot equilibrium is not appropriate, at least not in the short to 
medium term.  
 
The task of balancing the three elements of Sustainable Development (even if the pursuit of 
equilibrium is abandoned) is made difficult in practical situations by the problem of scale. The 
three-pillar definition might be useful in making strategic large scale decisions. At a fine scale 
it might not be appropriate to try to balance all three pillars. For example a localised 
development might result in a total destruction of the environment in that locality and 
therefore, at that scale, it would not constitute Sustainable Development. At a slightly larger 
scale the environmental damage is not total and, as the scale is gradually increased, the 
relative environmental damage decreases until the two are balanced. The issue is therefore, 
in practical terms, at what scale does one assess whether or not development is 
sustainable? Therefore as a concept Sustainable Development can be difficult to apply on an 
ad hoc basis by decision makers assessing development applications. 
 
A final word on the African cooking pot metaphor: the purpose of the legs is to hold the pot 
(and its contents) off of the fire, presumably, should the legs become too short then the 
contents will burn. Implicit in this metaphor is a requirement that the three legs be kept long 
enough so as to preserve humankind. Humankind cannot subsist without the trifecta of 
environmental protection, economic development and social development, this is possibly 
the underlying premise of Sustainable Development. Despite its shortcomings the metaphor 
remains one of the more certain renditions of the concept of Sustainable Development. 
 
2.2.4 How is Sustainable Development Evolving? 
A New Vision 
 
As a concept Sustainable Development was traditionally depicted using three overlapping 
circles as an illustration. The junction of the three circles (each respectively representing, 
environmental protection, economic development and social development) described a 
conceptual space where development could occur and which would qualify as being 
sustainable. This illustration then evolved into the ‘three pillars’ model also described using 
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the African three legged cooking pot metaphor. These illustrations now seem to have been 
replaced by using a nested model. Where ‘social, economic and ecosystem factors are 
embedded within each other, and are underpinned by our systems of governance.’84 
 
A ‘New’ Economic Model 
 
The accepted measure of economic development has, since the 1940’s, been Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). There is, however, an increasingly strong movement85 towards 
measures which, unlike GDP, include the environment and human well-being as factors in 
measuring success.86 GDP ‘ignores social costs, environmental impacts and income 
inequality.’87 A primary driver of GDP is the amount spent by an individual within an 
economy; thus increasing spending on health, crime prevention, counselling because of 
unhappiness and buffering the negative impacts of environmental degradation all contribute 
positively to GDP. Quality of life is therefore not always a function of GDP. Increasingly there 
is a move to replace GDP as the measure of economic performance with measures such as 
GPI (genuine progress indicator) or the World Bank’s Total Wealth.88 GPI measures an 
                                                          
84
 Department of Environment and Tourism, Republic of South Africa, A National Framework for Sustainable 
Development in South Africa (2008) at 14 also see the later Department of Environmental Affairs, Republic of 
South Africa, National Strategy for Sustainable Development and Action Plan (NSSD1) 2011 – 2014 (November 
2011). 
85 This is not a new concept. In A Blueprint for Survival (1972) it was stated: ‘It is in terms of these market 
prices that the GNP is calculated, and as we have seen, this provides the most misleading indication of our 
well-being. Edward Mishan points out that "An increase in the numbers killed on the roads, an increase in the 
numbers dying from cancer, coronaries or nervous diseases, provides extra business for physicians and 
undertakers, and can contribute to raising GNP. A forest destroyed to produce the hundreds of tons of paper 
necessary for the American Sunday editions is a component of GNP. The spreading of concrete over acres of 
once beautiful countryside adds, to the value of GNP ... and so one could go on."’ At paragraph 343 footnotes 
omitted. 
86
 See e.g. Costanza, R., Kubiszewski, I., Giovannini, E., Lovins, L. McGlade, J., Pickett, K. E., Ragnarsdóttir, K. V., 
Roberts, R., Roberto De Vogli, R. and Wilkinson, R. ‘Time to leave GDP behind’  (16 Jan 2014) 505 Nature  283 – 
285 at 283.  The World Bank’s Total Wealth measure (discussed later on) is one of these.  
87 
Costanza et al., fn 86 above at 283. 
88 ‘Total wealth: The measure of total (or comprehensive) wealth is built upon the intuitive notion that current 
wealth must constrain future consumption. … 
[and which comprises of:] 
■ Produced capital: This comprises machinery, structures, and equipment. 
■ Natural capital: This comprises agricultural land, protected areas, forests, minerals, and energy. 
■ Intangible capital: This asset is measured as a residual, the difference between total wealth and produced 
and natural capital. It implicitly includes measures of human, social, and institutional capital, which includes 
factors such as the rule of law and governance that contribute to an efficient economy. Net foreign financial 
assets, the balance of a country’s total financial assets and financial liabilities, are generally included as part of 
intangible capital….’ The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, The 
changing wealth of nations: measuring sustainable development in the new millennium. (2011) The World 
Bank, Washington DC at 4 -5. 
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individual’s spending but then accounts for a variety of social factors (for instance the value 
of volunteer work, the costs of divorce, crime and pollution).89 GDP however continues its 
predominant role, for instance it is elemental in the National Development Plan.90 Conversely 
the National Strategy for Sustainable Development and Action Plan recognises the inherent 
problem, from a Sustainable Development perspective, of measuring development through 
GDP: 
‘South Africa’s current economic development path is based primarily on 
maximising economic growth – as measured by the gross domestic product 
(GDP), particularly through mining, manufacturing and agricultural activities. 
This has resulted in an energy-intensive economy and an erosion of the 
resource base: a situation that is clearly unsustainable.’91 
 
GDP does not measure environmental capital. Environmental capital (or ‘natural capital’) 
comprises goods and services, provided by the environment (valuable and usually freely).92 
Thus the economic production (which by definition means ‘the complex of human activities 
concerned with the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services’93) 
represents a situation ‘where total production of an economy is a function of natural capital, 
human capital, and built capital.’94 ‘The economies of the Earth would grind to a halt without 
the services of ecological life-support systems, so in one sense their total value to the 
economy is infinite.’95 This factor means that environmental goods and services cannot be 
reduced to a monetary ‘built capital’ as they are, in their own right, infinitely important and 
                                                          
89
 See generally Costanza et al,. fn 86. 
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often irreplaceable. Human capital includes social elements including health, education and 
human well-being.  
‘Similarly, the meaning of "labor" has been broadened to include both the 
knowledge that people bring to the production process and the institutional 
and social networks (e.g., laws, educational systems, and practices of child 
upbringing) that underlie the formation of a trained labor force. It is now 
common to refer to labor and the familial and institutional processes that 
support it as "human capital”’.96  
The ‘economy’ is increasingly seen as, in itself, comprising human (social), natural 
(environmental) and built (financial) capital. This change in perspective reflects a growing 
realisation that the three legs cannot be truly separated and therefore cannot be balanced.97 
 
Reference in Sustainable Development to economic or economy is therefore a reference to 
a fluid concept which increasingly includes environmental components; one which has 
changed and which will continue to change as perceptions change. As economy is one of 
the foundational pillars of Sustainable Development it follows that Sustainable Development 
is a similarly fluid concept.  
 
Sustainable Development and Sustainability 
 
Sustainable Development is anthropocentric in its focus. This is clear from its formulation 
and its evolution. The environment is there to serve humankind and the needs of humankind 
are at the centre of the concept of Sustainable Development. ‘Although the protection of the 
environment is regarded as being essential to the present and future needs of the people, in 
the final analysis the environment is regarded as being subservient to those needs.’98 Any 
move to protect, conserve or manage the environment is purely to serve the human interest.  
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Historically Sustainability embodied a concept which was distinct from that of Sustainable 
Development.99 ‘The concept of sustainability is linked to developments in Western countries 
when the seriousness of the effects on the environment of consumption and production, 
which was attributable to post-war industrialisation, became widely realised.’100 Sustainability 
was used to describe the ecological sustainability called for in these, primarily ecocentric, 
reports. Writing with regard to the notion of eco-justice, Bosselmann notes: 
‘Despite the ongoing confusion surrounding the meaning of ‘sustainable 
development’, a good argument can be made that sustainability is an ethical 
concept rooted in ecocentrism. Ecological sustainability implies 
acknowledgement of the intrinsic values of ‘non-human others’, and the need 
to express such intrinsic value in political and legal concepts, not the least of 
which is the idea of justice.’101  
Similarly Meyers and Muller argue102 that ‘ecologically sustainable development’ means 
‘development which either improves, maintains, or does not materially interfere with the 
ecological structure and functions of the area in which such development takes place.’ The 
emphasis placed on ecological conservation agrees with the interpretation favoured here. 
The implication is that ‘ecologically sustainable’ is conceptually distinct from Sustainable 
Development. Conversely Sustainable Development was a response to the emergence of 
the concept of Sustainability and redirected the focus from limiting development because it 
was unsustainable to promoting sustainable development; this resulted in a shift in focus 
from protecting the environment through limiting development to promoting an alternative 
model of development.  
 
The distinction between the concepts has become blurred and there is clearly confusion in 
the everyday usage of ‘sustainable development’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘sustainable ‘X’’ (where 
‘X’ represents the noun of choice, e.g. job creation, livelihoods, exploitation of resources, 
globalisation and national policies to name but five taken from the NDP103). This muddying of 
the waters of Sustainable Development means that the phrase has acquired shades which it 
may never have been intended to have.  
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The impermissible grafting of the two concepts is clearly shown in the following extract from 
the NSSD: 
‘Sustainability (or a sustainable society) is seen as the overall goal of the 
NSSD 1. Sustainability in this context implies ecological sustainability. In 
the first instance, it recognises that the maintenance of healthy ecosystems 
and natural resources are preconditions for human wellbeing. In the second 
instance, it recognises that there are limits to the goods and services that 
can be provided. In other words, ecological sustainability acknowledges that 
human beings are part of nature and not a separate entity. 
Sustainable development is the process that is followed to achieve the goal 
of sustainability. Sustainable development implies the selection and 
implementation of a development option, which allows for appropriate and 
justifiable social and economic goals to be achieved, based on the meeting 
of basic needs and equity, without compromising the natural system on 
which it is based.’104    
This is not only confusing but is conceptually wrong. Sustainability and Sustainable 




Sustainable Development is a multi-faceted concept open to varied and self-serving 
interpretations. Its lack of rigid definition and its wide subject matter make it impossible to 
define in a clear, consistent and robust manner. 
 
A very cursory example of such flexibility in interpretation can be deduced from the NSSD.105 
The definition of Sustainable Development has changed from that of the Brundtland Report 
‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs’106 to ‘the integration of social, economic and 
environmental factors into planning, implementation and decision-making so as to ensure 
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that development serves present and future generations’107 to ‘the process that is followed to 
achieve the goal of sustainability. Sustainable development implies the selection and 
implementation of a development option, which allows for appropriate and justifiable social 
and economic goals to be achieved, based on the meeting of basic needs and equity, 
without compromising the natural system on which it is based.’108 
 
The changes listed above will not be discussed here and no comment is offered other than 
simply to record that Sustainable Development is a constantly shifting concept.109 It cannot 
be defined definitively nor can any particular meaning be pegged to it with any degree of 
certainty or assurance of consistency. It has been suggested110 that the popularity and 
widespread adoption of the concept of Sustainable Development can be attributed to ‘the 
concept’s lack of precise definition’ and the ‘theory’s widespread appeal to its vagueness’. 
This vagueness, although aiding in the concept’s adoption is, ultimately, a fatal flaw. 
‘[T]he vagueness of the term sustainable development has led such diverse 
groups as the scientific community, conservation organizations, governments, 
labor unions, industry groups, and the public in general to agree that they are 
in favor of [Sustainable Development], without being able to pinpoint what in 
fact they are in favor of. As such, the concept is meaningless, and, in fact, its 
use is counter-productive, because resolving the true meaning of sustainable 
development now constitutes the debate, rather than resolving the debate, 
about how we are to live sustainably in nature's community.’111 
The lack of precision renders Sustainable Development completely unsuitable to be a basis 
of law.112 In grappling with the true meaning of ‘the concept of sustainable development’ 
Field concludes that:113 
‘At the very core of the notion of sustainable development is the moral choice 
to pursue equity in the light of a certain consciousness of the linkages 
between human and natural systems in the context of past and continuing 
unsustainable practices. Equity, not environmental protection, is the absolute 
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core of sustainable development, notwithstanding the concept’s origin in texts 
aimed at environmental protection.’114 
This conclusion is at variance with the more widely accepted interpretation that Sustainable 
Development is defined by the integration principle115 (discussed below) and this is indicative 
of the inherent contradictions within the concept, the inherent uncertainty and the need to 
distil measurable normative elements. Without doing so the concept remains fatally vague. 
 
2.2.5 The International Legal Status of Sustainable Development  
 
Despite its unsuitability as a basis for law there is reference to Sustainable Development in 
public international law. Public International law describes a set of rules established between 
international role players, primarily sovereign states, which, when the rules are generally 
accepted and enforceable, are regarded as being law.116 Public international law is founded 
on universal consensus (usually evidenced by agreement or treaty) between sovereign 
states where such consensus evidences a ‘shared understanding of the world, the nature of 
the actors [role players] that populate it, their relationships to one another, and the various 
avenues available to them to pursue their goals and to interact with each other.’117 This 
consensus and consent acts ‘[a]s a substitute [to the lack of formal law making or legislative 
mechanisms at the international level] and perhaps an equivalent, there is the principle that 
the general consent of states creates rules of general application.’118 A rule may, because of 
its general and fundamental nature, acquire the status of a principle.119 Such consensus as 
to the nature of the rule and the consequences of breaching it becomes international law 
when there is a clear process for airing and hearing disputes as well as clear principles to be 
applied in determining such disputes. If these elements are present then consensus 
becomes law. 
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The International Court of Justice (the ICJ120) has identified121 the sources of public 
international law as being: 
‘a. international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules 
expressly recognized by the contesting states;  
b. international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law;  
c. the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations;  
d. subject to the provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of 
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means 
for the determination of rules of law.’ 
These four categories are ‘generally regarded as a complete statement of the sources of 
international law.’122  The first three categories are referred to as primary sources of law and 
the last as a secondary source of law ‘because rather than creating law, [judicial decisions] 
point to where the law may be found.’123 Brownlie suggests that this listing of the sources 
creates a hierarchy of importance.124  
 
Law making treaties (conventions) create on-going legal obligations of a permanent nature 
and are the ‘most concrete evidence of the existence of rights and obligations between 
States.’125 It is critical that the treaty creates obligations of a legal, i.e. binding and 
enforceable, nature and there must be evidence of the consensus and consent by the party 
to be bound by the treaty. 
 
International custom derives from evidence that parties regard a ‘certain practice as 
obligatory’126 and this implies twin requirements127 of firstly a recognised practice and 
secondly an acceptance of the practice as law, the opinio juris. Evidence of the practice 
requires three elements to be met,128 namely: duration; uniformity and consistency of the 
practice; and the universality of the practice. Duration implies either a long standing practice 
or one which is more recent but with strong indications of acceptance. Uniformity and 
consistency implies a ‘virtually uniform practice’129 and consistency implies that there is 
general consistency and an inconsistency is regarded as a breach of a rule rather than 
                                                          
120
 The International Court of Justice was founded by the United Nations through the Statute of the Court [of 
International Justice]. 
121
 Article 38(1) of the Statute of the Court. 
122
 Brownlie at 5. Rieu-Clarke at 15 also uses Article 38(1) as evidence of the sources of international law. 
123
 Rieu-Clarke at 15. 
124
 Brownlie at 5. 
125
 Rieu-Clarke at 15 and see generally Brownlie at 12 -15. 
126
 Brownlie at 6. 
127
 Rieu-Clarke at 17, also see Brownlie 6 – 10. 
128
 These requirements and the interpretations used here are discussed as discussed by Rieu-Clarke 17 – 20 
and Brownlie 6 -10. 
129
 Rieu-Clarke at 18 footnote omitted. 
P a g e  | 37 
 
evidence of a new rule.130 Finally, the practice must be generally applicable and accepted 
albeit this does not have to be universal and, where the subject matter restricts the number 
of parties, then universality is met if the practice is generally accepted by the affected 
parties.131 Treaties and other writings, which themselves are not international law, may 
contain recordals of international legal practices. 
 
The second element which must be present is the opinio juris and this differentiates custom 
from, the non-legal, usage. A usage which is regarded as being obligatory becomes custom 
and has legal status. The opinio juris is often inferred from the nature of the practice rather 
than being expressly stated.132 
 
The third category is that of ‘general principles of law’133 and this requires that general 
principles of national (domestic) law, as widely practised by nations or within the nation, may 
be ‘borrowed’ by the international community and to be regarded as having acquired 
international legal status. ‘An international tribunal chooses edits and adapts elements from 
better developed systems: the result is a new element of international law the content of 
which is influenced historically and logically by domestic law.’134 This third category ranks 
third in hierarchy according to Brownlie and last amongst the primary sources of international 
law: ‘the role of principles in the international legal system is very limited…the ICJ has 
seldom applied general principles of law,’135 preferring the first two categories. It must be 
noted though that strong argument has been made that general principles are ‘guiding 
principles of general content’136 and that ‘they differ from the norms or rules of positive 
international law, and transcend them.’137 They are the ‘basic pillars of the international legal 
system’138 and in the result: 
‘General principles of law emanate, in my perception, from human conscience, 
from the universal juridical conscience, which I regard as the ultimate material 
“source” of all law.’139 
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The fourth category140 is regarded as a secondary141 or material142 (i.e. non formal) source of 
international law. International judicial decisions are regarded as providing evidence of the 
existence of one of the first three categories of international law and are not binding except 
on the parties to the judicial process.143 Reference to various earlier international law 
decisions is sometimes made as these ‘judgements’ can be persuasive. 
  
As stated, public international law binds and applies to international role players, primarily 
sovereign states. Public international law does not usually apply within a state’s borders to 
the relationship between private entities or between private entities and the state. In South 
Africa the Constitution affects this usual situation in three ways: firstly, international law (all 
four categories) must be considered by ‘a court, tribunal or forum’ when interpreting the Bill 
of Rights;144 secondly, a treaty may become domestic law ‘if enacted into law by national 
legislation’;145 and thirdly, ‘[c]ustomary international law is law in the Republic unless it is 
inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.’146 
 
The formal principles of Sustainable Development are contained in the Stockholm 
Declaration, the World Conservation Strategy, the Brundtland Report, the Rio Declaration  
and the Johannesburg Declaration. Each builds on the previous and all are interrelated. The 
World Conservation Strategy and the Brundtland Report are discussion documents and, 
accordingly, have little if any legal force. The Stockholm, Rio and Johannesburg 
Declarations have been widely ratified (including by South Africa). Thus they have the status 
of international conventions (treaties) but are not binding international law. Treaties can be 
important and persuasive in a court’s decision making but unless the treaty has been 
‘approved by resolution in both the National Assembly and the National Council of 
Provinces’147 it is not binding in the Republic and accordingly cannot acquire the status of 
law. Even where a treaty has been approved as required it usually only ‘becomes law in the 
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Republic when it is enacted into law by national legislation;…’148 and accordingly these 
records of the principles of Sustainable Development have no legal standing in South Africa 
despite being incorporated in ratified documents.149  
 
Judge Weeramantry (of the ICJ) argued, in a separate opinion in the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros 
Project case,150 that Sustainable Development existed as a firm principle of international 
law.151 However it would appear that Sustainable Development is too fluid a concept to 
constitute a legal principle per se but rather presents an ideology applying to the 
interpretation and application of other legal principles. Rieu-Clarke, after assessing the legal 
relevance of Sustainable Development, concludes that: 
‘[T]he major body of opinion points away from sustainable developing having 
any normative status within international law…[S]ustainable development is a 
goal of the international community. Recent treaties, non-binding instruments, 
and the decision of courts and tribunals point towards sustainable 
development being a goal of the international community….[I]t is difficult to 
see how sustainable development, as a goal of the international community, 
could become a rule or principle of international law.’152 
Similarly the ICJ, in the main judgement of Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project, stated: 
‘This need to reconcile economic development with protection of the 
environment is aptly expressed in the concept of sustainable development.’153 
Likewise, in the later Pulp Mills Case the ICJ, seemed to regard Sustainable Development as 
an ‘objective’ to be aimed for rather than as a legal principle to be guided by (or 
implemented).154  
 
As outlined previously Judge Weeramantry regarded Sustainable Development as a stronger 
legal instrument than a concept or objective. Judge Cançado Trindade in his separate 
opinion in the Pulp Mills Case argues that general principles of international environmental 
law should have formed a basis for deciding the matter. The judge attaches significance to 
the role of general principles. However even this opinion falls short of regarding Sustainable 
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Development as a general legal principle and reverts to the more widely recognised general 
principles being the ‘precautionary principle’ and the ‘preventative principle’. More importantly 
though, the judge notes that both parties to the dispute refer to Sustainable Development, 
interchangeably, as a ‘concept’ and as a ‘principle’.155 This is possibly symptomatic of the 
inherent uncertainty of the phrase’s true import.  The judge concludes that Sustainable 
Development is a manifestation of the underlying temporal (or intergenerational equity)156 
general legal principle.157 Thus, even in this opinion which argues that Sustainable 
Development should have been given greater import in the hearing than its cursory 
description as an objective, it falls short of being a general legal principle in its own right.    
 
 
Tladi suggests that Sustainable Development is not a rule but is a principle which must be 
considered and equates this consideration to the South African legal consideration of 
reasonableness in delict and contract law.158 ‘Arguably sustainable development, like the 
notion of justice, which has been without a universal definition since time immemorial, is an 
ideal to which humanity aspires’.159 This view fits in with the statement of Judge Cançado 
Trindade160 where general principles emanate from human conscience and amount to a 
source of law rather than to law per se. Whilst general principles should not be disregarded 




It has previously been argued that Sustainable Development is a concept rather than a firm, 
well defined, principle. As such it is more in keeping with the notion of a concept than a law. 
As a concept it may very well form a basis of a general principle but probably has not yet 
been sufficiently concretised into a legal principle. Given its myriad interpretations 
Sustainable Development will need to be legally defined before it can emerge as a legal 
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principle. Accordingly, in this dissertation, Sustainable Development will continue to be 
regarded as a concept and not as a legal principle.161 
 
2.2.6 Incorporated Principles of Sustainable Development Law 
 
Although the treaties and conventions are, pending possible approval and enactment, not 
law within South Africa they may, nonetheless, contain evidence of customary law. 
Customary international law is, automatically, ‘law in the Republic unless it is inconsistent 
with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.’162 Furthermore such documents as may 
constitute international law of the first category must be used in interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
Certain principles of Sustainable Development have acquired (or seem to be acquiring) 
customary international legal status. As such these principles, if indeed they are customary 
international law, are law in South Africa (unless inconsistent with national law) and must 
also guide interpretation. 
 
A number of individual principles contained in the conventions are suggested as meeting the 
necessary requirement and therefore forming part of customary international law. Whether or 
not these principles actually form customary international law so as to convince a South 
African court that they apply remains to be proven. These principles include Principle 17 of 
the Stockholm Declaration and Principles 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 11, 20, 21, 22, 24 and 27 of the Rio 
Declaration as listed by van Reenen163 in citing a number of authors and sources. On the 
other hand Preston164 recognises Principles 3, 4, 15 and 16 of the Rio Declaration as having 
international legal status. These principles will be discussed below. 
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The international law elements of Sustainable Development therefore influence South 
African law either through actual incorporation or as interpretive guidelines. (Ngcobo J has 
referred to the ICJ decision in Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros as being guidance on how ‘the 
concept of sustainable development must be construed and understood in our law.’165) The 
discussion of these elements must therefore be considered in this light. The principles 
discussed here are those that that may be incorporated into South African law through their 
putative status as customary international law. Other principles of Sustainable Development 
may and have been incorporated directly through domestic South African law. Furthermore 
all law (and this would include incorporated principles of Sustainable Development) has to 
conform to the Constitution which ‘is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled’166 and 
includes the Bill of Rights which ‘applies to all law, and binds the legislature, the executive, 
the judiciary and all organs of state.’167 
 
2.2.7 Declaration Principles  
 
A number of principles are listed below. These are taken directly from an international 
document and could be regarded as a statement of an international legal principle. As such it 
is not suggested or implied that the source document was the origin of such putative 
principle. The roots of Sustainable Development and Sustainability extend back before the 
Stockholm Conference of 1972 and principles of the two concepts can similarly be traced 
back to before that time. Further, reference to a ‘principle’ is to a declaration principle and 
does not imply that the principle is a principle of international law, i.e. a rule which, because 
of its general and fundamental nature, has acquired the status of an international legal 
principle.  
 
Certain declaration principles appear to have been originally incorporated into South African 
law through the NEMA (the National Environmental Management Act, no. 107 of 1998). 
Where this has happened the NEMA principle will be deemed to be the equivalent to the 
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 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department 
of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province, and Others 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) at [56]. 
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declaration principle even where different wording permits a possible divergence in meaning. 
The use of ‘equivalent’ therefore does not imply actual equivalency.  
 
Stockholm Declaration, Principle 17 
‘Appropriate national institutions must be entrusted with the task of planning, 
managing or controlling the environmental resources of States with a view to 
enhancing environmental quality.’ 
 
This element probably is a limiting component of the ‘only one of the main rules and 
principles [which] can be considered as binding international law; sovereignty over natural 
resources.’168 Part of the sovereignty over natural resources would require a state to take 
active control and manage these resources. This principle has been stated in the ILA Delhi 
Declaration169 as principle 1.2: 
‘States are under a duty to manage natural resources, including natural 
resources within their own territory or jurisdiction, in a rational, sustainable and 
safe way so as to contribute to the development of their peoples’ 
 
As such this principle must be regarded as an element of the right of state sovereignty over 
their own resources and limits the right. This does not seem to have acquired universal 
acceptance.  
 
Although not appearing as a NEMA principle per se it could be argued that NEMA, in its 
entirety, is a manifestation of this Principle and this appears from the long title170 and 
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 Rieu-Clarke at 96. 
169
 ILA New Delhi Declaration of Principles of International Law Relating to Sustainable Development, 2 April 
2002 proceedings of the 70th Conference of the International Law Association, held in New Delhi, India, 2–6 
April 2002. 
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 ‘To provide for co-operative environmental governance by establishing principles for decision-making on 
matters affecting the environment, institutions that will promote cooperative governance and procedures for 
co-ordinating environmental functions exercised by organs of state; to provide for certain aspects of the 
administration and enforcement of other environmental management laws; and to provide for matters 
connected therewith.’ NEMA long title. 
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Rio Declaration, Principle 3 
 
‘The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.’ 
 
Whilst seemingly widely recognised this principle suffers from an inherent uncertainty171 in 
that its meaning is open to interpretation and cannot be given a firm, enforceable 
interpretation. ‘The right to development remains ambiguous at best’172 and should probably 
be regarded as ‘soft law’.  
 
This right to development has been recognised173 by the Constitutional Court as the first of 
two primary principles of Sustainable Development. This is an indication of the 
understandable importance South Africa has placed on social and economic development. 
NEMA reiterates ‘the State’s responsibility to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the social 
and economic rights in’174 the Bill of Rights and this implies the right of development. The 
needs of present and future generations are catered for by the public trust doctrine.175 
 
Rio Declaration, Principle 4 
‘In order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall 
constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be 
considered in isolation from it.’ 
 
The ICJ has explicitly recognised the importance of the environment and a state’s duty to 
respect the environment. 
‘The Court recalls that it has recently had occasion to stress, in the following 
terms, the great significance that it attaches to respect for the environment, 
not only for States but also for the whole of mankind: 
"the environment is not an abstraction but represents the living space, the 
quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations 
unborn. The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that 
activities within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other 
States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of 
international law relating to the environment.”’176 
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 See Brownlie at 277. 
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 Rieu-Clarke at 79 footnote omitted. 
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 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department 
of Agriculture, Conservation and Environment, Mpumalanga Province, and Others 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) at [50]. 
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 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (HungarylSlovakia), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1997, p. 7 at [53]. 
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And that, based on the importance of the environment, ‘safeguarding the ecological balance 
has come to be considered an ‘essential interest’ of all States.’177 The so-called Integration 
Principle is recognised a principle of international law.178 Principle 7.1 of the ILA Delhi 
Declaration179 states: 
‘The principle of integration reflects the interdependence of social, economic, 
financial, environmental and human rights aspects of principles and rules of 
international law relating to sustainable development as well as of the 
interdependence of the needs of current and future generations of 
humankind.’ 
And the ICJ has reflected that it is this integration which forms the basis of Sustainable 
Development. 
‘The Court has observed in this respect, in its Order of 13 July 2006, that such 
use should allow for sustainable development which takes account of “the 
need to safeguard the continued conservation of the river environment and the 
rights of economic development of the riparian States”’180  
 
And finally, in the Iron Rhine Railway,181 the integration principle was accepted as a principle 
of international law: 
‘Importantly, these emerging principles now integrate environmental protection 
into the development process. Environmental law and the law on development 
stand not as alternatives but as mutually reinforcing, integral concepts, which 
require that where development may cause significant harm to the 
environment there is a duty to prevent, or at least mitigate, such harm. This 
duty, in the opinion of the Tribunal, has now become a principle of general 
international law. This principle applies not only in autonomous activities but 




The integration principle has been recognised183 by the Constitutional Court as the second of 
two primary principles184 of Sustainable Development and forms a key part of NEMA.185 
Interestingly the Constitutional Court has, probably correctly, interpreted the integration 
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principle as a pro-developmental principle and that: ‘The practical significance of the 
integration of the environmental and developmental considerations is that environmental 
considerations will now increasingly be a feature of economic and development policy.’186 
Environmental protection is not the objective, environmental consideration is. As has been 
stated: 
‘Sustainable development is not a euphemism for environment. The emphasis 
is on development-development that proceeds sustainably but proceeds 
nonetheless. According to Agenda 21, sustainable development should lead to 
the "fulfilment of basic needs, improved living standards for all, better 




Rio Declaration, Principle 5 
‘All States and all people shall co-operate in the essential task of eradicating 
poverty as an indispensable requirement for sustainable development, in order 
to decrease the disparities in standards of living and better meet the needs of 
the majority of the people of the world.’ 
 
Co-operation is an important feature and recognised principle of international law. This is 
primarily because the law operates as between sovereign states and compulsion is not an 
option.188 Poverty eradication is regarded as a part of the right to development which is 
discussed further on. 
 
The NEMA equivalent can be found in the State’s duty to promote socio-economic rights.189 
 
Rio Declaration, Principle 7 
‘States shall co-operate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect 
and restore the health and integrity of the Earth's ecosystem. In view of the 
different contributions to global environmental degradation, States have 
common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of 
sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the 
global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they 
command.’ 
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 Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department 
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The common but differentiated responsibilities provision appears to be an emergent global 
usage. Provisions to this effect are found in a number of international treaties and there 
appears to be growing acceptance of this. However this has not achieved the required 
universality nor does it create legal obligations and therefore should only be regarded as a 
growing global practice. 190  
 
NEMA requires that: ‘Global and international responsibilities relating to the environment 
must be discharged in the national interest.’191 
 
Rio Declaration, Principle 8 
‘To achieve sustainable development and a higher quality of life for all people, 
States should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and 
consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies.’ 
 
This seems to conflict with many states’ avowed right to develop and the legal principle of 
sovereignty over resources. As such this has not achieved universal acceptance. 
 
NEMA equivalents require the promotion of socio-economic rights192 and that: ‘Development 
must be socially, environmentally and economically sustainable.’193 
 
Rio Declaration, Principle 9 
‘States should co-operate to strengthen endogenous capacity-building for 
sustainable development by improving scientific understanding through 
exchanges of scientific and technological knowledge, and by enhancing the 
development, adaptation, diffusion and transfer of technologies, including new 
and innovative technologies.’ 
 
This requires sovereign states to voluntarily assist each other. As a voluntary requirement it 
cannot be enforced and cannot therefore, create legal obligations. There does not seem to 
be a NEMA equivalent principle. 
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Rio Declaration, Principle 11 
‘States shall enact effective environmental legislation. Environmental 
standards, management objectives and priorities should reflect the 
environmental and developmental context to which they apply. Standards 
applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic 
and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries.’ 
 
This is similar to the status of Principle 7 discussed above, similarly there does not appear to 
be a NEMA equivalent although NEMA itself probably amounts to fulfilment of this principle. 
 
Rio Declaration, Principle 15 
‘In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be 
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are 
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall 




The need for a precautionary approach can be gleaned from the Principle requiring an EIA to 
be conducted and from the following reasoning194 of the ICJ: 
‘Throughout the ages, mankind has, for economic and other reasons, 
constantly interfered with nature. In the past, this was often done without 
consideration of the effects upon the environment. Owing to new scientific 
insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for mankind - for present and 
future generations - of pursuit of such interventions at an unconsidered and 
unabated pace, new norms and standards have been developed, set forth in a 
great number of instruments during the last two decades. Such new norms 
have to be taken into consideration, and such new standards given proper 
weight, not only when States contemplate new activities but also when 
continuing with activities begun in the past. This need to reconcile economic 
development with protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the 
concept of sustainable development.’195 
 
NEMA states that sustainable development requires consideration of factors including: ‘that 
a risk-averse and cautious approach is applied, which takes into account the limits of current 
knowledge about the consequences of decisions and actions’.196 
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195
 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (HungarylSlovakia), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1997, p. 7 at [140]. 
196
 S 2(4)(a)(vii) of NEMA. 
P a g e  | 49 
 
Rio Declaration, Principle 16 
‘National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalization of 
environmental costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account 
the approach that the polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, 
with due regard to the public interest and without distorting international trade 
and investment.’ 
 
This principle may be interpreted in two ways; firstly, where quantifiable damages to another 
party occur then, as was held in the Trail Smelter Case,197 the offending party should 
compensate the injured party. Pollution thus becomes an actionable wrong. Secondly, this 
has an economic dimension. ‘The source of the principle is in the economic theory of 
externalities.’198 Where a party benefits financially from pollution then they should bear some 
of the costs of the pollution. As such this principle has been criticised199 as being an 
economic measure and not a legal measure. There is no doubt that where the pollution 
amounts to a wrong it will be actionable however a blanket provision might amount to a case 
of strict liability. Either way this principle does not seem to have been widely accepted as yet 
although it is gaining purchase in municipal law. 
‘The language used in international instruments is more qualified than the 
statement of the polluter pays principle at the national level. As Sands 
explains, the reason for this is that the text “derives, at least in part, from the 
view held by a number of states, both developed and developing, that the 
polluter-pays principle is applicable at the domestic level but does not govern 
rights or responsibilities between states at the international level”.’200 
  
NEMA requires that: ‘The costs of remedying pollution, environmental degradation and 
consequent adverse health effects and of preventing, controlling or minimising further 
pollution, environmental damage or adverse health effects must be paid for by those 
responsible for harming the environment.’201 
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Rio Declaration, Principle 17 
‘Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument, shall be 
undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse 
impact on the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent 
national authority.’ 
 
The duty upon a state to prevent its territorial activities from having a negative impact upon 
the environment of other states is regarded as being a principle of international law: 
‘“The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or 
of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law 
relating to the environment.”’202 
 
This duty has long been recognised and forms the basis for the legal requirement of 
conduction an EIA. It has also been proposed that this duty extends to a situation where a 
state legally conducts an activity in another state with regard to protecting the second 
state.203  
 
EIA has some international legal status in particular when applied to transboundary impacts. 
Rieu-Carke states that ‘[o]ver 100 countries are believed to include environmental impact 
assessment as part of their national legislation.’ Furthermore several ICJ decisions endorse 
the need for EIA. E.g. the Trail Smelter Case,204 the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project 205 and 
the Pulp Mills Case.206 The obligation to conduct an EIA forms part of a state’s necessary 
assessment in exercising its international legal duty not to harm another state’s environment: 
                                                          
202 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996 (I), pp. 241-242, 
para. 29 and quoted with approval in the Pulp Mills Case at [193]. 
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 See Iron Rhine Railway at [223]. 
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that, under the principles of international law, …, no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory 
in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons 
therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and convincing 
evidence.’ (page 1965)  and ordered, at page 1974: ‘In order to prevent the occurrence of sulphur dioxide in 
the atmosphere in amounts, both as to concentration, duration and frequency, capable of causing damage in 
the State of Washington, the operation of the Smelter and the maximum emission of sulphur dioxide from its 
stacks shall be regulated as provided in the following [ongoing EIA] régime.’  
205 Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (HungarylSlovakia), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1997, p. 7. 
206 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 14. 
P a g e  | 51 
 
‘The [ICJ] points out that the principle of prevention, as a customary rule, has 
its origins in the due diligence that is required of a State in its territory. It is 
“every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts 
contrary to the rights of other States”. A State is thus obliged to use all the 
means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its 
territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to the 
environment of another State. This Court has established that this obligation 
“is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment”.’207 
And further: 
‘In this sense, the [contractual] obligation to protect and preserve [the 
environment], …, has to be interpreted in accordance with a practice, which in 
recent years has gained so much acceptance among States that it may now 
be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed 
industrial activity may have a significant adverse impact in a transboundary 
context, in particular, on a shared resource. Moreover, due diligence, and the 
duty of vigilance and prevention which it implies, would not be considered to 
have been exercised, if a party planning works liable to affect the régime of 
the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an environmental impact 
assessment on the potential effects of such works.’208 
 
 
The requirement to conduct an EIA is therefore an element of an older legal principle. The 
ICJ has also held that the requirement to conduct an EIA is an ongoing requirement.  
‘The awareness of the vulnerability of the environment and the recognition that 
environmental risks have to be assessed on a continuous basis have 
become much stronger in the years since the Treaty's conclusion.’209 
This requirement, for ongoing or continuous assessment was discussed at length by Judge 
Weeramantry210 who argues strongly ‘that this principle [of EIA] was gathering strength and 
international acceptance, and had reached the level of general recognition at which this 
Court should take notice of it’211 and that the assessment should be continuous: 
‘The greater the size and scope of the project, the greater is the need for a 
continuous monitoring of its effects, for EIA before the scheme can never be 
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expected, in a matter so complex as the environment, to anticipate every 
possible environmental danger.’ 212 
 
NEMA requires that: ‘The social, economic and environmental impacts of activities, including 
disadvantages and benefits, must be considered, assessed and evaluated, and decisions 
must be appropriate in the light of such consideration and assessment’213 and in keeping 
with the continuous assessment requirement: ‘Responsibility for the environmental health 
and safety consequences of a policy, programme, project, product, process, service or 
activity exists throughout its life cycle.’214 
 
Rio Declaration, Principle 20 
‘Women have a vital role in environmental management and development. 
Their full participation is therefore essential to achieve sustainable 
development.’ 
 
This principle and principles 21, 22, 24 and 27 which follow are all related to the right to 
development and co-operation. The right to development has not been universally accepted 
and therefore cannot be regarded as forming part of international law.215 At best this right 
can be regarded as ‘soft law’ i.e. persuasive at best. 
 
NEMA incorporates this principle (and the following principle) as: ‘The vital role of women 
and youth in environmental management and development must be recognised and their full 
participation therein must be promoted.’216 
 
Rio Declaration, Principle 21 
‘The creativity, ideals and courage of the youth of the world should be 
mobilized to forge a global partnership in order to achieve sustainable 
development and ensure a better future for all.’ 
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Rio Declaration, Principle 22 
‘Indigenous people and their communities, and other local communities, have 
a vital role in environmental management and development because of their 
knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and duly support 
their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in 
the achievement of sustainable development.’ 
 
NEMA’s equivalent principle is: ‘Decisions must take into account the interests, needs and 
values of all interested and affected parties, and this includes recognising all forms of 
knowledge, including traditional and ordinary knowledge.’217 
 
Rio Declaration, Principle 24 
‘Warfare is inherently destructive of sustainable development. States shall 
therefore respect international law providing protection for the environment in 
times of armed conflict and co-operate in its further development, as 
necessary.’ 
 
There is no NEMA equivalent. 
 
Rio Declaration, Principle 27 
‘States and people shall co-operate in good faith and in a spirit of partnership 
in the fulfilment of the principles embodied in this Declaration and in the further 
development of international law in the field of sustainable development.’ 
 
 
There is no NEMA equivalent. 
 
2.2.8 Summary  
 
In summary the following extract from the Iron Rhine Railway appears to accurately 
summarise the status of the various principles of Sustainable Development: 
‘Further, international environmental law has relevance to the relations 
between the Parties. There is considerable debate as to what, within the field 
of environmental law, constitutes “rules” or “principles”; what is “soft law”; and 
which environmental treaty law or principles have contributed to the 
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development of customary international law. Without entering further into 
those controversies, the Tribunal notes that in all of these categories 
“environment” is broadly referred to as including air, water, land, flora and 
fauna, natural ecosystems and sites, human health and safety, and climate. 
The emerging principles, whatever their current status, make reference to 
conservation, management, notions of prevention and of sustainable 
development, and protection for future generations.’218 
Rather than being regarded as principles of international Sustainable Development law they 
should rather be regarded as being emergent principles219 of international environmental 
law. Sustainable Development is a concept or goal directing the integration of environmental 
law into developmental law and policy; the Integration Principle is possibly the only element 
of Sustainable Development to have truly acquired the status of customary international law. 
 
2.3 Sustainable Development in South African Law 
 
Sustainable Development is a nebulous concept and as such is unsuitable as either a basis 
for law or a legal principle. In the realm of public international law the concept has certain 
emergent legal qualities but these are to be found in underlying principles rather than in the 
concept per se.  The failure to regard these emergent principles as customary international 
law does not prevent Sustainable Development from forming part of South African domestic 
law. All the failure does is to prevent their incorporation through the Constitutional 
mechanisms discussed previously. There is no prohibition on principles of Sustainable 
Development being incorporated directly by legislation intended to do so provided that, in 
doing so, the legislation remains Constitutionally compliant. 
 
Sustainable Development has been directly incorporated into South African domestic law. 
The first attempt to do so pre-dates Section 24(b) and is found in the DFA (the Development 
Facilitation Act no. 67 of 1995). The DFA was intended to ‘introduce extraordinary measures 
to facilitate and speed up the implementation of [housing] programmes…and…to lay down 
general principles governing land development’.220 Section 3(1) created general principles 
which applied to all land developments and s 3(1)(c)(viii) provided that:  
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‘Policy, administrative practice and laws should promote efficient and 
integrated land development in that they encourage environmentally 
sustainable land development practices and processes.’ 
Like the Constitution the DFA is a contemporary of the Rio Declaration and use of 
‘environmentally sustainable land development’ suggests an attempt to include Sustainable 
Development in its early guise. As in the Constitution, there appears to be an emphasis on 
‘environmentally sustainable’ as opposed to merely ‘sustainable’. The coincidence of the 
DFA and the Constitution and the thematic similarity between ‘environmentally sustainable’ 
and ‘ecologically sustainable’ suggest a conscious attempt to provide a guide as to what this 
phrase was intended to mean. This qualification is absent from NEMA. 
 
Sustainable Development then appeared in the NEMA in 1998. Possibly recognising the 
inherent ambiguity in the concept the NEMA defines, from a planning decision making 
perspective, what it means by the phrase: ‘'sustainable development' means the integration 
of social, economic and environmental factors into planning, implementation and decision-
making so as to ensure that development serves present and future generations’221 (this 
NEMA definition of sustainable development will be referred to as NSD to differentiate it from 
Sustainable Development as used elsewhere). NEMA also sets out defined principles of how 
NSD is to be interpreted and applied. These NSD principles are contained in s 2(4)(a) which 
is set out below: 
‘Sustainable development requires the consideration of all relevant factors 
including the following: 
  (i) That the disturbance of ecosystems and loss of biological diversity are 
avoided, or, where they cannot be altogether avoided, are minimised and 
remedied; 
 (ii) that pollution and degradation of the environment are avoided, or, 
where they cannot be altogether avoided, are minimised and remedied; 
 (iii) that the disturbance of landscapes and sites that constitute the nation's 
cultural heritage is avoided, or where it cannot be altogether avoided, is 
minimised and remedied; 
 (iv) that waste is avoided, or where it cannot be altogether avoided, 
minimised and re-used or recycled where possible and otherwise disposed of 
in a responsible manner; 
                                                          
221
 S 1 of NEMA. 
P a g e  | 56 
 
 (v) that the use and exploitation of non-renewable natural resources is 
responsible and equitable, and takes into account the consequences of the 
depletion of the resource; 
 (vi) that the development, use and exploitation of renewable resources and 
the ecosystems of which they are part do not exceed the level beyond which 
their integrity is jeopardised; 
 (vii) that a risk-averse and cautious approach is applied, which takes into 
account the limits of current knowledge about the consequences of decisions 
and actions; and 
 (viii) that negative impacts on the environment and on people's 
environmental rights be anticipated and prevented, and where they cannot be 
altogether prevented, are minimised and remedied.  
 
NEMA is, in keeping with Sustainable Development, unashamedly anthropocentric. It directs 
that ‘[e]nvironmental management must place people and their needs at the forefront of its 
concern, and serve their physical, psychological, developmental, cultural and social interests 
equitably’222 and emphasises social sustainability: ‘Development must be socially, 
environmentally and economically sustainable.’223 NEMA provides a framework for 
‘integrating good environmental management into all development activities’224 and governs 
environmental impact assessments generally and specifically in regard to a ‘specific 
environmental management Act’.225 
 
It is important to note that the NEMA sets out and defines NSD and, rightly, does not rely on 
Sustainable Development per se. Secondly, the NEMA does not require that the 
environment be protected absolutely, instead it requires a minimisation of harm. Additionally, 
NEMA specifically incorporates certain emergent international environmental law principles. 
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 (h) the World Heritage Convention Act, 1999 (Act 49 of 1999), 
and includes any regulation or other subordinate legislation made in terms of any of those Acts;’. 
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These NEMA principles, however, are proper law and supersede the equivalent emergent 
international environmental law provision. (Although the emergent provisions may be used 
as interpretive guidance). Finally, environmental protection is subsumed in favour of 
perceived human needs. There can be no clearer endorsement of the NEMA as a pro-
developmental, rather than environment protecting, legislation than the words of Ngcobo J in 
the Fuel Retailers case:226 
‘[60] One of the key principles of NEMA requires people and their needs to be 
placed at the forefront of environmental management - 'batho pele'. It requires 
all developments to be socially, economically and environmentally 
sustainable…. 
[61] Construed in the light of s 24 of the Constitution, NEMA therefore requires 
the integration of environmental protection and economic and social 
development. It requires that the interests of the environment be balanced with 
socio-economic interests. Thus, whenever a development which may have a 
significant impact on the environment is planned, it envisages that there will 
always be a need to weigh considerations of development, as underpinned by 
the right to socio-economic development, against environmental 
considerations, as underpinned by the right to environmental protection. In this 
sense, it contemplates that environmental decisions will achieve a balance 
between environmental and socio-economic developmental considerations 
through the concept of sustainable development.’    
 
The Fuel Retailers case confirms that Sustainable Development is, at best, ‘an evolving 
concept of international law’227 and that: 
‘Commentators on international law have understandably refrained from 
attempting to define the concept of sustainable development. Instead they 
have identified the evolving elements of the concept of sustainable 
development. These include the integration of environmental protection and 
economic development (the principle of integration); sustainable utilisation of 
natural resources (the principle of sustainable use and exploitation of natural 
resources); the right to development; the pursuit of equity in the use and 
allocation of natural resources (the principle of intra-generational equity); the 
need to preserve natural resources for the benefit of present and future 
generations (the principle of inter-generational and intra-generational equity); 
and the need to interpret and apply rules of international law in an integrated 
systematic manner.’228 
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 Fuel Retailers case at [60] and [61] footnotes omitted. 
227
Fuel Retailers case at [46]. 
228
 Fuel Retailers case at [51]. 
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Sustainable Development therefore does form part of South African law and it may even be 
‘the fundamental building block around which environmental legal norms have been 
fashioned,…in South Africa’.229 It is argued though that this has been through NEMA which 
has ascribed the concept a distinct defined meaning and has given it a set of principles. The 
Constitutional Court has recognised the concept, its inherent weaknesses as a possible legal 
basis and has shed light on how NEMA has framed an otherwise nebulous concept. 
 
Part Three: Section 24(b) Unpacked 
 
Previously it has been argued that Section 24(b) reads as follows: 
(i) Everyone has the right to have the environment protected, for the 
benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that prevent pollution and / or 
ecological degradation. 
 
(ii) Everyone has the right to have the environment protected, for the 
benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that promote conservation. 
 
(iii) Everyone has the right to have the environment protected, for the 
benefit of present and future generations, through reasonable 
legislative and other measures that secure ecologically 
sustainable development and ecologically sustainable use of 
natural resources while promoting justifiable economic 
development and justifiable social development. 
The discussion that follows is based on this construction of the Section as well as some of 
the understanding of Sustainable Development explored previously. 
  
‘Everyone has the right to have the environment protected’ is reasonably clear and accords 
everyone (presumably all human230 inhabitants and not only a resident or citizen of South 
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 BP Southern Africa case at 144 A – B. 
230
 Section 7(1) of the Constitution states that: ‘This Bill of Rights is a cornerstone of democracy in South Africa. 
It enshrines the rights of all people in our country and affirms the democratic values of human dignity, equality 
and freedom.’ As such it would be a stretch to include any non-human in the concept of ‘everyone’. 
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Africa)231 this right. This is also evidence of the justiciable nature of the right, it addresses 
some of the concerns raised regarding the Interim Constitution in that the right is given to all 
people which makes it individually enforceable. The broad locus standi provision232 of the 
Constitution makes this right potentially exercisable on a ‘class action’ basis and this accords 
with the solidarity element usually found in ‘third-generation’ rights. The right can be 
exercised by an individual in their own right or on behalf of the ‘collective’.233 
 
Using the dictionary234 definition ‘Environment’ is defined as ‘the external surroundings in 
which a plant or animal lives, which tend to influence its development and behaviour’ or 
simply ‘external conditions or surroundings’.235  
 
It has been suggested that, in the context of Section 24, ‘environment’ should ‘not be limited 
to the non-human natural environment, but must be understood broadly to include, for 
example, socio-economic and cultural dimensions of the inter-relationships between people 
and the natural environment.’236 By regarding any external influence which can affect human 
well-being as comprising the ‘environment’ the potential definition of environment is open 
ended. ‘The term 'well-being' is open-ended and, manifestly, is incapable of precise 
definition.’237 It has even been suggested that poverty is an environmental factor.238 
Presumably though ‘environment’ as used in both Section 24(a) and in Section 24(b) should 
have the same meaning. If this is the case then ‘environment’ would be limited to the 
external surroundings which may influence human health or well-being and which can be 
polluted, ecologically degraded, conserved or ecologically sustained. This seemingly limits 
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 The Bill of Rights seems to make a clear distinction between ‘everyone’ and ‘citizen’ and the two are used in 
clear distinction in the same right, see for instance Section 21 of the Constitution. Everyone therefore means 
everyone and not just citizens. 
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 Section 38 of the Constitution. 
233
 In this regard see De Waal, J., Currie, I. and Erasmus, G., The Bill of Rights Handbook, 4
th
 ed (2001), Juta & 
Co, Landsdowne at 403. 
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 Collins English Dictionary Millennium Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, Glasgow, 1998. 
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 This is similar to the then applicable legal definition, as set out in the Environment Conservation Act no. 73 
of 1989 ‘’environment’ means the aggregate of surrounding objects, conditions and influences that influence 
the life and habits of man or any other organism or collection of organisms;’. 
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 du Plessis, A., ‘Adding Flames to the Fuel: Why Further Constitutional Adjudication is Required for South 
Africa’s Constitutional Right to Catch Alight’ (2008) 15 SAJELP 57 – 84 at 63 – 64. 
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 HTF Developers case at [18] also see Kidd, M ‘Environment’ in Currie, I and De Waal, J., The Bill of Rights 
Handbook (6
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 ed) (2013), Juta & Co., Cape Town. 
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 Du Plessis has gone so far as to argue that poverty is an environmental factor contrary to human health and 
well-being therefore requiring State intervention in terms of Section 24. Du Plessis, A., ‘South Africa's 
Constitutional Environmental Right (Generously) Interpreted: What is in it for Poverty?’ (2011) 27 SAJHR 279 – 
307. 
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the open endedness somewhat and largely confines ‘environment’ to ecological and physical 
surroundings. Such a limitation would prevent possible dilution of Section 24 to such an 
extent as to render the Section largely meaningless. 
 
‘For the benefit of present and future generations,’ is clearly an intragenerational and 
intergenerational provision similar to that found in Sustainable Development. This is 
discussed in detail later on. 
 
‘Through reasonable and other measures that secure’ suggests that this is a ‘positive right’ 
which, presumably, is to be developed over time. However the wording used distinguishes 
Section 24(b) from the socio-economic rights and this is discussed in detail later on. 
 
3.1 Section 24(b)(i) 
 
Section 24(b)(i) requires that the environment be protected through legislative and other 
measures which prevent pollution and which prevent ecological degradation. Ecological 
degradation would encompass any process or event which negatively impacted upon the 
ecological process or ecosystem and which had a permanent effect. Degradation means239 
‘the act of degrading’ or ‘the state of being degraded’ and degrading (or being degraded) 
means to reduce in worth,’ or ‘to reduce in in strength [or] quality,’. Implicit in this wording is 
the prohibition on the action of degrading and that the action will lead to a state of 
impairment. There is a degree of permanence, an action which leaves no discernible 
impairment would not constitute degradation but it may nonetheless constitute pollution. It 
also follows that the environmental ‘health’ must be measurable in order to determine 
whether or not degradation has occurred. 
 
Pollution requires the addition of an element into an ecosystem or into the environment 
which will have an adverse impact. Unlike degradation the effect may be temporary or 
short-lived. Pollution would encompass elements which do not necessarily have a long term 
adverse impact which degrades an ecosystem or ecological process, e.g. excessive dust 
production may pose a threat to human health but, ultimately, the dust would be absorbed 
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 From the Collins English Dictionary Millennium Edition, HarperCollins Publishers, Glasgow, 1998.  
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by the environment without a lasting change in state of the ecosystem. The environment 
was not degraded but a pollution event occurred, similarly noise can constitute pollution. 
 
3.2 Section 24(b)(ii) 
 
Section 24(b)(ii) requires that the legislative and other measures promote (i.e. positively 
enhance) conservation. This would require measures to protect, preserve, improve and 
carefully manage ecosystems.240 Conserve must, in the context used, refer to conservation 
of the environment and ecosystems but may also describe the manner in which non-
renewable resources are used. 
 
3.3 Section 24(b)(iii) 
 
We need to examine precisely what is meant by the phrase ‘ecologically sustainable’ as this 
is critical to understanding Section 24(b)(iii). One interpretation of ecologically sustainable is 
that it simply equates to Sustainable Development.  
 
The Australian Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999241 makes 
reference to the principles of ‘ecologically sustainable development’. One of the objects of 
the Act is ‘to promote ecologically sustainable development through the conservation and 
ecologically sustainable use of natural resources;’242 and these principles are applied, 
generally, through requiring the Minister to consider them when making a decision in terms 
of the Act.  
 
The phrase ‘ecologically sustainable development’ is defined as ‘development that improves 
the total quality of life, both now and in the future, in a way that maintains the ecological 
processes on which life depends’243 This has been interpreted as recording Sustainable 
Development as articulated in the Brundtland Report in which ‘the adjective “sustainable” is 
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 Section 3(1)(b) of the Act. 
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 The Australian National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Development Part 1 - Introduction 
P a g e  | 62 
 
qualified by “ecologically” to emphasise the necessary integration of economy and 
environment.’244 That the Australian version is indeed a formulation of Sustainable 
Development can be deduced from the three core objectives of the Australian National 
Strategy245 which are: 
 ‘to enhance individual and community well-being and welfare by 
following a path of economic development that safeguards the welfare 
of future generations 
 to provide for equity within and between generations 
 to protect biological diversity and maintain essential ecological 
processes and life-support systems’ 
The Australian National Strategy then sets out guiding principles which were promulgated as 
section 3A of the Act. The core objectives are clearly development focused and, in keeping 
with the developmental nature of Sustainable Development must be regarded as being 
anthropocentric in focus. The Australian principles clearly indicate that the environment is 
not the primary object, it is merely a ‘fundamental consideration in decision making’ while the 
primary object is, in keeping with Sustainable Development per se, that ‘decision-making 
processes should effectively integrate both long-term and short-term economic, 
environmental, social and equitable considerations.’  
 
Sustainable Development from the original Brundtland Report definition has incorporated 
elements of intra and intergenerational environmental protection, economic development and 
social development so why then does Section 24(b)(iii) refer to sustainable development and 
also uses the explicit terms, ‘ecologically’, ‘economic’ and ‘social’ as well as the reference to 
‘present and future generations’? It might well be that the section is merely a recording of 
Sustainable Development and that the final, tautologous, wording is an unpacking of the 
phrase or it might indicate a closer relationship to Sustainability or it might be a nuanced 
formulation of its own. It is submitted that Section 24(b)(iii) is distinguishable from 
Sustainable Development for the following reasons: 
1. The original formulation, as proposed section 23, was deliberately changed from 
‘sustainable development’ to ‘ecologically sustainable development’ and this change 
presumably had a reason. 
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 See fn 243 above. 
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2. Grammatically, ‘ecologically sustainable development’ implies that the ecology must 
be sustained and this is different to Sustainable Development which requires 
[economic] development to be sustainable. 
3. Pollution, Conservation and ecological degradation (as used in Section 24(b)), all 
carry specific ecological connotations which suggest that ‘ecological sustainable 
development’ and ‘ecologically sustainable use’ also have specific ecological 
meanings. 
4. Authors such as Bosselmann246 as well as Meyers and Muller247 ascribe the phrase 
‘ecologically sustainable’ with an ecocentrism which is distinct from the 
anthropocentrism of Sustainable Development.  
5. Sustainable Development is patently unsuitable as a basis (without providing 
definitions such as appear in the NEMA and the Australian law) for law and especially 
for a constitutional right. 
6. NEMA refers simply to ‘sustainable development’ whilst the Constitution and the 
earlier DFA qualified the phrase respectively as ‘ecologically sustainable 
development’ or ‘environmentally sustainable land development’ and this seems to 
entrench a difference. 
7. Finally, other elements suggestive of Sustainable Development are found elsewhere 
in Section 24(b) and simply equating the two would render Section 24(b)(iii) a 
tautologous mess. 
Instead of attributing a purely Sustainable Development meaning to ecologically sustainable 
development the element ‘ecologically sustainable’ will be interpreted as having an important 
meaning of its own. ‘Ecologically sustainable’ will therefore be read as ‘sustaining the 
ecosystem’. Sustain, sustaining and sustainability have their ordinary grammatical 
meanings,248 as an adjective, of ‘to maintain or prolong’ and ‘capable of being maintained at 
a steady level’. 
 
The United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development249 states that: ‘development is a 
comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant 
improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of 
their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of 
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benefits resulting therefrom,’250 Similarly the dictionary251 defines development as being: ‘the 
act or process of growing, progressing, or developing’. 
 
‘Ecological sustainable development’ can therefore be interpreted to mean the act or process 
of growing, progressing or developing with the intention of improving general humankind’s 
benefits whilst maintaining or prolonging the underlying ecological processes (including the 
ecosystem). 
 
‘Use’ can be contrasted with ‘development’ in that ‘development’ contemplates growth and 
developing or building, adding to an existing resource or creating new resource. ‘Use’ has 
the opposite meaning as it implies consumption and, ultimately, exhaustion of the existing 
resource. The discussion of ‘ecologically sustainable…’ used above applies here too. On this 
basis ‘ecologically sustainable use’ means the act or process of consuming or exhausting a 
resource whilst maintaining or prolonging the underlying ecological processes (including the 
ecosystem). 
 
‘Use’ and ‘development’ seem to encapsulate most possible human activities, those which 
deplete a resource or those which add to a resource. Activities which comprise both activities 
are covered by the conjunction ‘and’. 
 
‘Economic development’ is not, on the face of it, a contentious term. ‘Economic’ is capable of 
a number of definitions (as discussed previously) although the most appropriate in the 
context is ‘the complex of human activities concerned with the production, distribution, and 
consumption of goods and services.’252 Economic development is therefore the act or 
process of growing, progressing or developing (with the intention of improving general 
humankind’s benefits) the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services.  
 
Social development is usually taken to mean the betterment of humankind through 
increasing benefits. The eighth principle in the Stockholm Declaration is a useful reference:  
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‘Economic and social development is essential for ensuring a favorable living and working 
environment for man and for creating conditions on earth that are necessary for the 
improvement of the quality of life.’ Social development is therefore the pursuit of creating 
more beneficial living conditions and improving the quality of life of humankind. 
 
Part Four: Section 24 in Context 
 
 
Before examining Section 24(b) in a purposive and generous manner, and in light of the 
detailed textual interpretation given above, we will look at a brief introduction to the concepts 
of ecology, ecological sustainability and the nature of environmental rights. We will then look 
at the historical context prevailing when both Constitutions were produced and the state of 
the South African environment to distil some of the issues which an environmental right, 
such as Section 24, would have to address. In the course of this discussion we will also try 
to establish the possible intention of the drafters of the Constitution which will form a basis 
for the purposive interpretation of Section 24(b). 
 
4.1 A Discussion of Ecology, Ecological Processes and Ecosystems     
 
‘As each organism adapts to its environment, it also modifies its 
environment, sometimes in minute ways and sometimes more dramatically. 
Meanwhile, the environment is continually changing as a result of landscape 
processes, such as soil erosion, storm damage, or subsidence. "The result is 
a coupled, complex, dynamic system of organism and environment, wherein 
natural selection optimizes the fitness of populations amid a continually 
changing, biotically driven environment."’253 
 
 
Section 24(b) refers to ‘environment’ and to ecology (as used in ‘ecologically sustainable’) 
and both of these have distinct technical meanings. The word ‘ecology’ does not appear to 
be legally defined by South African law although it has been used in a number of legal 
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documents including legislation254 and reported judgements.255 The environment has 
historically been defined as the totality of biotic and abiotic elements.256  And, in this regard, it 
is a static aggregation of things. Ecological processes describe the interactions between the 
components of an environment. They are the dynamic elements. The ECA defines257 an 
‘ecological process’ which ‘means the process relating to the interaction between plants, 
animals and humans and the elements in their environment’. 
 
Ecology is the study of living organisms within the context of the interactions of the study 
organism with other living organisms and with their abiotic surroundings. ‘It is a mathematical 
study which uses empirical data, statistics and deductive reasoning in an effort to understand 
the mechanics of the natural world.’258 In its simplest form ‘ecology’ operates at three levels, 
namely those of organism, population (consisting of individuals of the same species) and 
community (consisting of various populations of different species). At the organism level 
ecology deals with how individuals of a single species react with and influence their 
environment. At the population level ecology is the study of a population’s dynamic elements 
such as distributions, scarcity and changes in population. Community ecology deals with the 
structure of communities and the interactions of populations within such communities. 
Community ecology also examines the processes and functioning of the community i.e. 
issues such as nutrient flow, biomass flow and energy transfers.259 These three levels can be 
subdivided further and the result is that ecological studies are conducted from the sub-
cellular gene level through to the ultimate community ecosystem, the biosphere260 (or 
ecosphere). 
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The ecology of an area may be taken to mean the interaction between organisms and their 
environment, within and between organisms comprising a population and / or between 
populations which form communities. Crucially this concept of ecology also encompasses 
the processes governing the community’s dynamic, notably energy (food or trophic), flows. 
Begon et al. mention that a fourth type of ecology may be referred to, namely the 
‘ecosystem’ which comprises the study of ecology at the community level but with specific 
reference to the community’s abiotic environment (the community is the biotic 
component).261 In all these studies environment includes both biotic and abiotic elements. 
Essentially, therefore, the concept of community ecology is synonymous with the concept of 
ecosystem. 
 
The concept of an ecosystem is usually used to describe a portion of the wider environment 
in which community ecological processes can be measured and the community is ‘self-
sustaining and self-regulating’.262 Ecosystem can be distinguished from the environment in 
two ways, firstly it is a sub-set of the larger environment and, secondly, it is composed of 
both the static physical (environmental) components and the dynamic ecological processes. 
 
It must be noted that an ecosystem is a conceptual tool rather than a discrete physical entity. 
An ecosystem represents a conceptual ring-fencing of a section of the environment in order 
to study a self-sustaining community ecological process or for purposes of managing a 
community. Ecosystems tend to be defined by the objectives of a study or by the resources 
of the ecologist.263 The division of the environment into ecosystems is therefore artificial. The 
ring-fencing occurs along recognisable fault lines but these are not real divisions and the 
environment cannot be truly compartmentalised. Ultimately there is only one real ecosystem, 
the biosphere (ecosphere), and even this relies on externalities of sunlight, gravity, the 
earth’s spin and celestial orbit. 
‘Perhaps the most important feature of the ecosphere is its degree of 
organisation. It is made up of countless ecosystems, themselves organised 
into smaller ones, which are further organised into still smaller ones. Each of 
these is made up of populations of different species in close interaction with 
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each other, some of which are usually organised into communities and 
families-further organised into cells, molecules and atoms etc.’264 
 
Ecological sustainability therefore implies that an ecosystem comprising of both the 
ecological processes and the physical environment will be sustained. Ecological processes 
can be measured at organism, population or community levels. Communities comprise 
populations which in turn comprise organisms. From this it may be inferred that an 
ecologically sustainable community is, by definition, composed of ecologically sustainable 
populations and organisms.  
 
Ecological sustainability can best be conceptualised through the ecological study of 
‘resilience’.  
‘The emerging ecological concept of resilience provides an umbrella theory for 
integrating concepts of ecosystem management with ecological response to 
achieve sustainability.’265 
 
Ecological resilience has been proposed as the successor to Sustainable Development as it 
addresses a number of flaws in Sustainable Development.266The achievement of ecological 
sustainability requires and contemplates active environmental management and the tool for 
determining appropriate management interventions uses the concept of the ecosystem as a 
study and management tool. 
‘Resilience is a measure of the amount of perturbation a social-ecological 
system can withstand and still maintain the same structure and functions; it 
addresses the ability of a complex system to continue to provide a full range of 
ecosystem services in the face of change.’ 267 
And 
‘Resilience is about dynamic and complex systems and is here defined as the 
capacity of a system to absorb disturbance and reorganize while undergoing 
change so as to still retain essentially the same function, structure, identity, 
and feedbacks’268  
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Given that sustainability implies maintaining or prolonging a state of affairs then the 
ecosystem’s resilience is a useful measure of ecological sustainability. The greater an 
ecosystem’s resilience the better it will withstand negative impacts and therefore the greater 
the likelihood of the cause of such negative impacts being ‘ecologically sustainable’.269 
 
In a review of ecosystem resilience Gunderson270 identified three forms of resilience. The 
first is ‘adaptive capacity’ this refers to the environment’s capacity to retain its shape over 
time or despite an external impact. Within the environment the ecological processes 
themselves show resilience. If it is assumed that there is not a single equilibrium point but 
rather multiple steady states then ‘resilience is measured by the magnitude of disturbance 
that can be absorbed before the system redefines its structure by changing the variables and 
processes that control behaviour.’271 The single state equilibrium form is described as 
‘engineering resilience’ as it assumes only one acceptable state and which state can be 
achieved through an engineered solution. In the multiple steady state system process 
resilience is described as ecological resilience as it describes a situation where the process 
can continue to be resilient up until the point where it ‘flips’ into the next equilibrium state in 
which case the process itself has changed and has assumed a new identity. The resilience 
is described by the plasticity of the process, its capacity to absorb changes without itself 
fundamentally changing. Ecological resilience seems to better describe ecosystems, 
especially where influenced by humans, whilst single state systems might exist in wholly 
natural systems. An ecosystem’s resilience is therefore determined by its environmental 
adaptive capacity and by its equilibrium state. However, even if the ecosystem remains 
stable, there is flux272 within it. The third form of resilience relates to ‘adaptive capacity’ 
which describes an ecosystem’s capacity to organise and adapt to a change in its 
environment. The environment never remains constant (e.g. nutrient levels, species 
composition and physical structures change over time) and these changes may be regarded 
as a perturbation which the ecosystem is unable to resist and which causes it to ‘flip’ into a 
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new stable state. Adaptive capacity is the system’s ability to organise around a new stable 
equilibrium after such ‘flip’.   
 
The flux within an ecosystem is described by a four phase adaptive cycle of self-
organisation. Each phase exhibits different degrees of resilience and the relationship 
between cycles in a complex system is described as panarchy as it is non-linear and non-
hierachial. 
 
Panarchy describes the relationship between adaptive (flux) cycles in complex systems.  
‘An adaptive cycle describes the process of development and decay in a 
system. The initial stage of development of short duration consists of a rapid 
exploitation and garnering of resources by system components. This stage 
has been termed the r stage or function. The r stage is followed by a k stage 
or function, a stage of longer duration characterized by the accumulation of 
capital or other system elements or energies and increasing connectivity and 
rigidity. Increasing connectivity and rigidity during the k phase leads to 
decreased resilience and eventual collapse. This stage of collapse, the 
omega, is rapid and unleashes the "energy" accumulated and stored during 
the k phase.’ 273  
In panarchy (as opposed to a linear or nested hierarchy) the flux cycles co-exist and 
influence each other in a non-hierarchical or random manner which prevents an engineered 
type solution to managing systems for resilience.274   
 
It is therefore difficult to measure ecological resilience itself. Resilience depends on which of 
the stable states an ecosystem is in (presuming it is not in an unstable state) and which 
phase of its state of flux it is in. Instead of trying to measure resilience itself it is preferable to 
measure various components which are indicative of resilience. First and foremost of these 
is biodiversity.  
 
Ecosystems with higher numbers of species tend to be more resilient than those with fewer 
species. The reasons for this are that they are less brittle in the mature phase and are more 
stable in the reorganisation phase. In the conservative phase the fewer species there are the 
                                                          
273 Garmestani, A. S., Allen, C. R. and Heriberto Cabezas, H. ‘Panarchy, Adaptive Management and Governance: 
Policy Options for Building Resilience’ (2009) 87 Nebraska Law Review 1036 – 1054 at 1037 footnotes omitted 
274 Garmestani, A. S., Allen, C. R. and Heriberto Cabezas, H. ‘Panarchy, Adaptive Management and Governance: 
Policy Options for Building Resilience’ (2009) 87 Nebraska Law Review 1036 – 1054 at 1037 – 1038. 
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greater the impact if one species is removed by the disturbance agent. If however there are 
numerous apex species then where one is removed it can be replaced without the 
ecosystem being pushed into reorganisation. If the ecosystem does enter the reorganisation 
phase then the greater the number of species the more heterogeneous it will be and 
therefore the lower the chance of the reorganisation phase being dominated by one 
coloniser or a new coloniser which means it has a greater chance of reverting to a state 
approximating its previous conservative state.  
 
Generally the greater the number of component species the more stable or resilient the 
ecosystem although this is not always the case. This is because the greater the complexity 
of the interrelationships between the species within the ecosystem the greater the 
ecosystem’s resilience. However this is not a function of the number of species per se, 
rather the critical element of ecosystem resilience seems to the complexity of the 
relationships.275 ‘Complex [eco]systems are characterized by multiple pathways of 
development (multiple states or basins of attraction), interacting periods of gradual and rapid 
change, feedbacks and non-linear dynamics, thresholds, tipping points and shifts 
(transitions) between pathways, and how such dynamics interacts across temporal and 
spatial scales.’276 As has been noted: ‘Diversity within functional groups maintains the rate of 
ecosystem processes despite environmental fluctuations, if the individual species respond 
differently to environmental fluctuations. This phenomenon is called response diversity.’277 
 
Ecosystem resilience is expressed in three ways: ‘(i) the magnitude of shock that the system 
can absorb and remain within a given state; (ii) the degree to which the system is capable of 
self-organization; and (iii) the degree to which the system can build capacity for learning and 
adaptation.’278 The first of these is the ecosystem’s ability to resist perturbation. The second 
and third describe an ecosystem’s ability to recover from the perturbation or, where recovery 
cannot happen because of fundamental change in environment or similar, to adapt to a new 
environment. Both of these latter processes require time (at an ecological scale). 
                                                          
275 This aspect is discussed by Downing, A. L. and Leibold, M. A. ‘Species richness facilitates ecosystem 
resilience in aquatic food webs’ (2010) 55 Freshwater Biology  2123–2137. 
276 Folke, et al. fn 267 at 721; Carpenter, S. R., Bennett, E. M. and Peterson. G. D. ‘Scenarios for ecosystem 
services: an overview’. (2006) 11(1) Ecology and Society 29- 38 at 38.  
277
 Carpenter, S. R., Bennett, E. M. and Peterson. G. D. ‘Scenarios for ecosystem services: an overview’. (2006) 
11(1) Ecology and Society 29- 38 at 38 citations omitted. 
278 Folke, C., Carpenter, S., Elmqvist, T., Gunderson, L., Holling, C. S. and Walker, B. ‘Resilience and Sustainable 
Development: Building Adaptive Capacity in a World of Transformations’ (2002) 31(5) AMBIO: A Journal of the 
Human Environment 437- 440 at 438. 
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In the context of Section 24(b) ‘ecologically sustainable’ would mean development or use of 
resources which allows the ecosystem to ‘cope, adapt, or reorganize without sacrificing the 
provision of ecosystem service.’279 As such ‘ecologically sustainable’ can be inferred to 
mean prevention of or retarding of environmental perturbation so as to minimise the 
perturbation or maximise the adaptation. In this sense a non-renewable resource can be 
used in an ecologically sustainable manner (although the resource itself cannot be used in 
purely sustainable manner) provided that the ecosystem is given adequate time and retains 
adequate biodiversity to adapt where it cannot resist. Therefore, and unlike Sustainable 
Development, ‘ecologically sustainable’ can be given a firm meaning relevant to its context in 
Section 24(b)(iii) and it can be objectively assessed. Preferring this interpretation provides a 
basis for interpreting the remaining provisions of Section 24(b). 
 
 
‘Ecosystems are presumed to have a stable state that can be pushed across 
a threshold by one or a set of stressors to reach an alternative stable state. A 
shift to an alternative stable state of an ecosystem occurs when a change in 
an environmental driver produces large and persistent responses in an 
ecosystem, thereby pushing the ecosystem across a threshold’280 
Ecological degradation would therefore occur where any perturbation or ‘disturbance agent’ 
which exceeded the threshold of the receiving ecosystem to absorb or cope with it. Even 
where there is sufficient time for the ecosystem to adapt to the perturbation it would still 
amount to ecological degradation as the original ecosystem has been irreversibly 
compromised and a new ecosystem with a new stable state will emerge. If insufficient time is 
afforded the system then the ecosystem will enter a terminal spiral as it is unable to achieve 
a new stable state. 
 
Biodiversity is a principal indicator of ecosystem resilience and health but is not the final 
determinant and care is required. The precautionary principle has been adopted as a 
consequence of the uncertainty and complexity involved. However biodiversity (both species 
and process diversity) is a very useful barometer of ecological resilience and can be used to 
assess ecological degradation, conservation and ecologically sustainable development.  
 
                                                          
279 Folke, et al. fn 278 at 438. 
280 Lin, B. B., and Petersen, B. ‘Resilience, regime shifts, and guided transition under climate change: examining 
the practical difficulties of managing continually changing systems’. (2013) 18:1 Ecology and Society 28 – 37 at 
30 citations omitted. 
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Conservation can be regarded as the active management of ecosystems to maximise their 
resilience. Increasingly ecosystem management rather than species management is being 
regarded as the optimal form of management and conservation.281 Conservation therefore 
protects biodiversity and also actively manages ecosystems in order to do so.  
‘As conservation seeks to preserve very complex structures such as 
ecosystems, it is not possible to attribute to conservation a simplistic or 
segmented view. Conservation for resilience must take into account the 
interconnections between the various components of an ecosystem and it must 
include in the concept of "land" not only the forests and preserved landscapes, 
but also the landscapes intensely modified by humans.’282 
That the same reasoning would apply to aquatic conservation is taken for granted. As a 
means for enhancing resilience conservation would also encompass rehabilitation and 
remediation although these can be problematic.  Conservation should seek to protect the 
environment and enhance ecosystem resilience and preserve biodiversity. 
‘This leads, finally, to the conclusion that if humans can keep their alteration of 
nature within parameters that ecological systems have experienced in the 
past, the systems are likely to retain existing ecological functions over broad 
scales of time and place. The key question is whether scientists can identify 
the limits beyond which we risk ecological collapse, and whether we can 
develop laws and policies that will keep us within those limits.’283 
 
4.2 The Nature of Environmental Rights 
 
In exploring the nature of environmental law it has been noted284 that environmental law may 
derive its status as a right in three ways: firstly as an element of human rights law because 
the purpose of environmental protection is the preservation and enhancement of human 
welfare (an anthropocentric view);285 alternatively through an intrinsic right of the 
environment itself whilst recognising the humankind is merely a component of the wider 
                                                          
281 Allen, C. R., Cumming, G. S., Garmestani, A. S., Taylor, P. D. and Walker, B. H. ‘Managing for 
resilience’(2011) 17(4) Wildlife Biology 337-349. 
282
 Demange, L. H. M. D. L., ‘The Principle of Resilience’ (2012) 30 Pace Environmental Law Review 695 at 714. 
283 Bosselman, F., ‘What Lawmakers Can Learn From Large-scale Ecology’ (2001) 17 Journal of Land Use and 
Environmental Law 207 - at 219. 
284
 See for instance van Reenen, T. P., ‘Constitutional Protection of the Environment: Fundamental (Human) 
Right or Principle of State Policy’. (1997) 4 SAJELP 269 – 290  at 275 – 276 and Theron-Nelson, C ‘ A 
Jurisprudential Overview of the Question What does the Right to a Decent Environment Mean? ‘(1999) 6 
SAJELP 205-230 at 209-210. 
285 
‘The anthropocentric, human-centred approach holds, in an environmental context, that a healthy and 
sustainable natural environment should be holistically maintained for the sake of human well-being as 
opposed to for the environment's own sake.’ Du Plessis, A.,  Fulfilment of South Africa's Constitutional 
Environmental Right in the Local Government  Sphere (2008) LLD Thesis, North-West University at 29 footnote 
omitted. 
P a g e  | 74 
 
environment  and therefore ‘human rights are subsumed under the primary objective of 
protecting nature as a whole’ (an ecocentric286 view); the third approach is to recognise that 
human rights and environmental rights exist separately but in parallel, where they share ‘a 
core of common interests and objectives’ (an egocentric view). None of these three 
approaches is entirely satisfactory and a fourth alternative is proposed. 
 
The approaches to environmental rights represent three distinct approaches but, in 
compartmentalising them, we possibly lose sight of the truly paradoxical nature of the human 
nature relationship. ‘People and societies are integrated parts of the biosphere, depending 
on its functioning and life-support while also shaping it globally’.287 
 
Biologically there can be no doubt that humans are animals and that in our primitive state we 
are a component of the natural world in exactly the same way that any other animal, or 
indeed any other organism, is. Although all organisms adapt to and modify their 
environments humankind’s development has given it capacity unparalleled by other animals 
to dominate, control and regulate (at least to a point) the natural world. This capacity has 
also allowed humankind to shield itself from nature, in this regard we are no longer primitive 
but have buffered ourselves against many of the direct impacts of nature on us. Humans are 
also characterised by a will which can be directed to the conscious and deliberate 
modification of the natural environment with disregard to and, seeming impunity from, the 
environmental consequences of these modifications.288 
‘The history of life on earth has been a history of interaction between living 
things and their surroundings. To a large extent, the physical form and habits 
of the earth’s vegetation and its animal life have been molded by the 
environment. Considering the whole span of earthly time, the opposite effect, 
in which life actually modifies its surroundings, has been relatively slight. 
Only within the moment of time represented by the present century has one 
species – man – acquired significant power to alter the nature of his world.’289 
                                                          
286 
‘ The ecocentric approach suggests that on the one hand, rights should be afforded to the natural 
environment and on the other hand, that existing environmental rights (as rights afforded to people) should be 
interpreted not in terms of the value they afford to humanity, but in line with the environment's intrinsic 
worth.’ Du Plessis, A.,  fn 285 above at 35 footnote omitted. 
287
 Folke et al. fn 268 at 719 footnote omitted. 
288
 Some modifications include: the use of ‘Agent Orange’ ( the defoliant 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T) during the Vietnam 
War (c1960’s) in an attempt to defoliate large areas of jungle to make it more difficult for enemy forces to 
remain hidden; the draining of the fens in eastern England to produce arable farmland, this project is thought 
to have been begun in the 1630’s although there might have been earlier attempts to do so; the widespread 
spraying of DDT to control the occurrence of the Tsetse Fly (Glossina spp.) and thereby to limit the occurrence 
of the livestock disease nagana in KwaZulu-Natal.    
289
 Carson, R., Silent Spring (1962) Crest Books, New York, Chapter 2 page 16. 
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Humans therefore have two simultaneous relationships with nature, they can be an integral 
part of nature, or they can be a domineering force directing nature. These two relationships 
co-exist at all times and therefore humankind is, at the same time, both a servant of nature 
(an integral part of nature subject to its forces) and a master of nature (a domineering force 
bending nature to its will); we are both the trustee and beneficiary290 and this paradox needs 
to be factored into the understanding of human-nature interactions. Environmental rights 
need to be appreciated in light of this paradoxical relationship; at one level these rights are 
anthropocentric – humans need the environment to have rights for purely selfish reasons but, 
at the same time, these selfish objectives will not be fulfilled over time unless the 
environmental rights have an ecocentric quality. The environment needs to be protected from 
humans and humans need to be protected from the environment. This would require 
environmental rights to have two simultaneous centres of focus. Environmental rights should 
not be regarded as either anthropocentric or ecocentric but as bicentric. The bicentric 
environmental right provides for anthropocentric protection of humans from their environment 
and for accumulation by humans of benefits from their environment while simultaneously and 
equally providing for ecocentric protection of the environment from humans and the 
stewardship291 or trusteeship292 role which humans have in respect of the environment. 
 
This paradoxical bicentric relationship is further characterised by the fact that humans have 
interposed increasingly complex buffers between themselves and the natural world. The 
‘thickness’ of the buffer represents the degree of disconnection between humans and nature. 
The buffer may be of three forms: it may be either an absolute shield, or it may alter some of 
the impacts and allow others through unaltered, or it may simply delay the passing on of the 
impacts. The alteration of the impacts may be either positive (amelioration) or negative 
(escalation) and a buffer will probably take a combination of the forms. 
 
                                                          
290 ‘[Brown Weiss] posits the present generation of humans as both beneficiaries of a planetary legacy passed 
down from the past and as trustees of the planetary legacy for future generations.’ Brown Weiss is credited as 
being instrumental in developing the doctrine of intergenerational equity. Collins, L. M. ‘Revisiting the Doctrine 
of Intergenerational Equity in Global Environmental Governance’ (2007) 30 Dalhousie Law Journal 79 - 140 at 
93 footnote omitted. 
291 ‘Tipping points and thresholds highlight the importance of understanding and managing resilience. New 
modes of flexible governance are emerging. A central challenge is to reconnect these efforts to the changing 
preconditions for societal development as active stewards of the Earth System. We suggest that the 
Millennium Development Goals need to be reframed in such a planetary stewardship context combined with a 
call for a new social contract on global sustainability.’ Folke, et al. fn 268 at 719. 
292 ‘Through the concept of "public trusteeship", a stewardship ethic has been incorporated into South African 
natural resources law.’ van der Schyff, E., ‘Unpacking The Public Trust Doctrine: A Journey Into Foreign 
Territory’ (2010) 13:5 PELJ 121 – 189 at 123. 
P a g e  | 76 
 
As a result there is a chain reaction from the actions of humankind, through the buffer, to 
nature, through a second buffer, back to humankind. The actions of humankind ultimately 
filter back to humankind and there is a very real potential of mutually re-enforcing activities (a 
feedback loop is created) which can direct humankind into a spiral the direction of which 
depends on the nature of the activity. It is critical to this understanding that humans and 
nature are regarded as distinct elements of a cyclical indivisible293 whole. It is also important 
that the feedback loop is not linear, in a legal context the ‘causal’ link is present but mostly 
unprovable. 
 
Ecocentric rights which seek to protect the environment whilst excluding the domineering 
role of humanity ignore a primary component of ecosystems, humanity, which has powers 
and capabilities beyond those of other species. ‘Throughout history humanity has shaped 
nature and nature has shaped the development of human society. We are currently living in 
the Anthropocene era where most aspects of the functioning of the Earth system cannot be 
understood without accounting for the strong influence of humanity.’294 Likewise 
anthropocentric rights which favour humanity over intrinsic environmental health ignore the 
fact that humanity is part of and an integrated dependent of the environment. ‘Although 
people modify ecosystems, there are also significant feedbacks from ecosystem change to 
livelihoods, health, economies, and societies that lead to changes in human systems, 
engendering further ecosystem change.’295 Anthropocentric rights which ignore this fact do 
not actually confer a long term benefit on the holder of such ‘right’ which should be more 
correctly regarded as a burden than as a benefit; in the long term such ‘rights’ are damaging.  
 
 
A topical example which can illustrate the paradoxical relationship is to be found in global 
climate change. The IPCC296 has reported297 that it estimates that in the period between 
                                                          
293
 Although in a different context the cyclical paradoxical nature of the relationship between humankind 
(development) and nature (environment) was recognised by Ngcobo J in the Fuel Retailers case where it was 
stated that ‘Unlimited development is detrimental to the environment and the destruction of the environment 
is detrimental to development. Promotion of development requires the protection of the environment. Yet the 
environment cannot be protected if development does not pay attention to the costs of environmental 
destruction. The environment and development are thus inexorably linked.’ Fuel Retailers Association of 
Southern Africa v Director-General: Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Conservation and 
Environment, Mpumalanga Province, and Others 2007 (6) SA 4 (CC) at [44]. 
294
 Folke, C. ‘Reserves and resilience—from single equilibrium to complex systems’ (2003) 32(6) AMBIO: A 
Journal of the Human Environment  379-379. 
295 Carpenter, S. R., Bennett, E. M. and Peterson. G. D. ‘Scenarios for ecosystem services: an overview’. (2006) 
11(1) Ecology and Society 29 - 38 at 30. 
296
 The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
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1750 and 2011 somewhere between 470 and 640 PgC298 have been released into the 
atmosphere of which about 240 PgC have been retained in the atmosphere. This carbon 
was released as a consequence of anthropogenic fossil fuel combustion, cement production, 
and land use changes (mainly deforestation). The difference in carbon levels between what 
has been released and what has been retained indicates how much carbon has been taken 
up by ocean and terrestrial ecosystems. Best estimates (with a confidence of highly likely) 
are that between 125 and 185 anthropogenic PgC have been taken up by the oceans. 
 
The retention of carbon in the atmosphere has resulted in unprecedented warming and this 
is immediately felt by humankind. However the increase in oceanic carbon uptake causes 
acidification of the oceans as CO2 combines with sea water to form carbonic acid (H2CO3). 
Post the industrial revolution the pH of ocean surface water has decreased (i.e. become 
more acidic) by 0.1. (The pH scale is a logarithmic  scale which runs from 0 – highly acidic, 
to 7 – neutral, to 14 – highly basic, the measured change of 0.1 is not insignificant and 
represents an approximately 26% increase in acidity). Higher levels of carbonic acid can 
impair the uptake of calcium carbonate by animals. Calcium carbonate is the principal 
source of calcium which is used by almost all animals to form bone, cartilage and 
exoskeletons. This, in turn, affects fisheries upon which humans rely heavily as a protein 
source. This is reflected in the warning given by the IPCC: 
‘ocean acidification poses substantial risks to marine ecosystems, especially 
polar ecosystems and coral reefs, associated with impacts on the physiology, 
behavior, and population dynamics of individual species from phytoplankton to 
animals (medium to high confidence). Highly calcified mollusks, echinoderms, 
and reef-building corals are more sensitive than crustaceans (high confidence) 
and fishes (low confidence), with potentially detrimental consequences for 
fisheries and livelihoods. Ocean acidification acts together with other global 
changes (e.g., warming, decreasing oxygen levels) and with local changes 
(e.g., pollution, eutrophication) (high confidence). Simultaneous drivers, such 
as warming and ocean acidification, can lead to interactive, complex, and 
amplified impacts for species and ecosystems.’299 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
297 The facts and figures used in this discussion are taken from the IPCC AR5 (IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: 
The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. 
Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United 
Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pp.). Any error in their interpretation or application is the author’s and 
not the IPCC’s. The information used was found at TS.2.8.1 pages 50 – 52, read with 295. 
298
 ‘1 Petagram of carbon = 1 PgC = 1015 grams of carbon = 1 Gigatonne of carbon = 1 GtC. This corresponds to 
3.667 GtCO2.’ 
299 IPCC WGII, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 
(31 March 2014) at page 18 footnotes and references omitted. 
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In this example humans have modified the environment through releasing CO2 but the 
impacts of this are not felt directly.300 Instead the CO2 is absorbed by the atmosphere which 
acts as a short-term buffer. From this short-term buffer CO2 is absorbed by ecosystems 
(oceanic and terrestrial) which act as long-term buffers. The CO2 retained in the atmosphere 
(short-term buffer) has had an almost instantaneous direct impact on humans. For example 
as felt through warming, storms and drought which were the first signs of global climate 
change. However the (long-term) environmental buffers, and in this case the ocean, transmit 
the effect of the anthropogenic CO2 to a number of ecological processes through acidification 
and this compromises the environment. Humans are then impacted, not directly by this 
portion of the CO2 (there are no life choking pockets of CO2 floating around) nor by more 
acidic oceans (we are still able to sail, swim and extract salt) but through decreased protein 
supply. This decreased protein supply can be buffered by increased terrestrial production 
requiring increasing amount of fossil fuel based fertilisers and increased land clearances thus 
exacerbating this cycle. 
 
Human modification of the environment and the resulting cyclical impacts are not new 
phenomena and cannot be solely attributed to post-industrial humans.301 There can be no 
doubting that industrialisation increased both humanity’s capability for modification and its 
consumption of resources necessitating modification. However humans have always had this 
capability. Diamond, in his prize-winning work Guns, Germs and Steel,302 provides a 
convincing prehistoric example of this capability. Although this theory is not without challenge 
its logic is compelling.  
 
According to Diamond303 humans arrived in Australia between 35,000 and 40,000 years ago. 
Their arrival coincided with the mass extinction of all large (i.e. heavier than 45 kilograms) 
animal species (excluding the red kangaroo).304 In his interrogation of human development 
                                                          
300
 CO2 is heavier than air and if it was not absorbed by the atmosphere there would be pockets of life choking 
CO2 settling in low lying areas. 
301
 A resonating theme is that environmental degradation is a consequence of post-industrial human’s 
increased capabilities to modify the environment and coupled increasing consumption of resources. See for 
instance Okon E. E., ‘The Environmental Perspective in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution’ (2003) 5 Environmental 
Law Review 256 at 256. As will be seen this is not strictly speaking true. 
302
 Diamond, J. Guns, Germs and Steel: a short history of everybody for the last 13,000 years. (2005) Vantage 
Books, London 
303
 A synopsis of Diamond’s theory appears on pages 41 to 50 of his book. 
304 ‘Humans most likely played a decisive role in the demise of the megafauna in Australia and North America 
45,000 and 13,000 years ago, respectively, and most certainly in Madagascar during the past 2,000 years.’ 
Hanski, I. ‘The World that Became Ruined’ (2008) 9 EMBO Reports Special Issue s34 at s35. 
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Diamond postulates that one of the key foundations of human social development was the 
domestication of large animals. Few large animals are suitable candidates for domestication 
and, by exterminating the few large animal species then present, the ancient Australian 
Aborigines forsook any possibility of ever domesticating large animals. The lack of 
agricultural development condemned Australian Aborigines to life as hunter gatherers and 
prevented the social development found in Eurasia where first agriculture and then complex 
bureaucratic civilisations developed. Hunter gatherer societies were never able to develop 
this complexity because they never developed large population sizes with resultant social 
diversity. It must be stressed that the argument is not that this was the sole cause of different 
developmental pathways nor that, had the extermination of the large animals not occurred, 
agriculture would necessarily have followed. There are numerous causal factors and the 
availability of large animals is only one of these. However this pattern is mirrored by the 
movement of humans into North America approximately 13,000 years ago, this coincided 
with a similar extermination of a number of species of (although not all) large animals and 
similar pattern of non-development of agriculture or complex societies in North America305 
(until the much later external introduction of agriculture) followed. These hunter gatherer 
societies were unable to resist or cope with subsequent invasion by the large bureaucratic 
societies. If Diamond is correct (and his argument is compelling) then these would be early 
examples of human modification of their environment and the cyclical nature of the impacts. 
By modifying their environments early humans constrained any possibility of further social 
development and left themselves vulnerable to subsequent invasion, partial extermination 
and finally domination. These consequences of this modification were unforeseeable and 
heavily buffered; although environmental they only manifested thousands of years later and 
as social impacts.  
 
It is submitted that this bicentric cyclical paradox better explains the true relationship 
between humans and nature and therefore is a better interpretation of environmental rights 
than the egocentric (parallel), anthropocentric or ecocentric models referred to. 
Environmental rights are rights shared by nature and humans as, in the final analysis, there 
is no biological distinction between the two. However to simply regard humans as one more 
component of the natural world ignores the fact that humans have and will continue to have 
impacts far greater than other species. To argue that the environment can have rights 
exclusive of humans or that humans can have rights exclusive of the environment is flawed. 
The interrelationship has been aptly summarised: 
                                                          
305
 Limited agricultural development in central and southern America gave rise to complex societies but these 
never domesticated large animals. 
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‘Human action is changing the climate, land cover, oceans, and the 
biogeochemistry of the fundamental cycles that sustain life, and the diversity 
of life itself. These changes threaten the future availability of ecosystem 
services, defined as the benefits that people obtain from nature. Although 
people are buffered from the natural environment by culture and technology, 
ultimately our livelihoods, health, and even survival are completely dependent 
on ecosystem services.’306 
 
4.3 Constructing Section 24 
 
‘Our Constitution is a wholly different kind of instrument. For present purposes 
it is sufficient to note that it is infinitely more explicit, more detailed, more 
balanced, more carefully phrased and counterpoised, representing a multi-
disciplinary effort on the part of hundreds of expert advisors and political 
negotiators to produce a blueprint for the future governance of the country.’307 
 
In 1990 the ‘Nationalist’ government of South Africa entered into negotiations with the ANC 
(African National Congress) dominated opposition groups (the so-called ‘liberation’ 
movement). It was these negotiations which lead to the formation of the Interim Constitution 
and to the first democratic elections in 1994. The democratically elected government then 
negotiated and finalised the Constitution in due course.308 
 
Coinciding with the Constitutional processes were a number of environmentally significant 
developments. The 1992 Rio Conference and the Rio Declaration were seminal moments in 
the evolution of Sustainable Development309 along with Caring for the Earth: A Strategy for 
                                                          
306 Carpenter, S. R., Bennett, E. M. and Peterson. G. D., ‘Scenarios for ecosystem services: an overview’. (2006) 
11(1) Ecology and Society 29 - 38 at 29 (references omitted). 
307
 Kriegler J comparing the South African Constitution to that of the United States of America states. ‘The 
United States Constitution stands as a monument to the vision and the libertarian aspirations of the Founding 
Fathers; and the First Amendment in particular to the values endorsed by all who cherish freedom. But they 
paint eighteenth century revolutionary insights in broad, bold strokes. The language is simple, terse and direct, 
the injunctions unqualified and the style peremptory. Our Constitution is a wholly…’ S v Mamabolo (E TV and 
Others Intervening) 2001 (3) SA 409 (CC) at [40]. 
308
 See generally Sarkin, J. ‘The Drafting of South Africa's Final Constitution from a Human-Rights Perspective’ 
(1999) 47 American Journal of Comparative Law 67 – 87 as discussed below. 
309 ‘The United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development (also known as the Earth Summit) 
was held in 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil and attended by approximately 20,000 people from 178 countries. 
Five documents enunciating the concept of ecologically sustainable development and recommending a 
programme of action for the implementation of the concept were signed at UNCED. They were: 
• The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; 
• Agenda 21; 
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Sustainable Living. In addition to the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 the Rio Conference 
saw the publication of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Also in 1992; the United 
Nations published its widely-ratified UNFCCC (the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change). South Africa promulgated its Interim Constitution in 1993 and the 
Constitution in 1996. The early 1990’s therefore represented an extremely fertile period in 
the formulation of environmental law and policy from a South African perspective. 
 
The Constitutional negotiation310 process appears to be critical to the interpretation of 
Section 24(b).311 This was a two phase process with the Interim Constitution being the 
product of a negotiated settlement where the primary role players were the Nationalist 
Government and the ANC led liberation movement. These two parties then formed a 
government of national unity and, through the Constitutional Assembly and employing a 
broadly consultative process, forged the Constitution which was subsequently adopted.312  
 
In drafting Section 24(b) the starting point was Section 29 of the Interim Constitution. Section 
29 was both welcomed and criticised. Some of the criticisms313 were listed by Glavovic as: ‘ 
 it is doubtful whether it is of horizontal application 
 it does not impose the duty to uphold it on the state and all persons, including 
juristic persons; 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
• The Convention on Biological Diversity; 
• The Framework Convention on Climate Change; and 
• The Statement of Forest Principles.’ 
From Preston, B. J. Ecologically Sustainable Development in the Courts in Australia and Asia A paper presented 
to a seminar on environmental law organised by Buddle Findlay, Lawyers, Wellington, New Zealand, 28 August 
2006 at page 4, footnote omitted. 
310
 Sachs prefers to regard the process as a ‘construction’ and argues against negotiation, by constructing a bill 
of rights a purpose built document is achieved. See Sachs, A. ‘Towards A Bill Of Rights In A Democratic South 
Africa’ (1990) 6 SAJHR  1 – 24 at 10 – 11.  
311 Sarkin objectively describes this negotiation process in some detail.  Sarkin, J., ‘The Drafting of South 
Africa's Final Constitution from a Human-Rights Perspective’ (1999) 47 American Journal of Comparative Law 
67 - 87 at 68, footnote omitted. 
312 Sarkin, in his comprehensive discussion of the process, pages 67 – 77 inclusive, records the adoption (page 
72) thus: ‘As the two-year deadline for completion of the text approached, much of the final negotiations took 
place in all-night sessions. The text was finally adopted on 8 May, approved by an overwhelming majority of 80 
out of 90 Senators and 321 out of 400 National Assembly members. The African National Congress (ANC) voted 
in favor, as did the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), the National Party (NP) and the Democratic Party (DP). The 
African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), holding two seats, was the only party to vote against the 
Constitution, while the white right-wing party, the Freedom Front, abstained.’ After amendment following 
certification by the Constitutional Court the final version was signed into law in Sharpeville on 10 December 
1996.  Sarkin, J., ‘The Drafting of South Africa's Final Constitution from a Human-Rights Perspective’ (1999) 47 
American Journal of Comparative Law 67 – 87. 
313
 See also Kotzé, L. J., ‘A Critical Survey of Domestic Constitutional Provisions Relating to Environmental 
Protection in South Africa’ (2007) 14 Tilburg Law Review 298 at 301 – 302, footnotes omitted. 
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 it is negatively phrased and thus qualitatively inferior to the other rights 
entrenched in [the bill of rights]; 
 it makes no reference to sustainable development or the wise use of natural 
resources; 
 it makes no reference to the interests of future generations; 
 it makes no reference to the minimisation of waste generation and pollution; 
 it makes no reference to consideration of the environment in land use planning; 
 it makes no reference to the protection of biodiversity; 
 it makes no reference to the protection of our natural heritage (sites, wilderness 
and wildlife); 
 it makes no reference to the promotion of environmental education and 
awareness.’314 
 
Whilst it is not argued that the re-formulation of the environmental right as Section 24 (and in 
particular through the inclusion of Section 24(b)) was intended to address any or all of these 
criticisms it is clear that some were addressed when the draft of Section 24 (then proposed 
as Section 23), was produced.315 
 
The Nationalist Government’s stance to the environment seems to be best illustrated 
through its Environment Conservation Act, no. 73 of 1989. This was based on a preceding 
parliamentary Bill which ‘contained a far-reaching section which was akin to an 
environmental bill of rights.’316 This section referred to itself as a ‘National Policy for 
Environmental Conservation. Statement of principles’ and, in accordance with the proposed 
section 3(3), ‘All other laws shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the 
principles and policy contained in this Act’317 This Policy was subsequently promulgated318 
(just before the first democratic elections) in an amended format, by the Nationalist 
Government, as the ‘General Policy in terms of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 
1989’ the preamble319 to this is set out below: 
‘The environmental policy is based on the following premises and principles: 
[1] Every inhabitant of the Republic of South Africa has the right to live, 
work and relax in a safe, productive, healthy and aesthetically and culturally 
                                                          
314
 Glavovic, P. D., ‘Environmental Rights as Fundamental Rights’ (1996) 3 SAJELP 71 - 79 at 78. 
315
 See section 1.3 above. 
316
 Glazewski, J., ‘The Environment, Human Rights and a New South African Constitution’ (1991) 7 SAJHR 167 – 
184 at 180 also see Lyster, R. ‘The Protection of Environmental Rights’ (1992) 109 SALJ 518 – 528 at 521. 
317
 Section 3(3) of the Environment Conservation Bill as reported by  Glazewski, J., ‘The Environment, Human 
Rights and a New South African Constitution’ (1991) 7 SAJHR 167 – 184 at 181.   
318
 GN 51 of 1994 (Government Gazette 15428 of 21 January 1994) as per Juta’s Environmental Library 30 
September 2013, Jutastat Publications, South Arica. 
319
 Paragraph numbering has been inserted for ease of reference. 
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acceptable environment and therefore also has a personal responsibility to 
respect the same right of his fellow man. 
[2]  Every generation has an obligation to act as a trustee of its natural 
environment and cultural heritage in the interest of succeeding generations. In 
this respect, sobriety, moderation and discipline are necessary to restrict the 
demand for fulfilment of needs to sustainable levels. 
[3] Every inhabitant of the Republic of South Africa has the responsibility 
to regulate the size of his family to such an extent as to ensure that the 
population growth be kept within the confines of available resources so as to 
make possible a meaningful life for his descendants. 
[4] The State, every person and every legal entity has a responsibility to 
consider all activities that may have an influence on the environment duly and 
to take all reasonable steps to promote the protection, maintenance and 
improvement of both the natural environment and the human living 
environment. 
[5] The maintenance of natural systems and ecological processes and the 
protection of all species, diverse habitats and land forms is essential for the 
survival of all life on earth. 
[6] Renewable resources are part of complex and interlinked ecosystems 
and must through proper planning and judicious management be maintained 
for sustainability. Non-renewable natural resources are limited and their 
utilisation must be extended through judicious use and maximum reuse of 
materials with the object of combating further over-exploitation of these 
resources. 
[7]  The concept of sustainable development is accepted as the guiding 
principle for environmental management. Development and educational 
programmes are necessary to promote economic growth, social welfare and 
environmental awareness, to improve standards of living and to curtail the 
growth in the human population. Such programmes must be formulated and 
applied with due regard for environmental considerations. 
[8]  A partnership must be established between the State and the 
community as a whole, the private sector, developers, commerce and industry, 
agriculture, local community organisations, non-Governmental organisations 
(representing other relevant players), and the international community so as to 
pursue environmental goals collectively. 
Environmental Management System 
 [9] Each Minister, Administrator, local authority and government institution 
upon which any power has been conferred or to which any duty which may 
have an influence on the environment has been assigned by or under any act 
shall exercise such power and perform such duty with a view to promoting the 
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objectives stated in section 2 of the Environment Conservation Act, 1989 (Act 
73 of 1989). 
 [10] Every Government department and institution will accept full 
accountability for the consequences that the activities within its field of 
responsibility may have on the environment. 
 [11] The Department of Environment Affairs must conduct a continuous 
process of consultation, co-ordination, policy formulation, planning, legislation, 
monitoring and evaluation that is designed to direct and influence the activities 
of all Government institutions, non-Governmental organisations, private 
entrepreneurs and other participants in such a way that policy objectives are 
pursued. 
 [12] Although environmental matters are primarily the responsibility of the 
Central Government, executive responsibilities should, as far as possible, be 
devolved to regional and provincial governments and local authorities 
according to national norms, standards and guidelines established by the 
Central Government. Regional governments will be responsible for all regional 
environmental matters. Regional governments must, however have the 
financial means and proven expertise to perform such functions. 
[13] Organisations, companies and other players whose activities may have 
an impact on the environment must be encouraged to establish and implement 
formal environmental management systems based on acceptable standards 
and guidelines so as to enable them to exercise self-control over any of their 
activities that may influence the environment.’ 
 
This Policy was binding on ‘[e]ach Minister, Administrator, local authority and government 
institution upon which any power has been conferred or to which any duty has been 
assigned in connection with the environment by or under any law…’320  
 
The second main role player, the ANC, had produced a document, ‘A Bill of Rights for a New 
South Africa’,321 in 1990 and this was revised in 1993. These were drafts of what would, 
through negotiation, become the Interim and then Final Constitution respectively. Both 
provided for environmental rights and the revised text322 is quoted below: 
 
                                                          
320
 Section 3 of the Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 prior to amendment in 1992 and the subsequent 
repeal of this section. 
321
 http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=231 accessed 26 April 2014. 
322
 Provisions relating to Land only have been omitted, see http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=231 accessed 
26 April 2014. 
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‘Article 12 LAND AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
(1) The land, the waters and the sky and all the natural assets which they 
contain, are the common heritage of the people of South Africa who are 
equally entitled to their enjoyment and responsible for their conservation. 
(2) The system of property rights in relation to land shall take into account that 
it is the country's primary asset, the basis of life's necessities, and a finite 
resource. 
Rights to Land 
(3)…(11) omitted. 
(12) All natural resources below and above the surface area of the land, 
including the air, and all forms of potential energy or minerals in the territorial 
waters, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone of South Africa, 
which are not otherwise owned at the time of coming into being of this 
Constitution, shall be vested in the state acting as trustee of the whole nation. 
(13) The State shall have the right to regulate the exploitation of all natural 
resources, grant franchises and determine royalties subject to payment of just 
compensation in the event of interference with any existing title, mining right or 
concession. 
Environmental Rights 
(14) All men and women shall have the right to a healthy and ecologically 
balanced environment and the duty to defend it. 
(15) In order to secure this right, the State, acting through appropriate 
agencies and organs shall conserve, protect and improve the environment, 
and in particular:  
a) prevent and control pollution of the air and waters and degradation and 
erosion of the soil; 
b) have regard in local, regional and national planning to the maintenance 
or creation of balanced ecological and biological areas and to the 
prevention or minimising of harmful effects on the environment; 
c) promote the rational use of natural resources, safeguarding their 
capacity for renewal and ecological stability. 
d) ensure that long-term damage is not done to the environment by 
industrial or other forms of waste; 
e) maintain, create and develop natural reserves, parks and recreational 
areas and classify and protect other sites and landscapes so as to 
ensure the preservation and protection of areas of outstanding cultural, 
historic and natural interest. 
(16) Legislation shall provide for co-operation between the State, non-
governmental organisations, local communities and individuals in seeking to 
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improve the environment and encourage ecologically sensible habits in daily 
life. 
(17) The law shall provide for appropriate penalties and reparation in the case 
of any damage caused to the environment, and permit the interdiction by any 
interested person or by any agency established for the purpose of protecting 
the environment, of any public or private activity or undertaking which 
manifestly and unreasonably causes or threatens to cause irreparable 
damage to the environment.’ 
 
These two excerpts clearly indicate the respective policy positions of the two primary role 
players regarding environmental rights. Furthermore the policy positions clearly influenced 
the content of Section 24(b) and must therefore be strong indicators of the intention323 of the 
drafters of the Constitution.324 They will be referred to as the Government Policy and the 
ANC Policy respectively. It is also apparent that, despite differences, they are very similar in 
many regards. 
 
The Government position was also influenced by the South African Law Commission which 
proposed a draft environmental right before 1991 (and the promulgation of the Government 
Policy in 1993): 
‘“Everyone has the right not to be exposed to an environment which is 
dangerous to human health or well-being or which is seriously detrimental 
thereto and has the right to the conservation and protection of that 
environment.”'325 
The Law Commission also reportedly proposed ‘that the jus abutendi (the common-law right 
of the owner of property to do as he likes with it) ought to be abolished’.326 This draft right is 
important as it indicates a clear ecocentric environmental conservation and protection 
element (these are not linked to or measured by human health or well-being) in addition to 
                                                          
323
 Although a contextual and purposive interpretation is preferred (see ‘Constitutional Interpretation’ section 
1.1 above) the drafters’ intention can still be a useful starting point. For a discussion of the problems of 
interpretation based on intention see Davis, D., ‘Overview of the 1993 Interim Constitution and 1996 
Constitution’ in Davis, Cheadle and Haysom (eds.) Fundamental Rights in the Constitution: Commentary and 
Cases.  Cape Town, Juta and Co., (1997), pages 1-24. 
324
 It is assumed that, in preparing the Interim Constitution, the focus was on the more immediate political and 
fundamental freedom rights. Certainly section 29 of the Interim Constitution seems to be a curt rendition of 
two clearly more complex positions. Presumably this was, as with the whole Interim Constitution, a stopgap 
measure as well as being a trade off in a larger political game. The ‘trade off’ argument is advanced by Kotzé, L. 
J., ‘A Critical Survey of Domestic Constitutional Provisions Relating to Environmental Protection in South Africa’ 
(2007) 14 Tilburg Law Review 298 at 301. 
325
 Lyster, R., ‘The Protection of Environmental Rights’ (1992) 109 SALJ 518 – 528 at 527 citation omitted. 
326
 Lyster, R., ‘The Protection of Environmental Rights’ (1992) 109 SALJ 518 – 528 at 527. 
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the anthropocentric health and well-being environmental rights. Respectively the progenitors 
of Section 24(b)(i), Section 24(b)(ii) and Section 24(a). The proposal to limit property 
ownership rights is an important factor as will be seen when the question of reasonableness 
in limiting rights (a possible deprivation of property rights) is discussed later on. 
 
The intention of the drafters is an important interpretive tool but its importance should not be 
overstated. The, more important, purposive approach to constitutional interpretation requires 
an assessment of the putative purpose of the constitutional provision within its textual 
parameters. In doing this the purposive context is important. Furthermore constitutional 
provisions need to remain fluid to address the situation as it is and not as it was when the 
constitution was drafted. In this regard a very brief look at some of the environmental issues 
facing South Africa is useful as addressing these environmental issues must be the purpose 
of an environmental right.  
 
4.4 Environmental Context 
 
On a global scale biodiversity has declined by 30% while demand for natural resources  has 
doubled since 1966 and it takes the biosphere one and a half years to replenish the 
renewable resources consumed by humans every year.327 Biodiversity is an important 
measure of an ecosystem’s resilience and its ability to provide ecosystem goods and 
services, the value of which can be significant. The IPCC paints a disturbing picture of 
current and future global climate change and South Africa will be directly affected.328 Hanski 
notes the decline in mammal and bird species thus: 
‘Almost all of the mammalian and bird species known to science — numbering 
some 15,000 — have been assessed for their conservation status: 1–2% of 
these species have gone extinct in the past 400 years, and another 12% of 
birds and 23% of mammals are now classified as threatened. Among the other 
vertebrates, only 5% of the species are sufficiently well known to allow for 
classification; among those, 1–5% have gone extinct and a staggering 40–
70% are threatened.’329 
 
                                                          
327
 The facts and figures quoted here are unverified and have been taken, verbatim, from the biennial; WWF, 
Living Planet Report 2012 – Summary (2012) Gland, Switzerland. 
328
 IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
329
 Hanski, I., ‘The World that Became Ruined’ (2008) 9 EMBO Reports Special Issue s34 at s35. 
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In a South African context:330 nearly a fifth of South Africa’s total land area has been 
transformed331 and ‘KwaZulu-Natal, Gauteng and the North West are amongst the provinces 
that have had the greatest loss of natural habitat. And if the remaining natural areas continue 
to be transformed into crops and forestry or turned over to mining or urban sprawl at the 
current rate, there will be little to no natural vegetation left in these provinces by 2050, 
outside of protected areas’.332 Only about 25% of terrestrial ecosystems are formally 
protected and 35% are completely unprotected, 10% of South Africa’s wetlands are 
regarded as being protected and only about 9% of the coastline is situated in marine 
protected areas. 333  
 
Biodiversity is threatened to different extents:  There are 754 species of bird of which 681 
are classified as being ‘of least concern’; there are 297 species of mammal of which 232 are 
classified as being ‘of least concern’; there are 118 species of amphibian of which 96 are 
classified as being ‘of least concern’; and 44 species reptiles of which zero are least 
concern. One species of mammal was declared extinct and the rest range between ‘lower 
risk’ to ‘critically endangered’.334 About 600 invasive alien species have been recorded and 
these threaten indigenous biodiversity.335 While both deep sea and inshore fish catches are 
in steady decline.336   
 
Resource consumption is increasing: Wood and fossil fuels are important domestic energy 
sources, the number of households with access to electricity has gone from 8,975,000 in 
2002 to 12,361,000 in 2011.337 Coal consumption has steadily increased.338 The total 
number of motor vehicles on South Africa’s roads has increased by 19.35% between 2006 
and 2011 and of these private vehicles account for 66.28% of the total number.339 The 
human population has grown from 44.56 million in 2001 to 50.59 million in 2011,340 although 
                                                          
330 The facts and figures used here were sourced from Department of Environmental Affairs, South Africa 
Environmental Sustainability Indicators: Technical Report 2011 (2011) Department of Environmental Affairs, 
Pretoria and South African National Biodiversity Institute. Life: the state of South Africa’s biodiversity 2012. 
(2013) South African National Biodiversity Institute, Pretoria. 
331
 Technical Report fn 330 at 38. 
332
 SANBI Life: the state of South Africa’s biodiversity 2012. (2013) at 12. 
333
 SANBI Life: the state of South Africa’s biodiversity 2012. (2013) at 13, 18 and 37. 
334
 Technical Report, fn 330 at 33. 
335
 SANBI Life: the state of South Africa’s biodiversity 2012. (2013) at 48. 
336
 Technical Report, fn 330 at 46. 
337
 Technical Report, fn 330 at 29. 
338
 Technical Report, fn 330 at 71. 
339
 Technical Report, fn 330 at 73. 
340
 Technical Report, fn 330 at 82. 
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the growth rate is declining.341 Carbon emissions per capita have increased steadily since 
2005 and are at the highest levels ever. They appear set to continue this trend342 and this 
will exacerbate the global climate change problems. 
 
South Africa is resource constrained: South Africa has consistently exceeded the ecological 
carrying capacity of the country since 1996.343 Water is in short supply and in the 19 
declared water management areas only 6 are projected to have a surplus capacity by 
2025.344 
 
Although the complexity of environmental issues deserves a more thorough study; what has 
been touched upon above indicates some of the issues facing humanity and the 
environment. An important feature of these issues is that much of the environment occurs 
outside of formally protected areas. This places humans firmly in the ‘natural’ environment 
and means that each individual can have a direct impact upon the environment. Furthermore 
pollution, consumption, conservation and land transformation can all happen at the level of 
the individual and can have significant local and global impacts. 
 
The environmental context, outlined above, paints a grim picture for the future of both 
humankind and the environment. There is clear need for law to address these issues and an 
environmental right, such as Section 24 and in particular Section 24(b), must have, as its 
primary purpose, protection of the environment and, by doing so, benefitting humanity. 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                          
341
 Technical Report, fn 330 at 84. 
342
 Technical Report, fn 330 at 171. 
343
 Technical Report, fn 330 at 93. 
344
 Technical Report, fn 330 at 102. 
P a g e  | 90 
 
Part Five: A Purposive and Generous Interpretation of Section 24(b) 
 
5.1 Fundamental or Progressive Right? 
 
It has been stated that: ‘Section 24 establishes a fundamental environmental right (in the 
substantive sense) …[and]… is an anthropocentric right.’345 Whist the former is accepted the 
nature of the right, with respect, remains to be determined.  
 
Section 24 is divided into two parts, (a) and (b). Section 24(a) reads as: ‘[e]veryone has the 
right to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being’. This represents what 
can be described as a negative fundamental human right. Section 24(b)(iii) (as an example 
of Section 24(b)) is best described as a positive social fundamental right allowing for formal 
participation by the right holder.346 However there is an element of a directive principle of 
State policy directive to this right. The State is charged with doing something i.e. developing 
the law ‘through reasonable legislative and other measures’. Murphy J stated in this regard 
that:  
‘Section 24(a) of the Constitution guarantees the fundamental right of 
everyone to an environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being. 
Section 24(b) imposes programmatic and positive obligations on the State to 
protect the environment through reasonable legislative and other measures 
that prevent pollution and ecological degradation; promote conservation; and 
secure ecologically sustainable development, while promoting justifiable 
economic and social development.’347  
This reasoning has not yet been confirmed by the Constitutional Court and anyway does not 
exclude other possible interpretations of Section 24(b). A strict interpretation of Section 24(b) 
as being purely programmatic ignores the apparent intention of the drafters who, as 
discussed previously, expressed ecocentric leanings. There is also a practical contradiction 
between 24(a) and 24(b) which is discussed later on. 
 
                                                          
345
 Du Plessis, A.,  Fulfilment of South Africa's Constitutional Environmental Right in the Local Government  
Sphere (2008) LLD Thesis, North-West University at 342 footnotes omitted. 
346
 For a discussion of these principles refer to van Reenen, T. P., ‘Constitutional Protection of the 
Environment: Fundamental (Human) Right or Principle of State Policy’. (1997) 4 SAJELP 269 – 290 particularly 
at 270 -273. 
347
 HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2006 (5) SA 512 (T) at 
[16]. 
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The inclusion of an element of a policy directive into a fundamental right results in the right 
as a whole being both a subjective right and, in part, objective law. ‘Most constitutional 
environmental provision[s] are neither typical fundamental rights nor typical directive 
principles, but simultaneously contain elements of both types of mechanism.’348 And 
therefore this blending of the two is not unusual in constitutional environmental rights. An 
example of where such blending does not occur is in the Namibian Constitution where no 
fundamental environmental right is established in the ‘bill of rights’349 but a clear 
environmental policy directive350 exists in chapter eleven, Principles of State Policy. The 
state is charged with the task of developing law but no individual acquires a subjective right 
in respect of the environment.351 Similarly the Nigerian Constitution (of 1999) seemingly only 
provided a non-justiciable environmental directive as opposed to a fundamental right.352  
 
The positive element of the positive right stems from the policy directive upon the state to 
protect the environment ‘through reasonable legislative and other measures’. Similar 
directives can be found elsewhere in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights in the socio-economic 
rights dealing with property,353 housing354 and healthcare, food, water and social security355 
and education.356 Section 24(b) can be distinguished from these other rights in that these 
other rights contain a proviso limiting the steps which the state must take to those ‘within its 
available resources’ and that this occurs ‘progressively, no such limitations are imposed in 
Section 24(b).357 This distinction suggests that Section 24(b) is an ‘original right of 
participation’ whilst the other rights referred to are less ‘original rights’ but more of the nature 
of ‘derivative rights’. ‘An original right of participation recognizes a direct claim of the 
individual against the state for conferral of some good or service. A derivative right grants 
                                                          
348
 van Reenen, T. P., ‘Constitutional Protection of the Environment: Fundamental (Human) Right or Principle 
of State Policy’. (1997) 4 SAJELP 269 – 290  at 274. 
349
 Chapter Three of the Namibian Constitution is headed ‘Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms’.  
350 Article 95(l) of the Namibian Constitution states that, in promoting the welfare of the people, ‘The State 
shall actively promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting, inter alia, policies aimed at the 
following: maintenance of ecosystems, essential ecological processes and biological diversity of Namibia and 
utilization of living natural resources on a sustainable basis for the benefit of all Namibians, both present and 
future; in particular, the Government shall provide measures against the dumping or recycling of foreign 
nuclear and toxic waste on Namibian territory.’ See fn 349 above. 
351
 For a discussion of this see Obbes, D., ‘Maintaining Biological Diversity – A Namibian Constitutional 
Perspective’ (1999) 6 SAJELP 161 -170. 
352
 As discussed by Okon E. E., ‘The Environmental Perspective in the 1999 Nigerian Constitution’ (2003) 5 
Environmental Law Review 256. 
353
 Section 25(5). 
354
 Section 26(2). 
355
 Section 27(2). 
356
 Section 29(1)(b). 
357
 This distinction is important and will be discussed later on, for the present it is accepted that the state bears 
this responsibility but this will also be discussed more fully later on. 
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participation to the individual only in the framework of provided goods and services. The 
initial decision to provide either of the latter remains in the discretion of the government’.358 
In the case of the rights referred to it is probably more correct to regard these as being made 
available subject to the objective resources of government than to the subjective discretion 
of government. 
 
Section 29(1) of the Constitution sets out the ‘right to education’. As with Section 24 section 
29(1) is composed of two parts, part (a) is a fundamental right stating that: ‘Everyone has the 
right to a basic education…’, and a definite positive directive to the State in part (b): 
‘Everyone has the right to further education, which the state, through reasonable measures, 
must make progressively available and accessible.’ (The ‘progressive element’ has been 
emphasised). Section 29(1) has been interpreted by the Constitutional Court and this 
interpretation provides very useful insight on the nature of Section 24 given their similarities 
and differences. 
 ‘It is important, for the purpose of this judgment, to understand the nature of 
the right to “a basic education” under section 29(1)(a). Unlike some of the 
other socio-economic rights, this right is immediately realisable. There is no 
internal limitation requiring that the right be “progressively realised” within 
“available resources” subject to “reasonable legislative measures”. The right 
to a basic education in section 29(1)(a) may be limited only in terms of a law 
of general application which is “reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom”. This right 
is therefore distinct from the right to “further education” provided for in 
section 29(1)(b). The state is, in terms of that right, obliged, through 
reasonable measures, to make further education “progressively available 
and accessible.”’359 
This interpretation strongly supports the interpretation of Section 24 used above. The 
relevance of the omission of the ‘progressive element’ remains to be interrogated. Certainly 
the lack of a ‘progressive element’ implies with a great deal of certainty that Section 24(b) is 
‘immediately realisable’. 
 
                                                          
358 van Reenen, T. P., ‘Constitutional Protection of the Environment: Fundamental (Human) Right or Principle 
of State Policy’. (1997) 4 SAJELP 269 – 290  at 272, for a general discussion on constitutional rights see Brandl, 
E. and Bungert, H., ‘Constitutional Entrenchment Of Environmental Protection: A Comparative Analysis Of 
Experiences Abroad’ (1992) 16 Harvard Environmental Law Review 1 – 100 at 3 – 14.  
359
 Governing Body of the Juma Masjid Primary School and Others v Essay NO and Others 2011 (8) BCLR 761 
(CC) at [37]. 
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It is submitted that Section 24(a) and Section 24(b) are separate rights and that Section 
24(b) is not simply a programmatic formulation of Section 24(a).360 The first is a negative 
right361 and, based on the reasoning of Yacoob J in the Grootboom case,362 we can infer that 
the court will hold that there is ‘a negative obligation placed upon the State and all other 
entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right [‘to an environment that 
is not harmful to [human] health or well-being’363]’. Section 24(b) is a separate right and can 
stand alone, and independently, of Section 24(a). With reference to the Grootboom case364 
we can hold that Section 24(b): 
‘speaks to the positive obligation imposed upon the State. It requires the State 
to devise a comprehensive and workable plan to meet its obligations in terms 
of the subsection. However [Section 24(b)] also makes it clear that the 
obligation imposed upon the State is not an absolute or unqualified one. The 
extent of the State's obligation is defined [in part] by …the obligation to 'take 
reasonable legislative and other measures'…’ 
Like the right to housing which formed the basis of the discussion in Grootboom given 
above, Section 24(b) creates a positive duty on the State typical of second generation (or 
socio-economic) rights365 but arguably, through section 24(b)(i) in particular, also creates a 
negative obligation366 similar to that created in Section 24(a) and provides guidelines on how 
the right is to be developed. Section 24 is therefore a peculiar right and has similarities with 
                                                          
360
 This viewpoint is supported by du Plessis, A., ‘Adding Flames to the Fuel: Why Further Constitutional 
Adjudication is Required for South Africa’s Constitutional Right to Catch Alight’ (2008) 15 SAJELP 57 – 84 at 61 
and by Kotzé, L. J., ‘A Critical Survey of Domestic Constitutional Provisions Relating to Environmental 
Protection in South Africa’ (2007) 14 Tilburg Law Review 298 at 307 – 308. 
361
 Couzens in his critique of the Fuel Retailers case notes: ‘S 24(a) provides that everyone has the right “to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or well-being;…”; which is very different from the right “to a 
healthy environment”. The latter is a positive right; and the former a negative right. To explain the difference 
with an example [in the case of the negative right]: were a litigant against the State to claim that his or her 
constitutional right was infringed by a polluted environment, the State could remedy the problem by moving 
the person…; whereas, [in the case of a positive right]…, the State could remedy the situation only by placing 
the environment itself into a healthy condition.’ Couzens, E., ‘Filling Station Jurisprudence: Environmental Law 
in South African Courts and the Judgement in Fuel Retailers Association of Southern Africa v Director-General 
Environmental Management, Department of Agriculture, Consrvation and Environment, Mpumalanga 
Province, and Others’ (2008) 15 SAJELP 23 – 56 at 51. 
362
 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at [34]. 
363
 From Section 24(a) of the Constitution.  
364
 Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) at [38]. 
365
 This also appears to be the conclusion of du Plessis, A., ‘Adding Flames to the Fuel: Why Further 
Constitutional Adjudication is Required for South Africa’s Constitutional Right to Catch Alight’ (2008) 15 SAJELP 
57 – 84 at 62.  
366
 The omission of the proviso limiting the obligation imposed upon the state which is found in each of the 
three socio-economic rights listed means that the right is both an absolute, negative, right and a positive 
progressive right. Furthermore the right to have ‘the environment protected…through reasonable legislative 
and other measures which prevent pollution and ecological degradation’ (s24(b)(i)) qualifies as a negative 
right. 
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the socio-economic rights referred to but, importantly, is a justiciable367, 368 negative right.369 
Arguably only the requirements to promote conservation and to promote justifiable 
development are truly positive directives, the balance are negatively framed. Prevention of 
pollution and prevention of ecological degradation are both negatively framed, and this 
permits them to be negative rights. The lack of the progressive element means that they are 
immediately justiciable370 and the lack of a directive specifying against whom action can be 
taken opens the door to the possibility of the right being exercised both vertically and 
horizontally. Whilst Section 24(b) has elements of a directive measure it has, probably 
correctly, been described as being ‘more in the nature of a directive principle’371 rather than 
as a directive principle per se. 
 
Section 24(b) should therefore be regarded as being a fundamental human right 
characterised by being an original right of participation which incorporates an element of a 
policy directive requiring the State to take positive steps to realise the right and guiding the 
State in how to do so. Reference to Section 24(b) generally and to Section 24(b)(iii) in 
particular as a fundamental right must be seen in light of this. 
 
                                                          
367 Kotzé  is not as adamant in this regard but states that ‘This contention [i.e. that Section 24 is justiciable on 
its own] is substantiated by the argument that the environmental right requires no further legislative definition 
than any of the other rights (for example, the right to life) in the Bill of Rights, and hence no specific acts to 
facilitate legislative implementation and enforcement.’ Kotzé, L. J., ‘A Critical Survey of Domestic 
Constitutional Provisions Relating to Environmental Protection in South Africa’ (2007) 14 Tilburg Law Review 
298 at 332. 
368
 Where legislation has been passed which purport to implement Constitutional right then a litigant has to 
rely on such legislation and not the right. If it is alleged that the legislation is defective then the ‘litigant may 
not bypass that legislation and rely directly on the Constitution without challenging that legislation as falling 
short of the constitutional standard.’ South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Others 
2007 (5) SA 400 (CC) at [51]. 
369 Feris reasons that ‘section 24 is unique’ in that it imposes vertical and horizontal positive obligations. Her 
reasoning is limited to Section 24(a)  which ‘purports that private actors shoulder some of the custodial duties 
… the duties flowing from section 24(a) and resting on private actors may be of a slightly more moderate 
nature [than those of the State]. At a minimum, it includes the duty of care standard as it applies in 
environmental law’ but regards Section 24(b) as applying only to the State. Feris, L., ‘The Public Trust Doctrine 
and Liability for Historic Water Pollution In South Africa’ (2012) 8:1 Law of Environment and Development  
Journal 1 – 18 at 17. 
370
 In Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at [57] O’Regan J states: ‘That 
obligation [the progressive element] requires the State to take reasonable legislative and other measures 
progressively to achieve the right of access to sufficient water within available resources. It does not confer a 
right to claim 'sufficient water' from the State immediately.’ Conversely a lack of the progressive element 
would imply that the right could be claimed immediately. 
371
 HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2006 (5) SA 512 (T) at 
[17] emphasis added. 
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In discussing Section 24(b) it is significant372 to note that, unlike the socio-economic rights 
discussed previously,  the positive directive given to develop the right is not limited by the 
resources available to the State, nor is there an injunction requiring the right to be developed 
progressively over time. There is also no specific directive aimed at the State. These 
distinctions are important.373 The omission of the ‘progressive elements’ strongly indicates 
that the right is more of a fundamental right than it is a socio-economic right and that it may 
be of horizontal application.  
 
5.2 Horizontal or Vertical Application? 
 
Usually it is the State which bears the positive duty to promote374 a right even where the right 
is a negative one. 
‘[S]ocio-economic rights (like the right to a basic education) may be negatively 
protected from improper invasion. Breach of this obligation occurs directly 
when there is a failure to respect the right, or indirectly, when there is a failure 
to prevent the direct infringement of the right by another or a failure to respect 
the existing protection of the right by taking measures that diminish that 
protection. It needs to be stressed however that the purpose of section 8(2) of 
the Constitution is not to obstruct private autonomy or to impose on a private 
party the duties of the state in protecting the Bill of Rights. It is rather to 
require private parties not to interfere with or diminish the enjoyment of a right. 
Its application also depends on the “intensity of the constitutional right in 
                                                          
372
 Feris makes the same observation and questions whether or not S24(b) is a socio-economic right Feris, L., 
‘The socio-economic nature of section 24(b) of the Constitution – some thoughts on HTF Developers (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism (HTF)’ (2008) 23 SAPR/PL 194 – 207 at 202 - 204. Feris then 
proceeds on the basis that it is a distinguishable socio-economic right because of the lack of the progressive 
element and the resource element. While authors such as Kotzé  and du Plessis regard Section 24(b) as being a 
socio-economic right and do not draw this distinction. Kotzé, L. J., ‘A Critical Survey of Domestic Constitutional 
Provisions Relating to Environmental Protection in South Africa’ (2007) 14 Tilburg Law Review 298 at 307 – 
308; and Du Plessis, A., ‘South Africa's Constitutional Environmental Right (Generously) Interpreted: What is in 
it for Poverty?’ (2011) 27 SAJHR 279 – 307 at 282 and 300 although du Plessis has previously commented on 
this distinction she regards Section 24(b) as a purely socio-economic right. Du Plessis, A., Fulfilment of South 
Africa's Constitutional Environmental Right in the Local Government  Sphere (2008) LLD Thesis, North-West 
University  at 354 – 355. Kidd ‘simply assumes that this responsibility [the positve duty in Section 24(b)] is 
directed at the state’ when discussing Section 24 in broad terms. Kidd, M Environmental Law (2
nd
 ed) (2011) 
Juta & Co., Cape Town at 24. Whilst not dealing specifically with this point the Bill of Rights Handbook sets out 
the ‘Environment’ right in Chapter 24 and clearly distinguishes it from the ‘Socio-Economic Rights’ set out in 
chapter 26. Currie, I and De Waal, J The Bill of Rights Handbook (6
th
 ed) (2013), Juta & Co., Cape Town. 
373
 As stated by Mogoeng CJ:  ‘I keep in mind the established principle of interpretation that where the same 
words are used in the same statute, they should be given the same meaning, unless the context indicates 
otherwise. The converse is also true.’ Oriani-Ambrosini v Sisulu, Speaker of The National Assembly 2012 (6) SA 
588 (CC) at [27] footnotes omitted. 
374
 Section 7(2) of the Constitution. 
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question, coupled with the potential invasion of that right which could be 
occasioned by persons other than the State or organs of State”.’375 
A private entity has a duty not to interfere or ‘invade’ the right but does not normally share 
the State’s obligation to promote the right. 
 
Section 24(b), specifying that the realisation of the right is ‘through legislative’ measures 
clearly places the responsibility upon the various legislative spheres of the State. The 
simultaneous use of ‘other measures’ though allows other branches of government to bear 
this responsibility and also opens up the possibility that it is not the State alone who bears 
this duty. 
 
Where the directive is aimed at the State the range of possible ‘other measures’ is not 
constrained. 
‘'[O]ther measures' may be construed to mean, amongst others, administrative 
measures executed in terms of environmental governance mandates relating 
to issues such as protection of natural resources, regulation of pollution, 
enforcement of environmental laws, and policy development. 'Other measures' 
may further include measures of an administrative, technical, financial and 
educational nature.’376 
And the Constitutional Court has held that: 
‘A court considering reasonableness will not enquire whether other more 
desirable or favourable measures could have been adopted, or whether public 
money could have been better spent. The question would be whether the 
measures that have been adopted are reasonable. It is necessary to 
recognise that a wide range of possible measures could be adopted by the 
State to meet its obligations. Many of these would meet the requirement of 
reasonableness. Once it is shown that the measure adopted falls within the 
range of reasonableness, this requirement is met.'377 
‘Other measures’ therefore requires both ‘reasonableness’ and the necessity to give content 
to the basic right. Whether or not this could be extended to non-State entities is uncertain.  
‘The Constitution envisages that legislative and other measures will be the 
primary instrument for the achievement of social and economic rights. Thus it 
places a positive obligation upon the State to respond to the basic social and 
                                                          
375
 Governing Body of the Juma Masjid Primary School and Others v Essay NO and Others 2011 (8) BCLR 761 
(CC) at  [58] footnotes omitted. 
376
 Kotzé, L. J., ‘A Critical Survey of Domestic Constitutional Provisions Relating to Environmental Protection in 
South Africa’ (2007) 14 Tilburg Law Review 298 at 308 footnotes omitted. 
377
 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others (Centre on Housing Rights 
and Evictions and Another, Amici Curiae) 2010 (3) SA 454 (CC) at [366] footnotes omitted. 
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economic needs of the people by adopting reasonable legislative and other 
measures. By adopting such measures, the rights set out in the Constitution 
acquire content, and that content is subject to the constitutional standard of 
reasonableness.’378 
  
Section 24(b) will clearly apply in a vertical manner as between the State and its 
inhabitants.379 The positive duty requirement is therefore a right for the benefit of everyone 
exercisable against the State.380 Section 24 has been interpreted381 as imposing an ‘onerous 
constitutional mandate’ on government officials to promote conservation and protection of 
the environment’ and that they ‘owe the public a duty to ensure ecologically sustainable 
development.’ This is in keeping with the positive element of the right382 but what is important 
is that an aggrieved person can use this mandate to direct the State against a private party 
to compel the private entity, through reasonable legislative and other measures, to perform a 
positive duty. In this regard the right is vicariously justiciable against private entities. 
 
Section 24(b) will also apply in a horizontal manner, i.e. bind a natural or juristic person, ‘if, 
and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of any duty imposed by the right.’383 This means that, if it is appropriate, Section 24(b) 
can be enforced directly against a private person. 
 
Du Plessis argues that the ‘obligations imposed by section 24(b) are in the main directed at 
government – the legislature, executive and judiciary.’384 Her reasoning for reaching this 
conclusion is not immediately clear. Legislative measures, by their very nature, can only 
apply to the legislature and not to the judiciary or to the executive and there is no indication 
within Section 24(b) that the injunction is directed at any particular person or institution so as 
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 Mazibuko and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC) at [66] 
379
 In terms of Section 8(1) of the Constitution. 
380 Kotzé, L. J. and du Plessis, A., ‘Some Brief Observations on Fifteen Years of Environmental Rights 
Jurisprudence in South Africa’ (2010) 3:1 Journal of Court Innovation 157 – 176 at 158.  
381
 Khabisi NO and Another v Aquarella Investment 83 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2008 (4) SA 195 (T) at [27]. 
382
 ‘s 24(b) imposes positive obligations on the state to protect the environment 'through reasonable legislative 
and other measures that prevent pollution . . . while promoting justifiable economic and social development’ 
MEC for Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land Affairs v Sasol Oil (Pty) Ltd and Another 2006 (5) SA 
483 (SCA) at [14]. 
383
 Section 8(2) of the Constitution.  
384
 du Plessis, A., ‘Adding Flames to the Fuel: Why Further Constitutional Adjudication is Required for South 
Africa’s Constitutional Right to Catch Alight’ (2008) 15 SAJELP 57 – 84 at 71, emphasis added and footnotes 
omitted. 
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to include these two branches of the State. Section 8(1) of the Constitution explicitly states 
that all three branches of the State and all organs of State are bound and section 7(2) 
requires the State to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights.’ There 
is, however, no indication in the wording of Section 24(b) itself directing the State (other than 
its legislative parts) to perform a positive duty. The conclusion that all parts of the State bear 
this positive duty is no doubt correct, but it is implicit rather than explicit.385 Also, why state 
that the imposition is ‘in the main’? This would only apply if other non-state entities were also 
directed to fulfil the obligation.   
 
Although there is an implicit positive duty on all parts of the State these other parts cannot 
perform legislative functions but they would be bound by any legislation so produced. The 
use of ‘other measures’ broadens the ambit of the directive to include non-legislating 
branches of the State. However, if one is going to interpret ‘legislative and other measures’ 
to include non-legislating branches of the State then it seems equally permissible to apply 
them to other non-State entities. Put another way, holding the State liable to fulfil ‘other 
measures’ requires a reading in of sections 7(2) and 8(1) of the Constitution. This reading in 
in not disputed but what other provisions or considerations could be brought into play in 
addition to or in place of section 8(1), could section 8(2) not also be invoked with equal 
legitimacy? 
 
In discussing the continued State obligation to deliver water, despite having delegated 
responsibility to do so to private entities, Welch argues that the State cannot contract out of 
its duties and obligations and that a horizontal application of the right386 is required 
particularly given the delegation of the State’s authority and responsibility to private entities. 
‘Critics of horizontal application argue that constitutions regulate the public 
rather than the private sphere. This argument seems rooted in the notion of 
natural law, which prohibits government interference with private activities. 
However, this notion of natural law allows non-state entities to violate basic 
human rights without accountability. Because globalization has led to a 
growing amount of corporate control over some of the most basic human 
needs, human rights obligations should apply to the private sphere. In other 
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 ‘Section 24(b) imposes programmatic and positive obligations on the State to protect the environment 
through reasonable legislative and other measures…’ HTF Developers case at [16] and ‘s 24(b) imposes positive 
obligations on the state to protect the environment 'through reasonable legislative and other measures that 
prevent pollution . . . while promoting justifiable economic and social development'.’ Sasol Oil (SCA) at [14] 
footnote omitted. 
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 Section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
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words, "[i]f a bill of rights is there to create a 'culture of justification' by those 
who wield political power, one would question the wisdom of letting those who 
wield other forms of power akin to state power, or of a nature resulting in 
violations of individuals' or group rights, escape similar accountability." 
 
The argument against horizontal application of the Constitution to the private 
sphere would render many constitutional provisions superfluous. The 
increased number of private actors supplying water and other basic rights 
would be free to ignore the basic rights recognized under the Constitution 
without consequence.’387 
 
The principle of this argument has been approved, in part, by the Constitutional Court which 
stated: ‘Our Constitution ensures, …, that government cannot be released from its human 
rights and rule of law obligations simply because it employs the strategy of delegating its 
functions to another entity.’388 The public nature of environmental actions supports this 
interpretation. To argue that Section 24(b) should not apply in a horizontal manner would 
render the right superfluous. Welch’s argument can be distinguished on the basis that her 
argument is focussed on private entities exercising the delegated authority (and obligations) 
of the State; whereas environmental actions are performed by private entities based on their 
inherent powers and not on State authority. The basis for arguing a horizontal application of 
the positive duty elements of Section 24 is elaborated below. 
 
In the Juma Masjid case389 the Constitutional Court has considered when a private entity (in 
this case a Trust390) may be burdened with a positive duty by a Constitutional right. This case 
involved an allegation that a Trust owed a positive duty to learners in terms of section 
29(1)(a). Whether or not the private entity bore this duty depended on whether or not ‘by 
providing the premises to a public school, the Trust was performing a public function within 
the definition of “administrative action” in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Action 
Act’.391 In reaching its decision the court noted in passing: 
‘Traditionally, because of the clear distinction between public law and private 
law realms, a private owner could evict any tenant provided that the 
                                                          
387 Welch, A. R., ‘Obligations of State and Non-State Actors Regarding the Human Right To Water Under the 
South African Constitution’ (2005) 5 Sustainable Development Law and Policy 56 at 62-63. 
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 Micro Finance Case at [40]. 
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 Governing Body of the Juma Masjid Primary School and Others v Essay NO and Others 2011 (8) BCLR 761 
(CC). 
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 Interestingly a trust is not strictly speaking a juristic person but rather a collection of natural persons in the 
form of trustees. 
391
 Governing Body of the Juma Masjid Primary School and Others v Essay NO and Others 2011 (8) BCLR 761 
(CC) at [16]. 
P a g e  | 100 
 
requirements of rei vindicatio were satisfied. Private entities were held to be 
free to engage in their economic and social interests without state 
interference. As a result, over emphasis on the differences between the 
exercise of private and public power often sheltered private power used for 
public purposes.’392 
Ultimately, despite the Trust performing a public (administrative) purpose,393 it was held that 
the nature of the right and, in this case the State’s obligations under the same right, made it 
‘clear that there is no primary positive obligation on the Trust to provide basic education to 
the learners. That primary positive obligation rests on the [State].’394 The fact that the State 
bore the primary duty excluded the Trust’s liability. 
 
The Juma Masjid case is illuminating, the court’s reasoning strongly indicated that a private 
entity performing a public (administrative) purpose could, and in this case did, result in the 
private entity bearing not only the negative element of the right but also the positive duty. 
Seemingly: only by the ruling that the private entity’s positive duty was secondary to the 
State’s prevented a finding that the private entity was liable for fulfilling the positive element 
of the right. 
 
Using the reasoning of the Juma Masjid case395 we could infer that the positive elements of 
Section 24(b) should be exercised by a private entity in the following circumstances: 
1. The private entity was exercising a public power for a public purpose (or function), or 
2. The private entity was exercising a private power but for a public purpose. And (in 
both cases) 
3. The private entity bore the primary duty to fulfil the right, to the exclusion of the State. 
There doesn’t seem to be any doubt that the nature of Section 24(b) and in particular 
aspects of avoiding ecological degradation, promoting conservation, pollution prevention, 
ecologically sustainable development and ecologically sustainable use are all functions 
which can be exercised by private entities. It therefore follows that the nature of the positive 
duty can possibly be imposed on a private entity where the action (either private or public 
power) is for a public purpose or of an ‘administrative environmental nature’. 
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  Governing Body of the Juma Masjid Primary School and Others v Essay NO and Others 2011 (8) BCLR 761 
(CC) at [55] emphasis added and footnotes omitted. 
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 ‘[The Trust] performed the public function of managing, conducting and transacting all affairs of the 
[School] in the most advantageous manner, including the payment of the costs of various items which the 
[Governing Body] and the Department ought to have provided.’ Governing Body of the Juma Masjid Primary 
School and Others v Essay NO and Others 2011 (8) BCLR 761 (CC) at [59]. 
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 Governing Body of the Juma Masjid Primary School and Others v Essay NO and Others 2011 (8) BCLR 761 
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In determining whether or not a private entity is performing a public purpose we need to 
consider the administrative nature of environmental actions. 
 
5.3 Environmental Administrative Actions 
 
Administrative law is part of public law which governs law used for public functions or in the 
public purpose. There has been considerable intrusion of this otherwise public law into the 
arena of private law (the law applying to and binding private entities and private persons). 
Burns notes this: 
‘The distinction between public law and private law has long been a subject of 
debate in South African legal circles and a number of criteria, none of which 
were entirely satisfactory, have been used to illustrate this difference. The 
penetration of public law into the sphere of private law has been discernable 
for some considerable time…as a result of increased public regulation of 
private activities, the private performance of public service and the growth of 
corporatism in modern states.’396  
Can it be argued that the ‘penetration of public law into the sphere of private law’ has 
resulted in private entities bearing a positive environmental duty? Any entity, State or private, 
with a duty to act in the public interest could conceivably be regarded as performing an 
administrative action and various private entities have been held to do so.397 If a private body 
can exercise a power over people not contractually linked to it then it may well be performing 
an administrative action and therefore be acting in the public purpose.398 
 
A private entity, in making a decision which impacts upon the environment, might be 
regarded as performing an administrative action. The nature of the environment makes it not 
only possible but unavoidable that a negative modification of the environment will have a 
negative impact upon all persons within that environment. Given that there is only one true 
ecosystem, the biosphere (or ecosphere), any negative modification of the environment will 
affect all persons. 
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 Burns, Y., Administrative Law Under the 1996 Constitution (1999) Butterworths, Durban at 41 footnotes 
omitted. 
397 See Dawnlaan Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Johannesburg Stock Exchange 1983 (3) SA 344 (W), Coetzee v 
Comitis 2001 (1) SA 1254 (C), AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council and Ano 2007 (1) 
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nd
 Ed) 2012 Juta & Co. Claremont at 189 -
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In the case of Dawnlaan Beleggings399 a stock exchange was held to have been licensed 
because it was in the public interest to do so and had rules imposed upon it ‘to safeguard 
and further the public interest.’400 This lead the court to hold that: 
‘Strictly speaking, a stock exchange is not a statutory body. However, unlike 
companies or commercial banks or building societies formed under their 
respective statutes, the decisions of the committee of a stock exchange 
affect not only its own members or persons in contractual privity with it, 
but the general public and indeed the whole economy. It is for that reason 
that the Act makes the public interest paramount. To regard the [stock 
exchange] as a private institution would be to ignore commercial reality and 
would be to ignore the provisions and intention of the Act itself. It would also be 
to ignore the very public interest which the Legislature has sought to protect and 
safeguard in the Act.’401 
The changes wrought by the Constitution have led to the courts extending the range of 
public policy (or public interest): 
‘[C]onsiderations of public policy cannot be constant. Our society is an ever-
changing one. We have moved from a very dark past into a democracy where 
the Constitution is the supreme law, and public policy should be considered 
against the background of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. One can 
think of many situations which would, prior to 1994, have been found not to 
offend public policy which would today be regarded as inhuman. Examples are 
so plentiful that I do not believe that it is necessary for me to mention them.’402  
 
There can be little argument that environmental protection falls squarely within public 
interest. Furthermore, to paraphrase the excerpt from Dawnlaan Beleggings: environmental 
decisions of the private entities affect not only its own members or itself or persons in 
contractual privity with it, but the general public and indeed the whole economy. Section 
24(a) with it anthropocentric focus is indisputably a ground for public interest, at least insofar 
as the public is directly impacted by an environment which is rendered harmful to their health 
or well-being. Section 24(b) would only qualify if it is accepted that the continued good health 
of the environment, from an ecocentric perspective, is in the public interest. The importance 
of environmental concerns and the interrelationship between humans and the environment 
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support the qualification of an ecocentric environmental right as being within the public 
interest.403 
 
May and Daly make the observation that, in environmental public interest litigation very often 
the distinctions between private and public law are blurred and the roles of public and private 
entities may even be reversed. 
‘These difficult questions of public policy may, in some instances, even require 
rethinking the location and the very validity of the public/private line, as 
governments are held responsible for the environmental degradation caused 
by their licensees and as corporations are required to take on public goods 
like environmental clean-up. Environmental litigation may often in fact invert 
the normal expectations relating to the roles of public and private parties. 
Whereas traditional constitutional rights litigation pits the private individual 
against the public authority, environmental litigation often pits members of the 
public against a private entity (thus invoking the principle of the horizontal 
application of constitutional rights and obligations). Moreover, in many of these 
cases, private individuals are asserting public rights, whereas the government 
is facilitating private gain’404  
This role reversal enhances the reasoning that the public duty of the private entity is to 
protect the environment. 
 
The environmental action of a private entity, which is an act or omission within an 
environmental context and which is in the public interest, therefore meets one of the primary 
requirements of administrative action. Indeed it is the public interest element, where all 
people and not only those with contractual privity with the actor, are affected by the 
environmental action, which is definitive. The public interest element is only one of the 
requirements for an action to constitute administrative action. ‘[A]t the core of the definition of 
administrative action is the idea of action (a decision) “of an administrative nature” taken by 
a public body or functionary’405 Environmental action is inherently action of an administrative 
nature. As stated by Nugent JA: ‘Administrative action is rather, in general terms, the 
conduct of the bureaucracy (whoever the bureaucratic functionary might be) in carrying out 
                                                          
403 Ecocentric protection can be related to human health for instance: ‘Fundamental human rights to life and 
liberty, for example, cannot be achieved without adequate environmental conditions of clean water, air, and 
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the daily functions of the state which necessarily involves the application of policy, usually 
after its translation into law, with direct and immediate consequences for individuals or 
groups of individuals.’406 Environmental actions by a private entity exercising an inherent 
power rather than State authority (as an organ of State)407 or which are not of a bureaucratic 
nature (i.e. made by a natural person in his or her capacity as a natural person) would not 
qualify as administrative action and this argument is not intended to suggest otherwise. 
Environmental actions are inherently though, of a public nature in that their impacts are not 
confined to persons who have consented to such action occurring or who would necessarily, 
in the common-law, have injunctive or damages relief for an unlawful action. This means that 
private entities engaging in environmental actions are engaging in a public purpose. 
 
Conceivably environmental action may be taken by any one of three actors. The first an 
Organ of State, the second a private entity acting with some sort of state authority and the 
third a private entity acting in a purely private capacity. In many respects private entities will 
have the greatest environmental impacts.408 The actions of an Organ of State are covered by 
the explicit legislative requirement of Section 24(b), read with the general obligations 
imposed upon the State through section 7(2) of the Constitution, and environmental actions 
would seemingly fall squarely within the parameters of administrative action. A private entity, 
acting in a purely private capacity, would, in effecting an environmental action, not qualify as 
a public body or functionary and therefore the environmental action would not qualify as 
administrative action. Additionally there may not be a bureaucratic decision making process 
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in the case of a natural person. Despite not qualifying as administrative action an 
environmental action remains action of an administrative nature as the impacts are felt by 
people otherwise completely unconnected to the actor. A private entity may well act with 
some sort of state authority. In Dawnlaan Beleggings the actor was a statutorily licenced 
stock exchange, in the Comitis Case409 the National Soccer League’s rules were 
constitutionally challenged on grounds of public policy despite being rules of a private 
organisation, in the MTN Case410 MTN was operating in terms of a state licence to operate a 
cellular telecommunications network and in the Micro Finance Case411 a private entity was 
deemed an Organ of State by virtue of the function it performed. Private entities may act with 
State authority (e.g. delegated functions and powers, licences and concessions) or with 
State sanction (permits and authorisations). There is therefore a likelihood of some private 
entities engaging in administrative action when taking environmental actions. If a private 
entity is to be bound to the positive duty element of Section 24(b) for performing an 
environmental action because it has State authority to do so but would escape any obligation 
for the same environmental action where such authority is absent (either through a failure to 
obtain such authority or where it was not required) then the provisions of Section 24(b) 
would be considerably weakened. In such circumstances achieving the purposes of Section 
24(b) would be compromised. 
 
The intrusion of public law into private law relationships is a function of both the increasingly 
administrative or public nature of actions and / or the increasing use of private entities to 
perform state functions. The Constitutional Court has observed that ‘private institutions were 
increasingly being used to perform state functions and, … that the nature of the functionary 
was of little consequence. On this basis, the crucial inquiry … was whether the [institution] 
exercised public power’.412 Environmental action is of the nature of a public power given that 
it impacts persons who are not directly linked to the actor. Significant fundamental human 
rights can be affected, e.g. the right to life, the right to equality, the right to human dignity, 
the right to health care, food and water and the right to an environment not harmful to health 
or well-being413 by environmental actions.  
 
                                                          
409
 See fn 402. 
410
 Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd v SMI Trading CC (2012 (6) SA 638 (SCA). 
411
 AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council and Ano 2007 (1) SA 343 (CC). 
412
 Micro Finance Case at [22] footnotes omitted. 
413
 Constitution sections 11, 9, 10, 27 and 24(a) respectively. 
P a g e  | 106 
 
Reference to the administrative nature of an environmental action is therefore not to imply 
that environmental action always constitutes administrative action. Rather it is a recognition 
that private entities can and often do exercise public functions and powers when impacting 
on the environment. Environmental actions are public by nature in that, although possibly 
buffered, they ultimately impact upon the general public. The legal requirements set out in 
Dawnlaan Beleggings for substantive qualification as administrative actions seem to be met 
by environmental actions. In some instances the public functionary and bureaucratic 
requirements might also be met. 
 
 
The test suggested by Juma Masjid case requires only that the private entity be engaging in 
a public purpose and that it bears the primary public duty. The source of its authority is not 
important. Environmental actions are an expression of public purpose, the remaining 
question is therefore whether or not the private entity bears the primary duty. There are 
practical reasons supporting this argument. 
 
 
Given that many environmental actions will be undertaken in the course of a private entity 
enjoying its private rights it would not be unjustified for the entity to bear the primary duty 
when exercising such rights. Indeed, as the State would not be involved, there can seldom 
be an instance where the private entity does not do so.414 Private entities stand to benefit 
financially through their negative impacts upon the environment and often profit greatly 
therefrom. They should therefore bear a corresponding positive duty. Without a 
corresponding positive duty the objectives of Section 24 would be constantly eroded without 
recourse. The positive duty would mean that, in taking an environmental action, a private 
entity would be required to promote the protection of the environment through preventing 
pollution, preventing ecological degradation, promoting conservation and securing the 
ecologically sustainable development and the ecologically sustainable use of natural 
resources.  
 
The creation of such a moral duty might be regarded as weakening the fundamental right. 
However this is not necessarily so. Authors have suggested that the purpose of a 
fundamental environmental right is not purely to create a justiciable right. 
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‘It is therefore quite possible that fundamental environmental rights are 
included in constitutions not with the expectation that they will be realized or 
judicially enforced, but with the hope that they will, at most, influence the 
attitudes of policymakers, maybe the public, and perhaps, in the long term, 
encourage people within the nation to take environmental concerns into 
account.’ 415 
An aspirational right is not without value. ‘An environmental statement of public policy may 
have positive effects on both political and societal levels. It may raise the level of 
environmental consciousness in the government and in society as a whole, enhancing the 
likelihood of future initiatives towards environmental protection. In this sense it may serve an 
"impulse" function.’416 The Constitution must ‘play a creative and dynamic role in the 
expression and the achievement of the ideals and aspirations of the nation, in the articulation 
of the values bonding its people and in disciplining its Government."417 This value would be 
considerably enhanced if the aspirational provision could, when warranted, be given legal 
and not merely aspirational effect to. 
 
In the HTF Developers case418 the High Court described Section 24(b): ‘Despite its 
aspirational form, or perhaps because of it, s 24(b) gives content to the entrenched right 
envisaged, by specifically identifying the objects of regulation, namely the prevention of 
pollution and environmental degradation; the promotion of conservation; and the securing of 
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social development.’419 This reasoning does not seem to imply that 
aspirational equates to non-justiciable,420 rather it would suggest that, in a South African 
context, a right might be both aspirational and fundamental. The Constitutional Court has 
further stated that: ‘The Bill of Rights is not a set of (aspirational) directive principles of State 
policy - it is intended that the State should make whatever arrangements are necessary to 
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avoid rights violations.’421 In doing so the Constitutional Court appears to have opened the 
door to a situation where a right may be both aspirational and justiciable at the same time, it 
can be both the carrot and the stick. This seems to accord with the notion that a right may 
both positively ‘influence the attitudes of…the public’ whilst containing justiciable provisions. 
If this is so then Section 24(b) ‘gives [justiciable] content’ to the Section 24 right to an 
environment not harmful to one’s well-being and directs the process required to reach this 
point. A protected environment is an aspirational goal as fundamental as the notion of an 
‘open and democratic society [which] the Constitution has set as our aspirational norm.’422 
 
 
Imposing such a positive duty on private entities is supported by reference to both the 
Government Policy and the ANC Policy. The former states, at [4]: 
‘The State, every person and every legal entity has a responsibility to consider 
all activities that may have an influence on the environment duly and to take 
all reasonable steps to promote the protection, maintenance and improvement 
of both the natural environment and the human living environment.’ 
 
and at [8]: 
 
‘A partnership must be established between the State and the community as a 
whole, the private sector, developers, commerce and industry, agriculture, 
local community organisations, non-Governmental organisations (representing 
other relevant players), and the international community so as to pursue 
environmental goals collectively.’ 
 
And the latter states, at (14): 
 
‘All men and women shall have the right to a healthy and ecologically 
balanced environment and the duty to defend it.’ 
 
And at (16): 
 
‘Legislation shall provide for co-operation between the State, non-
governmental organisations, local communities and individuals in seeking to 
improve the environment and encourage ecologically sensible habits in daily 
life.’ 
 
It is clear from these extracts that the drafters of the Constitution shared similar views on the 
requirement that the positive environmental duty was to be borne by both State and private 
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entities including ‘all men and women’ and indeed ‘every person’. In discussing the intended 
nature of programmatic (Second and Third Generation) Rights one of the key ANC 
negotiators and architects of the Bill of Rights, Albie Sachs, stated the intention to require 
both the State and private entities to improve conditions for people’s health. Such conditions 
would naturally include environmental rights. 
‘Consideration thus needs to be given to a Bill of Rights as a legal programme 
and not simply as a set of justiciable interests. A constitutional document that 
is programmatic in character presupposes that certain major social goals are 
set out in the document, and public and private entities are placed under a 
legal duty to work towards their realization. The Second [and Third] 
Generation of rights lend themselves more to treatment of this kind than to the 
justiciable First Generation kind.’423 
This avowed intention appears to have been carried forward in the ANC Policy and there is 
no reason to conclude that it did not find its way, ultimately, into Section 24(b). 
 
International constitutions similarly impose a positive duty upon their citizens. The Uruguayan 
constitution was amended to record that ‘“the protection of the environment is of common 
interest.”’424 Such a positive duty was incorporated into a purely directive provision of the 
Indian Constitution in 1976 which: 
 
‘provides similarly in Article 51A, Clause (g), that it shall be the duty of every 
citizen of India to protect and improve the natural environment including 
forests, lakes, rivers and wildlife and to have compassion for living creatures. 
Thus there is both a constitutional pointer to the State and a constitutional duty 
of the citizens not only to protect but also to improve the environment and to 
preserve and safeguard the forests, the flora and fauna, the rivers and lakes 
and all the other water resources of the country. The neglect or failure to abide 
by the pointer or to perform the duty is nothing short of a betrayal of the 
fundamental law which the State and, indeed, every Indian, high or low, is 
bound to uphold and maintain.’425 
 
Article 48A of the Indian Constitution places a positive duty on the State to ‘protect and 
improve the environment’ and these two Articles ‘symbolise the need for collaboration 
between the State and the people in evolving a more ecologically sound order.’426 This 
positive duty is clearly stated and existed before the Rio Conference in 1992. It is perhaps 
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telling that the importance and inherent value of the environment was enshrined (although as 
a directive policy rather than a fundamental right) by a country which is less industrialised 
than the ‘western powers’ and whose population is accordingly less buffered against 
environmental impacts. Given South Africa’s history its human population is similarly 
exposed and this augments the desirability of a similar positive duty in the country. The final 
question in this regard would seemingly be: is the obligation consistent with the purpose of 
Section 24(b) of the Constitution? 
 
Apart from private entities profiting from environmental actions there are additional practical 
reasons why, in South Africa especially, a horizontal application is required. 
 
South Africa has a strong traditional leadership which enforces customary law in what are 
sometimes referred to as ‘traditional areas’. As noted by du Plessis: ‘A significant number of 
South Africans still reside in the country's rural areas and various of these areas are home to 
traditional communities. …Although not regulating this relationship itself, the Constitution 
suggests that in South Africa traditional leadership should be regarded as part of local 
government in the spherical composition of government.’427 It is unclear whether or not 
traditional leaders would constitute an organ of state. The Constitution deals with traditional 
leadership in a vague and noncommittal manner in sections 211 and 212. If traditional 
leaders are not organs of State then Section 24(b) would need to apply to non-organs of 
State (i.e. private entities) as otherwise a significant portion of South Africa’s population 
would not be afforded environmental protection by their de facto local administration. Du 
Plessis argues428 that traditional leadership should be regarded as forming part of local 
government and that this would provide for the positive duty of Section 24429 to apply. The 
same objective could be reached, without stretching the bounds of local government to 
include hereditary traditional leaders within the scope of democratically elected and 
Constitutionally empowered local government, by applying Section 24(b) in horizontal 
manner.     
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The interpretation that Section 24(b) creates a positive duty on both public and private 
entities has legislative support in the form of s28(1) of NEMA which provides that: ‘Every 
person who causes, has caused or may cause significant pollution or degradation of the 
environment must take reasonable measures to prevent such pollution or degradation from 
occurring, continuing or recurring’. Whilst legislative provisions should not be used to 
interpret Constitutional rights this section seems to lend support to the argument that there is 
no prohibition on applying such rights in a horizontal manner. By requiring that ‘every 
person… must take reasonable measures to prevent such pollution or degradation from 
occurring’ a clearly positive duty is imposed on everyone and this agrees with the 
interpretation of Section 24(b) as argued above. 
 
A further, and in some ways alternative argument, is that although framed as a positive right, 
environmental rights are actually negative rights.430 Conceptually the starting point is a 
healthy environment; pollution, ecological degradation and non-ecologically sustainable 
development and use threaten this state of affairs and therefore represent an invasion. Only 
the requirements to ‘promote conservation’ and to ‘promote justifiable economic and social 
development’ are truly positive obligations. And as such an invasion of a negative right is 
defensible against a private entity. The Constitutional Court (in examining the right to 
adequate housing431) confirms ‘that there is a negative content to socio-economic rights’432 
and concludes that: 
‘It is not necessary in this case to delineate all the circumstances in which a 
measure [by a private entity] will constitute a violation of the negative 
obligations imposed by the Constitution. However, in the light of the 
conception of adequate housing described above I conclude that, at the very 
least, any measure which permits a person to be deprived of existing access 
to adequate housing [i.e. an existing realised right], limits the rights protected 
in section 26(1) [i.e. the positive duty provision].’433 
Seemingly this would mean that, even where a right is framed in the positive, an invasion of 
a realised positive right by a private entity is equivalent to the invasion of a negative right. A 
healthy environment is, historically, the putative environmental starting point and therefore 
amounts to a realisation of the positive elements of Section 24. A private entity’s invasion of 
a realised positive right would therefore be justiciable. Even if Section 24(b) is seen as a 
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purely positive, programmatic, right the peculiar nature of the environment would render it a 
right justiciable against private entities.  
   
5.4 A Question of Reasonableness 
 
It has been argued that Section 24(b), in as much as it imposes a positive duty, imposes 
such duty upon private entities as well as the State. This duty is, however, not as onerous as 
it might be. This duty must, at all times be reasonable. Furthermore: all rights are subject to 
any inherent limitations and are also subject434 to the limitation of rights.435 Different rights 
may conflict with each other and will need to be balanced against each other. Thus a 
decision to pollute may be taken in furtherance of the right to property436 and the right to 
freedom of trade,437 this decision may constitute justifiable economic development438 or it 
may be legally justifiable as an exercise of a right in ‘an open and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom’.439 No right in the Bill of Rights is absolute and by 
imposing a positive duty the objectives of Section 24 can be met despite the lawful invasion 
of the negative right. 
 
The purpose of environmental protection would not be met if there was no positive duty on 
everyone. Reliance upon government as bearing the sole positive duty would be inadequate.  
‘During the last few years the debate on the responsibilities of private actors 
for fostering sustainable development has been emerging, because the 
problem-solving capacity of governments is - as is evident from many legal, 
policy, and economic studies - somewhat limited. Because a sustainable 
society is a collective interest, it is necessary to reconsider the role of societal 
actors and the need for shared responsibilities to enable the transition towards 
a sustainable society.’440  
Furthermore: 
‘But to resolve these problems caused by the cumulative effects of 
unidirectional, incremental change, society must undertake measures to 
reverse trends that are well entrenched and involve the cumulative effect of 
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millions of individual activities, the impact of any one of which may seem 
innocuous.’441 
 
South African common-law of negligence tends not to impose a positive legal duty on 
persons. However there are exceptions. In the liability of a farmer for the consequences of a 
fire which he did not start but which started on his property the (then) Rhodesian Appellate 
Division discussed circumstances in which a positive legal duty might arise. 
‘Whether a moral duty exists will not, in the majority of cases, be difficult to 
decide. The problem,…, is always to decide  whether the moral duty should be 
translated into a legal duty. The resolution of this problem in not an exact 
science; on the contrary, the Court, after assessing all the relevant factors 
must of necessity come to what is essentially a value judgement in order to do 
justice between the parties.’442 
With reference to the present discussion it is interesting to note that there is legal recognition 
of a moral duty which does not automatically translate into a legal duty but may, when it is in 
the interests of justice do so. Might this not be regarded simply as being a case of 
‘reasonableness’? 
 
Attributing any form of liability to private entities for a failure to perform a duty in terms of 
Section 24(b) might be likened to South Africa’s common law position regarding delictual 
(tortious) claims based on ‘pure economic loss’. ‘“Pure economic loss” in this context 
connotes loss that does not arise directly from damage to the plaintiff’s person or property 
but rather in consequence of the negligent act itself, such as a loss of profit, being put to 
extra expenses or the diminution in the value of property.’443 Liability flows from the negligent 
act and has economic consequences; environmental harm would similarly flow from the act 
itself and might not result in measurable (or actionable) ‘damage to person or property’ but 
might, instead ‘put [a person] to extra expense’ (e.g. increased costs of water purification or 
medical expenses) or diminish the value of property (e.g. chronic pollution or degradation 
may reduce property values). The assessment of wrongfulness requires a careful 
determination of public policy. ‘What then are the considerations of policy that are of 
particular relevance in this case? First, as always in claims of this kind, is the spectre of the 
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imposition of liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class’.444 An enquiry based on public policy is made to prevent the spectre of 
indeterminate liability being raised and a similar enquiry would provide a reasonable 
limitation on liability arising out of Section 24(b). Fault (i.e. negligence or intent) and 
causation would also be required in order for legal redress and therefore a universal positive 
duty would not automatically give rise to claims unless fault and causation were also 
present. 
 
It would appear that the common-law could be developed, in line with the positive duty and 
the question of reasonableness, by the courts to provide for the positive duty of Section 
24(b) without such imposition becoming unjust. A positive duty imposed on private entities 
would not automatically result in indeterminate liability. At its entry it merely imposes a moral 
duty, where justice requires and public policy dictates this moral duty may become a legal 
duty. As a positive legal duty it may be compelled but damages would only flow where fault 
and causation were also present. 
 
Every action a person takes has the potential to impact upon the environment and an impact 
upon the environment is, eventually, felt by everyone. From a perspective of offsetting a 
negative impact the positive duty should be proportional to the negative impact of the 
environmental administrative action. A small negative impact would only require a small 
positive action to offset it and the duty would therefore be proportional to the action and 
therefore would be reasonable. Conversely a severe negative impact will impose a 
proportional positive duty, and this would be reasonable. An absolute legal positive duty, in 
the absence of an environmental action, should not be imposed on private entities. 
 
However certain impacts will be too small to quantify or even to appreciate. These micro-
impacts may not be registered but, in terms of cumulative effects, eventually the cumulative 
impact is felt.445 Even if a micro-impact can be absorbed by and dissipated within the 
environment it still has a negative consequence. This necessitates an overall positive duty 
on everyone if the objective of environmental protection is to be realised. This overall 
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positive duty is, proportionally a small one. It should not overly burden any individual but, by 
taking certain small positive steps, the right to environmental protection can be realised. 
 
The element of ‘reasonableness’ in socio-economic rights has been stated as ‘requir[ing] 
nothing more of the state than is achievable within its available resources’446 but this has to 
be seen in the context of the explicit Progressive Element within such rights. In the case of 
education: 
‘The State is required to take reasonable legislative and other measures. 
Legislative measures by themselves are not likely to constitute constitutional 
compliance. Mere legislation is not enough. The State is obliged to act to 
achieve the intended result, and the legislative measures will invariably have 
to be supported by appropriate, well-directed policies and programs 
implemented by the Executive. These policies and programs must be 
reasonable both in their conception and their implementation. The formulation 
of a program is only the first stage in meeting the State's obligations. The 
program must also be reasonably implemented. An otherwise reasonable 
program that is not implemented reasonably will not constitute compliance with 
the State's obligations.’447 
 
In Section 24(b) reasonableness should apply in the context of proportionality. Where an 
entity (including the State) has a large impact on or obtains a large economic benefit from 
the environment then the requirements imposed by the positive duty would be proportionally 
large. Where the opposite is the case then the requirements imposed by the positive duty 
are proportionally smaller.  This is in keeping with the dictum in the Grootboom Case: ‘In 
determining whether a set of measures is reasonable, it will be necessary to consider 
housing problems in their social, economic and historical context and to consider the 
capacity of institutions responsible for implementing the program’448 by making the measures 
proportional they should be in keeping with the entities’ capacity to implement them. This 
capacity can be taken to include the capacity of and nature of traditional leadership.  
 
The State bears an additional positive duty to produce legislative measures. Furthermore the 
State must, within its available resources, implement ‘other measures’: these could include 
fiscal measures, policy measures, education programmes, implementation, enforcement etc. 
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The issue of reasonableness would then apply to the resources the State makes available in 
proportion to the scale of the problems which need to be addressed.   
 
A distinction between the socio-economic rights and Section 24 is that there is no 
requirement in Section 24 for the progressive realisation of the underlying fundamental right; 
in this case either the right contained in Section 24(a), namely the right to an environment 
that is not harmful to a person’s health or well-being, or, in Section 24(b), the right to have 
the environment protected. The underlying rights to further education,449 of access to 
adequate housing,450 of access to health care services, access to sufficient food and water 
and access to social security451 are all finite objectives: therefore the progressive realisation 
of these rights is an achievable goal. The right to have the environment protected is not a 
finite goal, rather it requires constant ongoing application to prevent erosion of and to realise 
the objective. 
 
Decisions to negatively impact upon the environment will be legitimately taken every day, if 
not every hour, if not every second: these decisions will be taken in the furtherance of 
legitimate rights. The State lacks the capacity to micro-manage all of these impacts. The 
State’s finite resources and, by implication its inability to micro-manage the realisation of 
Section 24(b), has been recognised by the Constitutional Court which has been loath to 
interfere with the executive’s decisions on allocation of resources.452 
 
The interpretation of Section 24(b) proposed thus far is an admittedly generous one. 
However it does appear to accord with the intention of drafters, the textual and contextual 
interpretation as well as achieving the argued purpose of the Section in addressing 
environmental protection. By applying a proportionality requirement to the positive duty and 
recognising that reasonableness always requires an assessment of actual resources this 
generous interpretation is reasonable. 
 
                                                          
449
 Section 29 of the Constitution. 
450
 Section 26 of the Constitution. 
451
 All three fall under Section 27 of the Constitution. 
452
 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at [11]. 
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Where the positive duty is limited to the State (and for the purposes of discussion to ignore 
the hypothesis that private entities could, and should, bear the positive duty too) then 
‘reasonable’ needs to be interpreted in the context in which it is used. Authors453 have 
interpreted ‘reasonable’ to have the same meaning as the Constitutional Court’s reasoning in 
socio-economic rights enquiries such as used in the Grootboom case. There can be little 
doubt that the Court’s reasoning will apply to use of ‘reasonable’ in Section 24(b). 
‘Reasonableness’ applies not only to the nature of the measures but to their implementation 
too:  
‘The reasonableness review…look[s] at an array of different factors, such as, 
that: the measures taken by government are comprehensive and 
coordinated; the financial and human resources needed to implement such 
measures have been made available; the measures are both reasonably 
conceived and reasonably implemented. The measures taken by all public 
authorities must be balanced and flexible, should be designed to respond to 
short-, medium- and long-term needs of society, and may not exclude certain 
members of the public society.’454 
 
However there are two critical distinctions between a true socio-economic right and Section 
24(b). The first of these is Section 24(b)’s omission of the progressive element and its 
implementation is not conditional upon the availability of State resources. Secondly, the 
fulfilment of socio-economic rights requires infrastructure which, in turn, requires resources 
and time inputs. The socio-economic rights cannot be immediately justiciable as there will 
always be a lag between need and realisation. The historical context of South Africa and the 
colonial and apartheid legacies exacerbate this lag. Environmental protection does not 
require any infrastructure; it is an immediately justiciable negative right. It is implementable 
by human behaviour alone. The argument to suggest that ‘reasonable’ in Section 24(b) ‘must 
surely be interpreted to function as a limitation measure in that government needs only to 
fulfil the specific objectives of Sections 24(b)(i)-24(b)(iii) insofar as it has the requisite 
financial and human resources to do so,’455 must, with respect, be rejected. Rather the 
question of reasonableness, as it relates to legislative and other State measures, must 
                                                          
453
 See for instance Kotzé, L. J., ‘A Critical Survey of Domestic Constitutional Provisions Relating to 
Environmental Protection in South Africa’ (2007) 14 Tilburg Law Review 298 at 334 and also du Plessis, A., 
‘Adding Flames to the Fuel: Why Further Constitutional Adjudication is Required for South Africa’s 
Constitutional Right to Catch Alight’ (2008) 15 SAJELP 57 – 84 at 77 for discussion and further references. 
454 Du Plessis, A., ‘South Africa's Constitutional Environmental Right (Generously) Interpreted: What is in it for 
Poverty? ‘ (2011) 27 SAJHR 279 – 307 at 302 footnotes omitted also see Du Plessis, A.,  Fulfilment of South 
Africa's Constitutional Environmental Right in the Local Government  Sphere (2008) LLD Thesis, North-West 
University, at 381 – 382. 
455
 Kotzé, L. J., ‘A Critical Survey of Domestic Constitutional Provisions Relating to Environmental Protection in 
South Africa’ (2007) 14 Tilburg Law Review 298 at 334 also see du Plessis, A., ‘Adding Flames to the Fuel: Why 
Further Constitutional Adjudication is Required for South Africa’s Constitutional Right to Catch Alight’ (2008) 
15 SAJELP 57 – 84 at 77. 
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surely mean that the legislative and other measures imposed by the State cannot be 
unreasonable. There can be little doubt that true environmental protection (to the exclusion 
of other human rights) could best be implemented through draconian legislative and other 
measures. An absolute prohibition on further infrastructure development or the burning of 
coal for electricity generation would no doubt achieve considerable environmental protection 
(at least in the short term) but would be manifestly unreasonable (and ultimately un-
sustainable and counter-productive). 
 
Where the ‘other measures’ impose a resource obligation on the State then reasonableness 
must take into account the State’s resources. Legislative and other measures to protect the 
environment could well impose restrictions on private rights.456 For instance restrictions 
placed on land use probably amount to a deprivation of property rights but may be required 
to protect biodiversity and ecosystem services e.g. wetland protection. Legislation, policy, 
judicial interpretation, development of the common-law, education etc. do not require 
significant State resources and accordingly reasonable must mean that the measures 
implemented are reasonable as to their impact on other rights rather than in reference to 
State resources. 
 
If the hypothesis of a private entity positive duty is supported then this interpretation of 
‘reasonable’ should apply (along with the interpretation discussed previously) to the private 
entity too. The environmental right is unlike other socio-economic rights as it requires, 
primarily, implementation at a personal behavioural level rather than costly infrastructure. 
Thus individuals could have a positive duty to recycle, to use energy sparingly, to refrain 
from littering and to protect biodiversity. These other measures are both reasonable and 
implementable by private entities; whereas a duty to build a school or provide potable water 
would be an unreasonable imposition upon a private entity. 
 
 
                                                          
456 In the (as yet unreported) case of Le Sueur and Another v Ethekwini Municipality and Others (9714/11) 
[2013] ZAKZPHC 6 (30 January 2013) private property owners objected to the local government’s (the 
eThekwini Metro’s) amended town planning scheme which provided for the Durban Metropolitan Open Space 
System. The property owners alleged that the D-MOSS amounted to ‘expropriation by stealth’ at [17] as the D-
MOSS, with the avowed intention of environmental protection, limited property owner’s rights in respect of 
their properties as parts or the whole where zoned for conservation purposes and were thus undevelopable. 
Interestingly the judgement was based, in part, upon a ruling that Section 24(b) created a justiciable right and 
imposed a positive duty on the local government to implement ‘other measures’ e.g. D-MOSS to achieve its 
fulfilment (see at [19]). It would have been interesting had the State justified its authority based on the public 
trust doctrine and the principle of subsidiarity.   
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5.5 Anthropocentric or Ecocentric? 
 
The acid test in determining whether a right is anthropocentric or ecocentric is whether the 
right seeks to protect humans or whether it seeks to protect ‘all forms of life’.457 Section 24(b) 
appears to be clearly ecocentric, its purpose is to protect the environment, through the 
mechanisms contained in its three subsections. There is no indication that either human 
well-being or human health is a criterion in determining a threshold for this right. Conversely 
Section 24(a) is intended to protect ‘everyone’ and protects human health and well-being. As 
such it is clearly anthropocentric. With its focus on ecological elements and the preceding 
discussion Section 24(b) should not be restrictively interpreted as a mere programmatic 
directive to achieve the rights in Section 24(a).  
 
While Section 24(b) seems to be clearly directed at environmental protection, mainly through 
preservation of ecological systems and conservation, it has possibly anthropocentric 
elements. Firstly the right is in favour of ‘Everyone’ and secondly, and more importantly, the 
environment is protected ‘for the benefit of present and future generations’. The first element 
is clearly a reference to the fact that the right can be exercised by everyone and therefore 
anyone, as such it does not determine whether or not the right is anthropocentric. The 
second element may be simply recording an intragenerational and intergenerational 
component in keeping with the concepts of Sustainable Development or Sustainability as the 
case may be as well as being a feature of emergent international environmental law. It may 
also be a situation of giving the rights a human focus assuming their overall environmental 
bias. One may also argue, from an ecocentric perspective, that generations could apply 
equally to other organisms and not necessarily only to humans, but in truth generations must 
be presumed to refer to humans and to intragenerational and intergenerational rights. Does 
the requirement that the protection of the environment is for the benefit of humankind render 
the rights anthropocentric?458  
 
The textual meaning of Section 24(b) seems to be clear, the environment is to be protected 
through measures which prevent pollution, prevent ecological degradation, promote 
                                                          
457 Bruckerhoff, J. J., ‘Giving Nature Constitutional Protection: A Less Anthropocentric Interpretation of 
Environmental Rights’ (2008) 86 Texas Law Review 615 - 646 at 618. 
458
 Bruckerhoff has suggested that an intergenerational provision is characteristic of a weakly anthropocentric 
right. Bruckerhoff, J. J., ‘Giving Nature Constitutional Protection: A Less Anthropocentric Interpretation of 
Environmental Rights’ (2008) 86 Texas Law Review 615 - 646 at 633. 
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conservation or which ensure ecologically sustainable development and use. All of these 
actions apply to the environment and not to humans. So the environment is protected 
through positive environmental actions. Unlike Section 24(a), protection is not linked to 
human health and well-being: it is clearly directed at the environment. In the circumstance it 
would not be in keeping with the rest of Section 24(b) to give the word ‘benefit’ too much 
weight. It must also be noted that to leave environmental protection to a point where 
negative effects manifest themselves in human health and well-being may well leave it too 
late for a meaningful intervention. There is therefore a need to protect the environment 
before it becomes a measurable human health or well-being issue.459 
 
‘Benefit’ is an imprecise term and it would be difficult to interpret it to mean that Section 
24(b) was geared to human interest and away from the environment per se. That humans 
can benefit from a protected or enhanced environment is not contrary to an ecocentric right. 
Caring for the Earth described itself as ‘a strategy for a kind of development that provides 
real improvements in the quality of human life and at the same time conserves the vitality 
and diversity of the Earth.’460 Human well-being can be reconciled with the ecocentric 
approach, an approach where humans are part of the environment and the environment is 
worthy of protection for its intrinsic value whilst recognising the role a healthy environment 
plays in human well-being.461  
 
By referring to the content of the directive elements it is clear that an ecocentric 
interpretation is correct, environmental protection is achieved without reference to 
                                                          
459
 Bruckerhoff, J. J., ‘Giving Nature Constitutional Protection: A Less Anthropocentric Interpretation of 
Environmental Rights’ (2008) 86 Texas Law Review 615 - 646 at 624. 
460
 Caring for the Earth, page 8. 
461
 Thus a statement such as: ‘The scope of [Section 24] is therefore extensive. It does not confine itself to 
protection against conduct harmful to health, but seeks also by, inter alia, the promotion of conservation and 
ecologically sustainable development, to ensure an environment beneficial to our 'well-being'.’* Might, as it 
does, convey an anthropocentrism but this anthropocentrism should not, automatically exclude an underlying 
eocentrism. This is particularly so as the judge then goes on to comment that ‘The term 'well-being' is open-
ended and, manifestly, is incapable of precise definition. Nevertheless, it is critically important in that it defines 
for the environmental authorities the constitutional objectives of their task.’* It is unclear and, with respect, 
untenable that a constitutional objective is defined in such an open ended manner. It would have been far 
more beneficial had an objective ecocentric approach been used to ‘define…the constitutional objective’. The 
question of well-being can then be approached on a subjective basis from an objectively determinable base of 
environmental health which prevents the enquiry from being completely open-ended. This would, with due 
respect, be a more legally sound approach to have taken. * HTF Developers case at [18]. The anthropocentric 
approach can be contrasted to the Supreme Court of Appeals statement: ‘s 24(b) imposes positive obligations 
on the state to protect the environment 'through reasonable legislative and other measures that prevent 
pollution . . . while promoting justifiable economic and social development'.’** which appears to be ecocentric 
in that the human well-being requirement is left out. ** Sasol Oil (SCA) case at [14] footnote omitted. 
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humankind but on the basis of ecological conservation. The use of ‘while promoting 
justifiable economic and social development’ in Section 24(b)(iii) would be redundant if the 
whole of Section 24(b) was anthropocentric; the fact that this proviso is included strongly 
indicates that the right is ecocentric and requires the proviso to limit its applicability to retard 
other, anthropocentric, human rights. The correct interpretation of Section 24(b) must 
therefore be as an ecocentric right. 
 
The use of ‘justifiable’ is indicative of the ecocentric approach. Clearly it is envisaged that 
economic development and social development will compromise the environment otherwise 
they would not be used as a proviso in a right designed to protect the environment. The 
question then is; from whose perspective must the compromise be justified? Humans are 
obviously the drivers of the economic and social development and therefore any such 
development would be justified from an anthropocentric perspective, the only possibility 
where this would not be the case would be where the developments posed an immediate 
risk to human health or well-being. In such a case Section 24(a) could be invoked. It 
therefore seems that the only logical interpretation is that the justification must relate to the 
environment. The justification relates to a purely environmental perspective as there is no 
direct measurable harm to humans or their well-being otherwise Section 24(a) would apply. 
On this basis Section 24(b)(iii) is strongly ecocentric as it considers the merits of economic 
and social development from the perspective of the environment.  
  
Whilst not wanting to stretch the bounds of a purely textual interpretation too far: it may be 
possible to infer that the change from the phrase ‘to have their environment protected’ as 
contained in the proposed section 23(b) of the Constitution to the actual ‘to have the 
environment protected’ in Section 24(b) was significant. ‘Their’ implies a possessive element 
and may also imply a proximity element. By changing ‘their’ to ‘the’ the possessive, possibly 
anthropocentric, element is lost. Furthermore, the proximity element is also lost, thus a 
person can seek to enforce the right to protect a part of the environment physically distant 
and also, legally remote from such person. 
 
This alone should be sufficient purposive justification for regarding Section 24(b) as an 
ecocentric right. Human health and well-being are buffered from the environment. To rely on 
anthropocentric assessment of environmental protection would mean that the greater the 
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buffering the more remote the result of the harm is from the cause of the harm. 
Metaphorically this remoteness means that, in addressing environmental protection 
anthropocentrically, one would, in effect, be treating the symptoms (i.e. human health and 
well-being) of a disease (i.e. environmental deterioration) without ever addressing its cause 
(i.e. pollution, ecological degradation and non-ecologically sustainable development and 
use). Additionally the cause and the symptom are not necessarily linearly connected (e.g. 
burning fossil fuels impacts on fishing). An ecocentric approach would address the cause of 
the problem and, hopefully, offer a cure. Amelioration of the symptoms would naturally 
follow. On the other hand treatment of the symptoms only without providing a cure will lead 
to inevitable decline and death of the patient. 
 
5.6 ‘Benefit of Present and Future Generations’ 
 
At first glance this seems to be a relatively simply provision. With regard to Sustainable 
Development, Kates et al.462 posed the question of over what period must development be 
sustainable. ‘[The period] has been defined from as little as a generation — when almost 
everything is sustainable — to forever — when surely nothing is sustainable.’463 Simply 
answered, nothing lasts forever and therefore how far into the future can Sustainable 
Development be pushed? Section 24(b) appears to answer this by simply requiring that all 
future generations benefit. The spectre of impossibility is therefore raised.  
 
To address this issue two points are noted. The first is the argument that Section 24(b) does 
not refer to Sustainable Development but rather it requires that the ‘environment [be] 
protected’. By ensuring and preserving ecological resilience as opposed to advocating 
development it is conceivable that the environment can be protected ad infinitum. This is not 
to imply that the environment and its component ecological processes will remain 
unchanging forever but conscious management to achieve enhanced ecological resilience 
would equate to environmental protection and fulfil this requirement. Extraneous factors such 
as natural erosion, natural climate change, natural droughts and floods and natural 
extinctions will continue to occur but ecosystems which retain their adaptive capacities would 
                                                          
462
 Kates, R. W., Parris, T. M. and Leiserowitz, A. A., ‘What is Sustainable Development? Goals, Indicators, 
Values and Practice.’ (April 2005)  Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, Volume 47, 
Number 3, 8–21 at 12. 
463
 Kates et al. fn 462 at 12. 
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remain resilient and environmental protection would be achieved. It must also be recalled 
that humans form part of the environment and therefore environmental protection would 
include ‘human ecosystem’ resilience along with ‘natural ecosystem’ resilience.  So, while 
development can never be sustained forever the environment can, on this basis, be 
protected forever. 
 
The second issue relates to what is meant by ‘present and future generations’. On the one 
hand the simplistic meaning of ‘forever’ (as used above) seems to answer this. However 
there are subtleties which need to be addressed. 
 
Generations are not discrete events. Humans are not born at regular intervals but 
continuously (unlike some other animals which have regular discretely spaced seasonal 
reproductive events). This means that the future generation exists contemporaneously with 
the present generation. In truth there is only one generation which has existed, uninterrupted 
since humans first evolved and will continue until their ultimate extinction.464 This conundrum 
aside: does the reference to ‘future generations’ imply that some, as yet unborn and 
unconceived person has a fundamental right in terms of the Constitution?465  
 
Whilst our law has afforded rights to unborn foetuses these rights only manifest when the 
foetus is born alive and the right must have arisen after conception.466 At most the so called 
nasciturus fiction has a nine month time horizon as opposed to the potentially infinite time 
horizon contemplated in Section 24(b). This raises the question, if rights are given to future 
generations then against whom can these rights be enforced? By the time the future rights 
                                                          
464 The thought might have been expressed thus: ‘In my own perception, the message of solidarity in time — 
conveyed by inter-generational equity — projects itself both ways, into the future and the past, encompassing 
future as well as past generations’. Judge Cançado Trindade’s separate opinion in the Pulp Mills case at [125]. 
465 ‘Streams of African customary law also include a notion of ownership/ stewardship of land by the 
collective, including future generations. One Ghanaian chief has explained that in this conceptualization, "land 
belongs to a vast family of whom many are dead, a few are living, and [a] countless host are still unborn.”’ 
Collins, L. M., ‘Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational Equity in Global Environmental Governance’ (2007) 
30 Dalhousie Law Journal 79 - 140 at 95 footnote omitted. 
466
 The Supreme Court of Appeal has approved Hiemstra J’s description of the nasciturus fiction given in the 
case of Pinchin and Another NO v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1963 (2) SA 254 (W) at 260 A-C which is ‘I hold that 
a child does have an action to recover damages for pre-natal injuries. This rule is based on the rule of the 
Roman law, received into our law, that an unborn child, if subsequently born alive, is deemed to have all the 
rights of a born child, whenever this is to its advantage. There is apparently no reason to limit this rule to the 
law of property and to exclude it from the law of delict.’ Road Accident Fund v Mtati [2005] 3 All SA 340 (SCA) 
at [6] to [8]. 
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are infringed the culprits are no more. Such future rights can only be exercised by the injured 
against the injured as the causal generation will be pre-deceased by the time that the injured 
can act. Making the rights future dependent would not serve the primary directive of present 
environmental protection. Future dependent rights would, instead of protecting the 
environment, be a case of remediating past damage or claiming compensation for such 
damage. As such the provision becomes meaningless. 
 
An alternative interpretation is to render the future rights actionable by the present 
generation on behalf of the future generation. This interpretation is appealing because, if the 
environment is not protected in the present, it cannot be protected in the future. The present 
generation could conceivably exercise these future rights either ‘in the public interest’ or, if 
the courts permit, ‘on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name’ or ‘in the 
interest of a [future] class of persons’.467 A possible problem here is that a court would have 
to interpret ‘person’ to include a putative member of a possible future generation. The 
nasciturus fiction has been deemed necessary because a foetus is not regarded as being a 
person and it seems unlikely that a hypothetical future generation would be regarded as 
being a person. The exerciser of the future right would therefore presumably have to rely on 
‘public interest’.  
 
 
Feris suggests468 that in considering the needs of children already born a court would be 
applying an aspect of intergenerational equity. This may be partially correct but it must be 
noted that children already born would logically constitute the present generation although 
yet to attain full rights. This lack of rights is addressed through section 28 of the Constitution 
which protects children’s rights. In discussing intergenerational rights in light of Section 24(b) 
the High Court in BP Southern Africa quotes with approval a 1971 ratio: 
‘The idea which prevailed in the past that ownership of land conferred the right 
on the owner to use his land as he pleased is rapidly giving way in the modern 
world to the more responsible conception that an owner must not use his land 
in a way which may prejudice his neighbours or the community in which he 
lives, and that he holds his land in trust for future generations. Legislation 
dealing with such matters as town and country planning, the conservation of 
natural resources, and the prevention of pollution, and regulations designed to 
ensure that proper farming practices are followed, all bear eloquent testimony 
                                                          
467
 Section 38 of the Constitution sets out these and other qualifications of person who may approach a court 
to allege the infringement of or threat to a Constitutional right.  
468
 Feris, L., ‘Environmental Rights and Locus Standi’  in Paterson and Kotzé (eds.) Environmental Compliance 
and Enforcement in South Africa: Legal Perspectives (2009) at 142 – 143. 
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of the existence of this more civilised and enlightened attitude towards the 
rights conferred by ownership of land.'469 
This judgment, and the later court’s approval of it, is interesting as indicates that 
intergenerational rights are not a new legal concept, that they are not limited to existing 
children’s rights and it also introduces the concept of a trust doctrine which is binding on 
private entities.  
 
A further alternative has been suggested470 which is to ignore the issue of the future 
generation and to focus exclusively on the present generation. As the present generation is 
constantly cycling if the environment is protected for the present generation in toto then, by 
implication, the environment will be protected for the future generation. Thus 
intragenerational equity achieves intergenerational equity. This might well be the most 
practical way to assess whether or not environmental protection is in the benefit of future 
generations. If the environment is protected here and now in a manner which facilitates 
ecological resilience and adaptability rather than a preservationist frozen moment we will 
achieve the objective. This requires absolute environmental protection failing which 
ecological resilience will be gradually eroded until ecosystem collapse is inevitable. The use 
of children’s rights and the reasoning of Feris might provide the required legal basis to 
achieve this goal and fulfil Section 24(b). Sustainable Development which permits a 
proponent determined (subjective) focus to determine what constitutes sustainable 
development cannot use this methodology (of focusing on the present generation and 
thereby automatically providing for future generations) as it lacks the necessary objectivity. 
The lack of objectivity makes it nearly impossible, in terms of Sustainable Development, to 
conceive a true future benefit as the future remains uncertain.  
 
The intragenerational model must be seen in the light of the fact that it is not proposed here 
to imply that the rights of the future generation cannot exist or are less important than the 
present generation rights.471 Rather it is offered as a practical method, in the context of 
                                                          
469
 The ratio of MacDonald ACJ of the (then) Rhodesia Appellate Division in King v Dykes 1971 (3) SA 540 (RA) 
545 G - H quoted in BP Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v MEC For Agriculture, Conservation, Environment and Land 
Affairs 2004 (5) SA 124 (W) at 143 B – C, the emphasis is as it appears. 
470
 Collins, L. M., ‘Revisiting the Doctrine of Intergenerational Equity in Global Environmental Governance’ 
(2007) 30 Dalhousie Law Journal 79 - 140 at 113 – 115. 
471
 For a criticism of the purely intragenerational rights approach see Brown Weiss, E., ‘A Reply to Barresi's 
"Beyond Fairness to Future Generations"’ (1997) 11 Tulane Environmental Law Journal 89 – 97. 
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Section 24(b), to measure, assess and assure environmental protection for the benefit of the 
future generation.  
 
5.7 ‘Benefit’ and the Public Trust Doctrine 
 
‘Intergenerational equity embodies the notion that the present generation 
holds the earth's resources in trust for future generations.’472 
 
Any lasting concern that the use of ‘benefit’ imparts an anthropocentrism to Section 24(b) 
can also be dispelled by reference to the second paragraph of the Government Policy which 
states that: 
‘Every generation has an obligation to act as a trustee of its natural 
environment and cultural heritage in the interest of succeeding generations. In 
this respect, sobriety, moderation and discipline are necessary to restrict the 
demand for fulfilment of needs to sustainable levels.’ 
 
The word ‘benefit’ is also suggestive of the State’s duty as trustee of the environment. This 
would be in accordance with the public trust doctrine. Trust law requires that the bare 
dominium of an asset be held by a trustee for the benefit of someone else (a beneficiary). 
The public trust doctrine would place the State in such a fiduciary position473 with respect to 
the asset, in this case ‘the environment’. ‘Benefit’ might therefore imply a situation of public 
trust where the present and future generations are the beneficiaries of the public trust so 
created. 
‘The essence of the public trust is that the State, as trustee, is under a 
fiduciary duty to deal with the trust property, being the common natural 
resources, in a manner that is in the interests of the general public. Hence, the 
State cannot alienate the trust property unless the public benefit that would 
                                                          
472
 Boer, B., ‘Institutionalising Ecologically Sustainable Development: The Roles Of National, State, And Local 
Governments In Translating Grand Strategy Into Action’ (1995) 31:2 Willamette Law Review 307- 358 at 319. 
473
 ‘Locke stated in his Second Treatise on Civil Government (1685) that governments merely exercise a 
"fiduciary trust" on behalf of their people. Pound suggests that the role of states in the management of 
common natural resources must be limited to "a sort of guardianship for social purposes"’. van der Schyff, E., 
‘Unpacking The Public Trust Doctrine: A Journey Into Foreign Territory’ (2010) 13:5 PELJ 121 – 189 at 123 
footnotes omitted. 
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‘The public trust doctrine creates a legal obligation for the sovereign to hold 
certain natural resources in trust for its people, and at the same time it places 
a custodial duty on the sovereign to protect and preserve these resources for 
present and future generations. The public trust doctrine has been described 
as 'an ancient legal precept of public ownership of important natural 
resources'.’475 
The public trust doctrine is seemingly based on the Roman legal principle of res communes 
in terms of which the State held ‘property’ on behalf of everyone.476 ‘Ownership’477 therefore 
vested equally in everyone and the beneficial rights are administered on everyone’s behalf 
and for their general benefit by the State as trustee.478 It is critical to distinguish this situation 
from other forms of trusteeship where the subject matter is capable of true ownership and is 
therefore owned by the trustee.  
 
 
The concept of public trust is in keeping with Roman Law and can be found, in principle, in 
the ANC Policy479 as well as the Government Policy480 and appears to have been brought 
                                                          
474
 Preston, B. J., Ecologically Sustainable Development in the Courts in Australia and Asia A paper presented to 
a seminar on environmental law organised by Buddle Findlay, Lawyers, Wellington, New Zealand, 28 August 
2006 at pages 38 -39 footnote omitted. 
475 Feris, L., ‘The Public Trust Doctrine and Liability for Historic Water Pollution In South Africa’ (2012) 8:1 Law 
of Environment and Development Journal  1 – 18 at 5 footnote omitted . 
476
 Feris describes the Roman concept of res communes forming part of the English Law Public Trust Doctrine. 
Feris, L., ‘The Public Trust Doctrine and Liability for Historic Water Pollution In South Africa’ (2012) 8:1 Law of 
Environment and Development Journal  1 – 18  at 5; see also van der Schyff, E., ‘Unpacking The Public Trust 
Doctrine: A Journey Into Foreign Territory’ (2010) 13:5 PELJ 121 – 189 at 125 – 126 and at 132 for similar 
reasoning. 
477
 Res omnium communes are generally regarded as being res extra commercium which means that they are 
not capable of being owned in their natural state (although parts can be ‘captured’ and controlled and 
therefore owned in such captured state. See Van Der Merwe, G. G. ‘Things’ in Joubert, W. A., Faris, J. A. and 
Harms, L. T. C. The Law of South Africa (First Reissue) (2002), Butterworths, Durban pages 101-355 at [213] – 
[214]. 
478
 LAWSA  Vol 27 First Edition describes Common things ‘(res omnium communes) [as being] things which by 
natural law are common to mankind and therefore insusceptible of private ownership. Examples are the air 
and running water. These things are to be enjoyed in common by all living persons conforming with the use for 
which nature had intended them.’ (Van Der Merwe, G. G. ‘Things’ in Joubert, W. A., Faris, J. A. and Harms, L. T. 
C. The Law of South Africa (First Reissue) (2002), Butterworths, Durban pages 101-355 at [213]) footnotes 
omitted. They are distinct from State assets which were regarded as res publicae. ‘Like common things, public 
things can be used freely by the general public but, unlike common things, they do not belong to the 
community as a whole but to the state.’ (Van Der Merwe, G. G. ‘Things’ in Joubert, W. A., Faris, J. A. and 
Harms, L. T. C. The Law of South Africa (First Reissue) (2002), Butterworths, Durban pages 101-355 at at [214]) 
footnotes omitted. 
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 Interestingly enough the ANC Policy at (12) preferred to vest ‘all natural resources below and above the 
surface area of the land, including the air, and all forms of potential energy or minerals in the territorial 
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into post Constitutional legislation dealing with natural resources.481 The public trust doctrine 
therefore seems to be, in principle, a legally acceptable premise and resonates with Section 
24(b)’s use of ‘everyone’ and ‘benefit’. 
 
 
Where the State acts as a Trustee and where the beneficiaries are as diverse a group as the 
inhabitants of South Africa then it would simplify administration of the subject matter (i.e. the 
environment) if an objective test were employed. Reference to ecological sustainability 
would provide such a test; it is divorced from subjectivity and can be objectively and 
scientifically assessed in an impartial way. Feris argues that Section 24(b) constitutionally 
prescribes a ‘custodial obligation on government as the public trustees of South Africa’s 
water resources’.482 This argument is supported but extended to the environment as a 
whole. A contention supported by s 2(4)(o) of NEMA which explicitly states that ‘The 
environment is held in public trust for the people…’. 
 
 
The  question of ‘benefit’ would be problematic in the context of Sustainable Development as 
this would require an assessment of an immediate, developmental, benefit subjectively 
assessed against the immediate environmental cost and then an extrapolation of both of 
these into some, unascertainable and hypothetical, future. ‘A critical question that remains 
unanswered both nationally and in international environmental law is whether there is a 
universal way of measuring the sustainability of a given development model’.483 However 
these problems are sidestepped by the objective directive to protect the environment. A 
functioning (if not actually healthy) environment is a sine qua non of human survival. 
Protection of the environment is therefore, axiomatically, to the benefit of future generations. 
This requires no assessment of financial or developmental benefit or other subjective 
consideration. It will also not permit economic conjuring. Simply put, it is objectively and 
universally beneficial to protect the environment i.e. to manage for ecological resilience. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
waters, the continental shelf and the exclusive economic zone of South Africa,’ in the State ‘acting as trustee of 
the whole nation’. 
480
 See fn 317. 
481
 See for instance s 2(4)(o) of NEMA ‘The environment is held in public trust for the people…’; s3(1) of the 
National Water Act, no. 36 of 1998 ‘As the public trustee of the nation's water resources the National 
Government…’; and s 3(1) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act, no. 28 of 2002 ‘Mineral 
and petroleum resources are the common heritage of all the people of South Africa and the State is the 
custodian thereof for the benefit of all South Africans.’ 
482
 Feris, L., ‘The Public Trust Doctrine and Liability for Historic Water Pollution In South Africa’ (2012) 8:1 Law 
of Environment and Development Journal 1 – 18  at 13. 
483
 Murombo, T., ‘From Crude Environmentalism to Sustainable Development: Fuel Retailers’(2008) 125(3) SALJ 
488 – 504 at 496. 
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The State may exercise its mandate as Trustee either as an independent ‘person’ or it may 
do so as the manifestation of the executive will of ‘everyone’. Because the root of the public 
trust doctrine lies in the Roman principle of res communes and not in res publicae the latter 
interpretation is preferred. In which case the actual trustees are ‘everyone’ but for practical 
reasons their will is executed by a democratically elected State (the presence of ‘everyone’ 
in Section 24(b) echoes this conclusion). This latter interpretation seems to accord with the 
Government and ANC Policy positions (as well as the directive principles of the Indian 
Constitution and the public trust doctrine) and if it is accepted would lend support to the 
argument that the positive duty elements of Section 24(b) are borne by everyone and not 
only the State. It has also received judicial approval in the High Court: 
‘The attainment of this [Section 24(a)] objective or imperative confers upon the 
authorities a stewardship, whereby the present generation is constituted as 
the custodian or trustee of the environment for future generations.’484 
A position strongly reinforced by the Constitutional Court in Fuel Retailers: 
‘The importance of the protection of the environment cannot be gainsaid. Its 
protection is vital to the enjoyment of the other rights contained in the Bill of 
Rights; indeed, it is vital to life itself. It must therefore be protected for the 
benefit of the present and future generations. The present generation holds 
the earth in trust for the next generation. This trusteeship position carries with 
it the responsibility to look after the environment. It is the duty of the Court to 
ensure that this responsibility is carried out.’485 
 
Although ‘benefit’ might give Section 24(b) an anthropocentric tone it might, more plausibly, 
instead imply a relationship of trusteeship. If this is the case then any anthropocentric tone 
would be diminished. In the circumstances, ‘benefit’ is insufficient to characterise the whole 
of Section 24(b) as anthropocentric, and it must be regarded as, primarily, an ecocentric 
right. Read with the primarily anthropocentric Section 24(a) the whole of Section 24 can be 
regarded as capturing the spirit of the bicentric cyclical paradoxical human / environmental 
right. 
 
One final aspect of ‘benefit of present … generations’ remains to be dealt with. 
Intragenerational equity has been used as an argument to support the concept of 
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 HTF Developers case at [19]. 
485
 Fuel Retailers case at [102]. 
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‘environmental justice’. Kidd appears prepared to accept ‘that the concept of [environmental] 
justice is concerned with the distribution of benefits and burdens in a society’.486 While 
environmental justice appears to be an accepted concept in the USA where it serves to 
protect ‘minorities and the poor’ its translated content and application in a South African 
context appears to be less certain.487,488 It is not suggested that Section 24(b) imports the 
concept into South African law but rather that it could be used to illuminate the requirement 
that environmental protection is for the benefit of everyone. The blanket requirement that 
‘environmental protection benefits the present generation’ would seem to suggest and, by 
implication, require that the benefits are equally distributed throughout society both now and 
in the future.  
‘Thus, intragenerational equity,…, is concerned with the equitable distribution 
of environmental costs and benefits from developmental activities. In this 
sense intragenerational equity attempts to achieve justice between [persons]. 
In particular, intragenerational equity attempts to achieve justice between rich 
and poor’.489  
This interpretation would accord with the public trust doctrine which, by implication, requires 
the trust ‘capital’ to be fairly used for all the beneficiaries. Conversely, environmental 
protection would impose burdens in the form of constraints upon development. Although 
these are not expressly mentioned; developmental burdens must naturally flow from 
environmental protection and these too need to be fairly and equitably distributed. This is a 





                                                          
486 Kidd, M., ‘Environmental justice - a South African perspective’ ( 1999) Acta Juridica 142 – 162 at 149; for a 
discussion of Environmental Justice in the USA context see Monsma, D., ‘Equal Rights, Governance, and the 
Environment: Integrating Environmental Justice Principles in Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2006) 33 Ecology 
Law Quarterly  443 – 498 at 450 – 472. 
487
 Although it is expressly recognised and provided for s 2(4)(c) of NEMA: ‘Environmental justice must be 
pursued so that adverse environmental impacts shall not be distributed in such a manner as to unfairly 
discriminate against any person, particularly vulnerable and disadvantaged persons.’ 
488
 For example ‘[E] environmental justice is an all-encompassing notion that affirms the use value of life, all 
forms of life, against the interests of wealth, power and technology… In this context, environmental rights are 
tools that can be used to legitimise claims and challenge power relations vis-á-vis government, mining, 
business or industry, or private powerholders; and whether in the form of confrontation, engagement or 
litigation. And environmental justice is a platform that holds the potential to collectively mobilise and vindicate 
unsatisfied social needs.’ Dugard, J. and Alcaro, A., ‘Let’s Work Together: Environmental And Socioeconomic 
Rights In The Courts’ (2013) 29 SAJHR 14 – 32 at 18. 
489 Tladi, D., ‘Intragenerational Equity: A New Name for International Environmental Justice’ (2003) 9 
Fundamina  197 – 204 at 198 footnote omitted. 
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5.8 ‘Pollution’, ‘Ecological Degradation’ and ‘Conservation’ 
 
The grammatical or textual interpretation of the Section 24(b)(i) and Section 24(b)(ii) has 
been given previously. The concept of ecological degradation has also been dealt with and 
pollution is given its widely accepted meaning. 
 
Conservation must, in the context, mean conservation of the environment and its underlying 
ecological processes. Conservation is distinct from preservation. Preservation is used in 
environmental circles to describe protection against change and harm whilst conservation 
implies a positive management function whilst simultaneously protecting the underlying 
resource. Thus conservation does not preclude use and active management but requires 
also preservation of the resource. As such, and in the context of Section 24(b)(ii) it means 
the prudent use of the environment whilst preserving the environment’s integrity. 
 
In this regard conservation can also be applied to non-renewable resources. Although these 
will ultimately be depleted they can be conserved, i.e. made to last longer, with resultant 
slower harm. Conservation can occur both by improving technology e.g., in the case of coal 
used for electricity generation (more efficient generators would consume less coal per unit of 
output) and through better end-user technology as well as more prudent end-user behaviour.  
Better technology and more prudent use would result in less electricity being consumed for 
the same work (e.g. using ‘energy saver’ light bulbs in the place of incandescent light bulbs) 
and a reduction in wasteful use (e.g. leaving lights on unnecessarily), resulting in extended 
duration of coal reserves. Conservation would then also allow the environment longer to 
assimilate the pollution with a possibly less detrimental impact on its ecosystems. The 
private positive duty is clear in this example. 
 
5.9 ‘Ecologically Sustainable Development’  
 
Ecologically sustainable development means that the short term advances secured by 
humankind must not compromise ecological integrity of and thereby be harmful to the 
environment. An assessment of ecological sustainability could only properly be made where 
the dependency of humans on the environment is factored in; ultimately this is an enquiry 
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based on assessing short term gains against long term harm but must be assessed from the 
environment’s perspective as this is where the harm initially manifests itself. The buffering 
effects contemplated in the cyclical paradoxical model of the human environmental 
relationship means that the harm (negative impact) may not be directly and immediately 
transmitted to humankind but rather it will be transmitted to a distant (in either time or space) 
human population. Therefore the impacts must be assessed at the environmental level and 
from the environment’s perspective. An ecocentric interpretation of Section 24(b) and the 
use of ecological resilience seem to be the most appropriate tool for this purpose. 
 
Ecosystems cannot be preserved unchanging, they are dynamic systems in a constant state 
of perpetual flux. Sustaining an ecosystem therefore cannot be equated to preserving an 
ecosystem, rather the underlying ecological processes need to be protected so that the 
ecosystem can remain resilient. Ecologically sustainable development would therefore be 
development which, prior to commencing, recognises the ecological processes and then 
commences in a manner which does not fatally compromise these processes.  
 
In this regard the requirement is that ecological sustainable development is secured. There 
needs to be a reasonable assurance that ecological sustainability will be achieved, it is not 
enough to merely aim for this goal but there must be a reasonable certainty of achievement.       
 
5.10 Ecologically Sustainable ‘Use of Natural Resources’ 
 
In Caring for the Earth sustainable use of resources is described as follows: 
‘Ensure that uses of renewable resources are sustainable. 
Renewable resources include soil, wild and domesticated organisms, forests 
rangelands, cultivated land, and the marine and freshwater ecosystems that 
support fisheries. A use is sustainable if it is within the resource’s capacity for 
renewal. 
Minimize the depletion of non-renewable resources. 
Minerals, oil, gas and coal are effectively non-renewable. Unlike plants, fish or 
soil, they cannot be used sustainably. However, their “life” can be extended, 
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for example, by recycling, by using less of a resource to make a particular 
product, or by switching to renewable substitutes where possible….’490 
These concepts present a number of practical problems when viewed from the perspective 
of Section 24(b)(iii)’s requirement of ‘ecologically sustainable use of natural resources’.  
 
Firstly, over what time period is a resource’s capacity for renewal measured? A possibly 
apocryphal example comes from the story of the white rhino (Ceratotherium simum).  
‘At the end of 1893 a few white rhino were said to inhabit the low, 
inaccessible, tsetse fly haunted country between the lower courses of the 
Black and White Umfolozi rivers in Zululand. Over the rest of Southern Africa 
they were extinct. The long and terrible slaughter was surpassed only by the 
extermination of the bison in North America.’491 
From these approximately 437 last remaining animals492 their former habitats were 
successfully re-populated so that ‘by 1965 the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature was able to declare that the animal had been saved, and it was removed from the 
Class A Protection List.’493 Whilst the exact dates, the surviving numbers and whether or not 
the general extinction was absolute may be questioned: there can be no doubt that the 
approximately 437 animals, through preservation and then conservation allowed the 
resource to renew itself in the years between 1953 when the animals were counted and 
1965. Does the ‘long and terrible slaughter’ constitute sustainable use of a renewable 
resource? Instinctively the answer must be ‘no’ and therefore the question of the time period 
will need to be determined in such a way that the resource numbers remain at a constant 
level rather than experiencing unnatural dramatic fluctuations. The use of the resource 
should approximate the changes in number that would occur in a normally functioning 
ecosystem or which would allow the resource to renew itself within one generation. 
 
With regard to non-renewable resources; can their use ever be sustainable? If ‘sustainable’ 
means to preserve a non-renewable resource in perpetuity then its use can never be 
sustainable.494 If however sustainable means to prolong or extend the use then, conceivably, 
sustainable use of a non-renewable resource is possible. Given the understanding that 
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 Caring for the Earth at pages 9 and 10. 
491
 Player, I., The White Rhino Saga (1972) Collins, London at page 33. 
492
 These animals were counted by aerial survey in 1953. Player, I. The White Rhino Saga (1972) Collins, London 
at page 37. 
493
 Player, I., The White Rhino Saga (1972) Collins, London at page 15. 
494
 Philosophically one could argue that a resource which is not used ceases to be a resource and therefore 
that perpetual preservation of resource is logically impossible. 
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neither the environment nor its underlying ecological processes can be preserved, 
unchanging in perpetuity; using sustainability to mean prolong rather than only maintain is 
permissible. Time is an environmental resource as much as space is. 
 
Use of a resource (renewable or non-renewable) must also be interpreted from the 
environment’s perspective. Whilst harvesting a renewable resource might be conducted in a 
manner which allows that resource to renew itself; its depletion, albeit temporary, will have a 
knock on effect on other ecological processes within the environment. Similarly the use of a 
non-renewable resource, which will ultimately lead to the depletion of the resource, must be 
assessed from the perspective of the impact of the use on the environment. The use of a 
resource in a manner which compromises the environment’s integrity and which 
compromises the underlying ecological processes renders the use of that resource 
ecologically unsustainable and would thus be prohibited.  In assessing the ecological 
sustainability (or not) of resource use the use must be assessed from the perspective of the 
resource and also from the perspective of the environment. By implication therefore Section 
24(b) must be ecocentric to achieve its purpose. 
 
The concept of Sustainable Development suffers from a lack of focus. In the Pulp Mills Case, 
the ICJ had formulated an earlier order relating to the dispute: 
‘that such use should allow for sustainable development which takes account 
of “the need to safeguard the continued conservation of the river environment 
and the rights of economic development of the riparian States”’495  
 
It would appear that the one party to the dispute, Argentina, had interpreted this requirement 
‘to allow for Sustainable Development’ to mean that ‘principles of international law ensuring 
protection of the environment. …, the principles of sustainable development, prevention, 
precaution and the need to carry out an environmental impact assessment’ should be 
applied to the project.496 Conversely Uruguay (as the other party) argued that the project 
was necessary to its Sustainable Development as a state and therefore the issue had to be 
seen, not at a project level, but at the state level.497 By focussing the requirement at an 
ecological level, as Section 24(b)(iii) appears to have done, this confusion is resolved. 
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 Pulp Mills Case at [75] footnotes omitted. 
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 Pulp Mills Case at [55]. 
497
 Pulp Mills Case at [152]. 
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In assessing the ecological sustainability of a development the sustainability of the 
development needs to be assessed in its own right and from the perspective of the receiving 
environment. It would seem that the assessment of the use or development per se would 
conform to the principles of Sustainable Development while the impact on the environment 
would necessitate an application of Sustainability principles. 
 
5.11 ‘Justifiable Economic and Social Development’ 
 
 
The grammatical interpretation of Section 24(b)(iii) used prefers the separation of justifiable 
economic development from justifiable social development. (Although as noted ‘socio-
economic’ has become an accepted term and the two could be conjoined). The separation is 
also preferable from a contextual perspective based on the three pillar concept of 
Sustainable Development and, most importantly, from a purposive South African 
perspective. 
 
The three pillar concept addresses the historical position where economic development (i.e. 
built infrastructure and accumulated monetary wealth) has not always improved the lives of 
the general human population. The advancement of economic development which did not 
confer a simultaneous social benefit is regarded as being unbalanced and therefore the 
economic development would be unsustainable and contrary to the concept of Sustainable 
Development. It is important to bear the distinction between economic development on the 
one hand and social development on the other in mind when interpreting Section 24(b)(iii) as 
the two are not synonymous.  
 
In a South African context social development is critical. As a consequence of its colonial 
and apartheid history South Africa is a country of extreme social injustice. Quoting figures 
from 1994 (the official end of the apartheid state) Kidd paints a grim picture of both an 
absolute lack of social development as well as its gross racial bias.498 Categories listed by 
Kidd include unemployment, electrification, potable water, infant mortality, sanitation and 
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 Kidd, M., ‘Environmental justice - a South African perspective’ ( 1999) Acta Juridica 142 – 162 at 149 – 151. 
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housing. The Constitution has been regarded as being instrumental in addressing this social 
and economic inequality: 
'We live in a society in which there are great disparities in wealth. Millions of 
people are living in deplorable conditions and in great poverty. There is a high 
level of unemployment, inadequate social security, and many do not have 
access to clean water or to adequate health services. These conditions 
already existed when the Constitution was adopted and a commitment to 
address them, and to transform our society into one in which there will be 
human dignity, freedom and equality, lies at the heart of our new constitutional 
order. For as long as these conditions continue to exist that aspiration will 
have a hollow ring.'499 
 
Table One records census data relating to various social development criteria. It must be 
noted that, in the context of South Africa’s history, there is considerable variation between 
racial groupings and this variation is not reflected in Table One. Whilst commendable effort 
by government has addressed many social development issues there remains considerable 
work to be done. Key aspects which appear from Table One include the fact that 8.6% of the 
population have absolutely no formal education and that only 28.9% have completed formal 
schooling, almost 70% of South Arica’s population have dropped out of the school system 
before completing their schooling. Almost 20% of all households had no access500 to piped 
water in 1996 and in 2011 there were still almost 9% of households without any access to 
piped water and 5.2% of households have no toilets. Infant mortality is high and nearly 65% 
of households have no access to the internet. Social development, despite some 17 years 
remedial effort (between 1994 and 2011), remains of paramount importance as an absolute 
requirement and there is also an urgent need to redress its racial bias. 
 
In addition to the need for social development outlined above there is a concomitant need for 
economic development. Economic development is a sine qua non of social development 
(environmental protection is a sine qua non of social existence). Unemployment, whilst listed 
as a social inequality, is also an economic inequality. Without economic development 
unemployment will not be reduced. The world’s highest GINI Index value of 63.1 points to a 
gross inequality in economic development between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots’. South 
Africa is not a poor country.  
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 Soobramoney v Minister of Health, Kwazulu-Natal 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) at [8]. 
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Table One: Census Data  
Comparison of the three official post democracy censuses (1996, 2001 and 2011) together with the results of a 
‘Community Survey’ in 2007 which cannot be regarded as an official census. ‘-‘ indicates that data are lacking. 
All figures are taken from Statistics South Africa Census 2011. 
*The actual figure of ZAR 48,385 has been adjusted for 77.5% cumulative inflation (see Census 2011 page 41). 
**Categories have been combined. 
***Total number of deaths as a percentage of total mortality less mortality in unspecified age classes. 
  
Category 1996 2001 CS 2007 2011 
Total Population 40,583,573 44,819,778 48,502,059 51,770,560 
Percentage of school going population (5-24yrs 
old) in pre-school 
- 4.2% - 0.9% 
Percentage of school going population (5-24yrs 
old) in school 
- 91.7% - 93.0% 
Percentage of school going population (5-24yrs 
old) in College 
- 1.4% - 2.6% 
Percentage of school going population (5-24yrs 
old) in University or Technicon  
- 2.3% - 3.0% 
Percentage of Population aged 20 yrs + with no 
schooling 
19.1% 17.9% - 8.6% 
Percentage of Population aged 20 yrs + 
completed primary schooling 
7.4% 6.4% - 4.6% 
Percentage of Population aged 20 yrs + 
completed high schooling 
16.3% 20.4% - 28.9% 
Percentage of Population aged 20 yrs + 
completed higher education 
7.1% 8.4% - 11.8% 
Average annual household income - ZAR 85,883* - ZAR 103,204 
Households in Formal Dwellings 65.1% 68.7% 70.6% 77.6% 
Households in Traditional Dwellings 18.3% 14.8% 11.7% 7.9% 
Households in informal or other dwellings** 16.6% 16.7% 17.7% 14.5% 
Households with own piped water 60.8% 62.3% 69.4% 73.4% 
Households with other access to piped water 19.6% 22.7% 19.2% 11.4% 
Households with no access to piped water 19.7% 15.0% 11.4% 8.8% 
Households with flushing toilets** - 51.9% 57.8% 60.1% 
Households with other toilets** - 34.5% 29.9% 32.7% 
Households with no toilets - 1.6% 8.3% 5.2% 
Households with electrical lighting 58.2% 69.7% 80.1% 84.7% 
Households with electricity for cooking 47.5% 52.2% 66.4% 73.9% 
Households with electricity for heating 46.3% 49.9% 58.7% 58.8% 
Households with Municipal refuse collection 54.3% 57.2% 61.6% 63.6% 
Households with access to refuse dump** 35.8% 34.3% 31% 30.1% 
Households with no refuse disposal  9.7% 8.5% 7.1% 5.4% 
Households with own personal computer - 8.5% 15.6% 21.4% 
Households with home access to internet** - - - 24.9% 
Households with no access to internet - - - 64.8% 
Mortality*** ≤ 4 yrs old** (5 yrs) - - - 12.0% 
Mortality*** 5 - 19 yrs old** (15 yrs) - - - 4.0% 
Mortality*** 20 - 34 yrs old** (15 yrs) - - - 19.0% 
Mortality*** 35 - 64 yrs old** (30 yrs) - - - 40.7% 
Mortality*** ≥ 65 yrs old** (35+ yrs) - - - 24.2% 
Employment (Labour absorption) rate Males - - - 46.0% 
Employment (Labour absorption) rate Females - - - 33.6% 
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The World Bank’s listing of national GDP values as at 2012 places South Africa in 29th 
position out of a total of 189 nations.501 The World Bank has produced a second measure 
which is the Total Wealth502 of nations. This places South Africa, as at 2005, in the upper 
half of the ‘upper middle income’ band of nations, a position it held in 1995 too. This would 
suggest that real, per capita, development has not occurred at a particularly impressive rate. 
As Total Wealth measures traditional wealth measures and natural capital; given the 
advances made in social development the fact that South Africa’s Total Wealth has 
remained relatively flat503 might suggest that economic development has occurred at the 
expense of natural capital depletion and that these have balanced each other out. The high 
GINI Index is especially concerning as it indicates that the economic development which has 
occurred has not been translated into broad social development because wealth has 
accumulated in an unbalanced manner. This disjuncture alone points to the need to regard 
economic development separately from social development. In a South African context these 
are truly two separate legs of the cooking pot and must, in interpreting Section 24(b)(iii) be 
dealt with as such. 
 
In applying Section 24(b)(iii) ecologically sustainable development has to be ‘secured’ in 
order to protect the environment. The incorporation of the directive ‘secured’ suggests a 
peremptory instruction which requires achievement and not merely a best effort. This 
directive though may be limited by the proviso, the directive to promote justifiable 
development. The word ‘promote’ imparts a positive obligation and thus twin, seemingly, 
opposing imperatives are created; the peremptory directives to secure ecological sustainable 
development whilst promoting justifiable development. It is submitted that the securing of 
ecologically sustainable development is an absolute requirement and that the duty to 
promote justifiable development is secondary to this requirement. The ordering of the two 
directives supports this interpretation, ecologically sustainable development must be secured 
while promoting justifiable developments and not vice versa.  
 
What would constitute ‘justifiable’ in this regard? There is a clear need for both economic 
development and, especially, social development in South Africa. (Both types of 
                                                          
501 World Development Indicators database, World Bank, 7 May 2014 accessed on 24 May 2014 through 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GDP.pdf  . 
502 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank, The changing wealth of 
nations: measuring sustainable development in the new millennium. (2011) The World Bank, Washington DC 
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 See fn 501 at 167. 
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development require resource use to some extent and therefore, in this part development is 
used to indicate both development and / or use). Development could potentially be divided 
into two types, the first would benefit a wide sector of society and would not contribute to 
widening wealth divide (i.e. not increase the GINI Index) while providing necessary social 
upliftment or betterment. The second might or might not be geared to social betterment but it 
would, ultimately, not qualify as being justified as the nett result would either be ecologically 
unsustainable and / or would not meet the twin requirements of economic and social 
betterment. It would be impossible to canvass the full range of possibilities here.  
 
One point to consider in any application of this provision to the facts of a matter is that 
economic measures, such as the valuation of ecosystem goods and services or the 
valuation of natural capital, translate environmental components into monetary terms. While 
these are useful comparative tools it must be remembered that in doing this the intrinsic, 
non-anthropocentric, values of the environment (and its ecosystems) are ignored. The 
concern is that there could be a monetary trade-off. Trade-offs in environmental services are 
difficult to evaluate as they require a projection of future needs and resources.504 This would 
not constitute ‘justifiable’ as the fundamental requirement is to secure ecologically 
sustainable development and not to achieve a possible trade-off or monetary balancing of 
the books. The use of ‘justifiable’ should not be regarded as a licence to sacrifice the 
environment in the pursuit of development. Instead it should probably be regarded as 
excluding frivolous, unnecessary, undesirable or purely profit orientated development. Most 
importantly though; promotion of justifiable economic development requires that the 
development is ecologically compatible or ecologically appropriate and that it results in a 
social benefit too. South Africa’s need for economic and social development should not 
override the focus of Section 24(b)(iii) which is to secure ecologically sustainable 
development (or use of resources) and is not to promote development as such. It may be 
possible to categorise Section 24(b)(iii) as integrating development into environmental 
protection rather than the Sustainable Development integration of environmental concern 
into pro-development objectives.  
 
Whilst ecosystem goods and services valuations should not be used as a basis for 
assessing ‘justifiable economic development’ they do have an import in addition to their use 
as a comparative measure. The growing acknowledgment that natural capital constitutes an 
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 See for instance Carpenter, S. R., Bennett, E. M. and Peterson. G. D., ‘Scenarios for ecosystem services: an 
overview.’ (2006) 11(1) Ecology and Society 29 – 38.  
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element of the economy means that economic development is not automatically antagonistic 
to environmental protection. Environmental protection, insofar as it increases or preserves 
natural capital, is economic development. Enhanced ecological resilience will lead to 
enhanced ecosystem goods and services and therefore environmental protection as 
contemplated here is a form of economic development. (Similarly it is also a form of social 
development although possibly the social benefits accrue not only from ecosystem services 
(e.g. recreation, health benefits etc.) but also from the intrinsic intangible environmental 
elements (e.g. a sense of belonging, spiritual well-being etc.).  
 
The relationship between poverty and the environment is intricate. Poverty and ecological 
degradation are often associated with each other but it must be noted that ‘the growth of 
human, social, and manufactured capital can degrade natural capital and ecosystem 
services.’505 It appears to be accepted practice that natural capital is surrendered to achieve 
economic growth and that, when economic growth has be assured, the harm can be 
remedied. This approach has rightly been condemned by du Plessis in discussing poverty 
alleviation. The author emphatically states that: 
‘This approach is unsound, illogical and 'potentially dangerous in policy terms'. 
It does injustice to the severity of the long-term impact of poor environmental 
quality on the lives of people, it disregards the irreversibility of some forms of 
environmental harm and it does not recognise the consequences that 
cumulative environmental impacts may have on people's health and well-
being’.506 
This approach treats natural capital as though it were financial capital and  
‘that by treating the environment like any other commodity, it fails to take into 
account the unique aspects of the environment. The cumulative and 
synergistic nature of the impact of human activity on ecological support 
systems and biodiversity is inconsistent with the marginal analysis employed 
in the neoclassical microeconomic model and the assumption of divisibility. 
The public goods represented by the environment are not readily reduced to 
private ownership through which the general equilibrium of the market could 
assure allocative efficiency. Natural capital, once spent, cannot necessarily be 
replaced, for many environmental impacts are irreversible.’507 
 
                                                          
505
 Carpenter, S. R., Bennett, E. M. and Peterson. G. D., ‘Scenarios for ecosystem services: an overview.’ (2006) 
11(1) Ecology and Society 29 - 38 at 35. 
506
 Du Plessis, A., ‘South Africa's Constitutional Environmental Right (Generously) Interpreted: What is in it for 
Poverty?’ (2011) 27 SAJHR 279 – 307 at 286 footnote omitted. 
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 Smith, S. L., ‘Ecologically Sustainable Development: Integrating Economics, Ecology, and Law’ (1995) 31:2 
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5.12 Section 24 Interpreted 
 
Section 24(b) is to be interpreted as a fundamental right imposing both negative and positive 
obligations on everyone. The positive duties apply horizontally subject to an element of 
proportionality and reasonableness. Section 24(b) is ecocentric and has as its purpose the 
protection of the environment through preventing pollution, preventing ecological 
degradation and promoting conservation of the environment. Section 24(b)(iii) requires that, 
in addition to the positive duties imposed by (i) and (ii) development and the use of natural 
resources must be ecologically sustainable i.e. ecologically compatible. This compatibility 
extends to both the development and the use. Only ecologically compatible development is 
to be promoted in terms of Section 24(b)(iii). As such Section 24(b)(iii) is not a 
developmental right, it is an environmental protection right. Its wording is ‘carefully phrased 
and counterpoised’508 and is not ‘simply the result of clumsy drafting’509 as feared.  
 
The overall purpose of Section 24(b) is to protect the environment now and in the long term. 
Its ecocentric focus distinguishes it from Section 24(a) which is anthropocentric and protects 
humans from their environment. Section 24(b) protects the environment from humans and 
this fits into the bicentric cyclical paradoxical model proposed previously. In this way each is 
a side of the same coin. Furthermore this interpretation is in keeping with the apparent 
purpose of Section 24 as deduced from the contextual concepts of Sustainable 
Development, Sustainability and the presumed intention of the drafters. 
 
South African environmental laws are fragmented between spheres of government, across 
subject matter and across institutions.510 Having a single environmental right would act as a 
touchstone allowing the range of role players to apply the various pieces of legislation and to 
ensure that the objectives of the laws are met. By making this right an objective 
environmental right there is less chance of subjective factors weakening its purpose. 
   
                                                          
508
 See fn 307 above. 
509
 See fn 11 above. 
510 This aspect is discussed by Kotzé, L. J., ‘Improving Unsustainable Environmental Governance in South Africa: 
The Case for Holistic Governance’ (2006) 9 PELJ / PER 1 – 44. 
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Section 24 as a whole can be regarded as an example of the bicentric environmental right. 
Section 24(b) protects the environment from humans. Section 24(a) protects humans from 
the environment. Together they provide for a bicentric environmental right. With reference to 
Section 24(a) it must be noted that the protection of humans from their environment will not 
be limited to buffering the negative consequences of a lack of environmental protection. The 
cyclical paradox regards humans, at one level, as being components of the ecosystem. As 
such humans are merely one of the animal species making up an ecosystem. This would 
mean that humans are also vulnerable to purely natural environmental dangers. These 
dangers may be especially acute in the South African context, and would include: predation 
(e.g. by lions, leopards, hyenas, crocodiles and sharks), poisoning (e.g. snake bites, 
poisonous plants and fungi), food conflicts (e.g. elephant and large herbivore damage of 
crops, other herbivore competition and stock losses to predation), animal confrontations (e.g. 
elephants, hippopotami, buffalo and other large animals can cause non predation death), 
vector borne diseases (e.g. rabies, malaria, sleeping sickness (nagana), bilharzia and 
anthrax) and natural disasters (e.g. floods and droughts). All of these dangers occur 
naturally in the environment and humans, in terms of Section 24(a), have a fundamental 
right not to be harmed by them. The negative nature of Section 24(a) means that the State 
must not aggravate or exacerbate these risks but is not under a general positive duty to 
remove the risks. However other positive developmental rights might impose a positive duty 
in this regard. Development which aggravates these dangers would presumably be contrary 
to Section 24(a) and environmentally harmful measures to avert these dangers would 
conflict with Section 24(b), a truly paradoxical situation requiring development to tread a 
narrow path between the two. Finally, Section 24(b) cannot, in this context, be assumed to 
‘give content to the entrenched right envisaged’511 in Section 24(a). A truly healthy natural 
environment would pose significant natural threats to human health and well-being.   
 
One final point to consider in reaching the conclusion that Section 24(b) is an environmental 
protection right and not a Sustainable Development right flows from an assessment of the 
primary principle of Sustainable Development and the nature of the Bill of Rights as a whole. 
Sustainable Development is unashamedly anthropocentric in nature and, strictly speaking, is 
a developmental right. The primary principle of Sustainable Development is the integration 
principle. This has been recognised as an emergent or possibly fully-fledged international 
legal principle, it has also been recognised as having legal status in South African municipal 
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law by virtue of its international status512 and by virtue of its inclusion in national 
legislation.513 The integration principle can be regarded as promoting economic (monetary 
wealth) development but requiring that environmental (and social) factors be considered in 
the pursuit of monetary wealth. In this regard the environmental impact assessment 
mechanisms set out in NEMA confirm this; in conducting an assessment ‘of the potential 
consequences or impacts of activities on the environment [procedures] must include, with 
respect to every application for an environmental authorisation and where applicable, 
investigation of mitigation measures to keep adverse consequences or impacts to a 
minimum’.514  
 
If it is accepted that Section 24(b) is a purely ecocentric right (and Section 24 as a whole is 
an environmental and not a developmental right) how then can Sustainable Development be 
Constitutionally permissible? The Bill of Rights contains 27 substantive human rights 
including Section 24. These 26 other rights are all anthropocentric and most, if not all, of 
them can be used as a basis for economic and / or social development. Whilst it may be 
possible to use some of these other rights for purposes of environmental protection515 Baresi 
posits that there are ‘hazards [in] seeking to achieve environmental sustainability using 
substantive rights guarantees that are not explicitly environmental.'516 Whilst other rights 
inherently promote social and economic development there is only one substantive right 
explicitly protecting the environment. 
 
A number of other rights in the Bill of Rights immediately come to mind and could, 
legitimately and without unduly stretching the bounds of interpretation, be used to foster both 
                                                          
512
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social and economic development. These include: the socio-economic rights to housing, 
health care, water services, freedom of trade and education; and the first generation rights of 
life, equality, human dignity and children’s rights. The Constitution takes development further 
however. Section 152 states that one of the objects of local government is ‘to promote social 
and economic development’ (note the omission of ecologically justifiable requirement of 
Section 24(b)(iii)) and this object is given peremptory weight by Section 153 which insists 
that: 
‘A municipality must- 
(a) structure and manage its administration and budgeting and planning 
processes to give priority to the basic needs of the community, and to 
promote the social and economic development of the community; and 
 (b) participate in national and provincial development programmes.’ 
In turn provincial government must assist local government in achieving their functions 
(which must include the development objectives).517 All public administration (which applies 
to the administration of all spheres of government (i.e. National, Provincial and Local), all 
organs of State and all public enterprises)518 in South Africa is governed by a number of 
principles including that: ‘Public administration must be development-oriented.’519 
 
To couch Section 24, or Section 24(b), or even Section 24(b)(iii) as a Sustainable 
Development right would be an exercise in redundancy and the only tangible result would be 
to lose an environmental right. The objectives of Sustainable Development can be met 
without an explicit right; through the integration of an environmental right into the matrix of 
socio-economic and human developmental rights as well as the developmental policy 
directives contained elsewhere in the Constitution. The need for social and economic 
development is neither disputed nor denied but this need is amply provided for. Two of the 
three Sustainable Development pillars are well catered for. The third is universally regarded 
as being necessary and this is environmental protection. The objective of environmental 
protection cannot be met without an explicit ecocentric environmental right and therefore 
Section 24(b)(iii) would lose its purpose if regarded as a recordal of Sustainable 
Development. But the objectives of Sustainable Development (if that was indeed the goal) 
could still be met by a purely environmental Section 24 with its ecocentric Section 24(b). 
Section 24(b) and in particular Section 24(b)(iii) is not a recordal of Sustainable 
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Development. Rather, the concept of Sustainable Development can be achieved using the 
whole Constitution, Section 24(b) is the sole true environmental protection right in the 
Constitution, it is, together with Section 24(a) the third pillar. 
 
Part Six: Conclusion 
 
Section 24 of the Constitution has been interpreted in a textual (grammatical)520, 
contextual521 and purposive522 manner and found to encapsulate both an anthropocentric 
right in Section 24(a) and an ecocentric right in Section 24(b). As such it seems to be best 
described as a bicentric right.523 A novel description proposed in this dissertation. 
 
Section 24(b) differs from South African socio-economic rights and probably should not be 
regarded as being a socio-economic right. In lacking a progressive element and a State 
directive it has been argued that it is an immediately justiciable right and that it is capable of 
vertical and horizontal application. These are features not apparent in socio-economic rights. 
Common-law principles exist as a foundation to accommodate this interpretation and can be 
developed in due course.524 
 
Section 24(b) was found to be a gateway for the introduction of; a true ecocentric right, the 
public trust doctrine and ecological resilience into South African law.525 The National 
Environmental Management Act, no. 107 of 1998 was found to be the source of many of the 
principles underpinning Sustainable Development in the South African context.526 
 
In contrasting Section 24(b) to Sustainable Development the concept of Sustainable 
Development was examined as a basis for a legal right and as a basis for law. Sustainable 
Development was found to lack a precise meaning and is rejected as a basis for either a 
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521
 See section 4 of this dissertation. 
522
 See section 5 of this dissertation. 
523
 See section 4.2 of this dissertation. 
524
 This was discussed in section 5 and in particular 5.2. 
525
 This was discussed in section 5 and in particular 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.9. 
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right or law. At best it is a procedural principle or goal directing an integration of social 
development and environmental protection considerations into its primary, economic, 
development objective.527 This requires a subjective assessment which is problematic as a 
legal doctrine. Section 24 was found to be an environmental right and therefore not a 
formulation of Sustainable Development. Instead Section 24 can be used as the 
environmental leg in achieving Sustainable Development and through ecological resilience, 
provides an objective means to assess the sustainability of any proposed activity.528 
 
The purpose of Section 24 can be achieved by using ecological resilience to measure and 
assess environmental protection. The balancing mechanism inherent in the Constitution 
together with its social development and economic development rights and directives can be 
balanced against the environmental right that is Section 24. This balancing act can be used 
to achieve the desired result, either pro-developmental Sustainable Development or the 
more environmentally sound Sustainability. It is this balancing mechanism which will allow 
South Africa to best address the social development imperatives it faces whilst allowing it to 
shift focus as and when appropriate.529 
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